<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> <!DOCTYPE rfc [ <!ENTITY nbsp " "> <!ENTITY zwsp "​"> <!ENTITY nbhy "‑"> <!ENTITY wj "⁠"> ]> <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?> <!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.29 (Ruby3.4.4)2.5.9) --> <rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-tls-esni-25" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" number="9849" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3"> <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion3.28.13.31.0 --> <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni-25" rel="prev"/> <front> <title abbrev="TLS Encrypted Client Hello">TLS Encrypted Client Hello</title> <seriesInfoname="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-esni-25"/>name="RFC" value="9849"/> <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla"><organization>Independent</organization><organization>Knight-Georgetown Institute</organization> <address> <email>ekr@rtfm.com</email> </address> </author> <author initials="K." surname="Oku" fullname="Kazuho Oku"> <organization>Fastly</organization> <address> <email>kazuhooku@gmail.com</email> </address> </author> <author initials="N." surname="Sullivan" fullname="Nick Sullivan"> <organization>Cryptography Consulting LLC</organization> <address> <email>nicholas.sullivan+ietf@gmail.com</email> </address> </author> <author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood"> <organization>Cloudflare</organization> <address> <email>caw@heapingbits.net</email> </address> </author> <date year="2025"month="June" day="14"/>month="December"/> <area>SEC</area> <workgroup>tls</workgroup><keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword><abstract> <?line67?>108?> <!-- [rfced] References a) Regarding [WHATWG-IPV4], this reference's date is May 2021. The URL provided resolves to a page with "Last Updated 12 May 2025". Note that WHATWG provides "commit snapshots" of their living standards and there are several commit snapshots from May 2021 with the latest being from 20 May 2021. For example: 20 May 2021 (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/commit-snapshots/1b8b8c55eb4bed9f139c9a439fb1c1bf5566b619/#concept-ipv4-parser) We recommend updating this reference to the most current version of the WHATWG Living Standard, replacing the URL with the more general URL to the standard (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/), and adding a "commit snapshot" URL to the reference. Current: [WHATWG-IPV4] WHATWG, "URL - IPv4 Parser", WHATWG Living Standard, May 2021, <https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-ipv4-parser>. EKR: Per MT, WHATWG has asked us not to do that. We should leave this as-is and change the date to December 2025. d) FYI, RFCYYY1 (draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech) will be updated during the XML stage. OK. --> <!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in the title) for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search. --> <t>This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encrypting aClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> message under a server public key.</t> </abstract><note removeInRFC="true"> <name>Discussion Venues</name> <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <eref target="https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</eref>.</t> </note></front> <middle> <?line72?>145?> <section anchor="intro"> <name>Introduction</name> <t>Although TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/> encrypts most of the handshake, including the server certificate, there are several ways in which an on-path attacker can learn private information about the connection. The plaintext Server Name Indication (SNI) extension inClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> messages, which leaks the target domain for a given connection, is perhaps the most sensitive information left unencrypted in TLS 1.3.</t> <t>This document specifies a new TLSextension,extension called Encrypted Client Hello(ECH),(ECH) that allows clients to encrypt theirClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> to the TLS server. This protects the SNI and other potentially sensitive fields, such as theApplication LayerApplication-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) list <xref target="RFC7301"/>. Co-located servers with consistent externally visible TLS configurations and behavior, including supported versions and cipher suites and how they respond to incoming client connections, form an anonymity set. (Note that implementation-specific choices, such as extension ordering within TLS messages or division of data into record-layer boundaries, can result in different externally visible behavior, even for servers with consistent TLS configurations.) Usage of this mechanism reveals that a client is connecting to a particular service provider, but does not reveal which server from the anonymity set terminates the connection. Deployment implications of this feature are discussed in <xref target="deployment"/>.</t> <t>ECH is not in itself sufficient to protect the identity of the server. The target domain may also be visible through other channels, such as plaintext client DNS queries or visible server IP addresses. However, encrypted DNS mechanisms such as DNS over HTTPS <xref target="RFC8484"/>, DNS over TLS/DTLS <xref target="RFC7858"/> <xref target="RFC8094"/>, and DNS over QUIC <xref target="RFC9250"/> provide mechanisms for clients to conceal DNS lookups from network inspection, and many TLS servers host multiple domains on the same IP address. Private origins may also be deployed behind a common provider, such as a reverse proxy. In such environments, the SNI remains the primary explicit signal available to observers to determine the server's identity.</t> <t>ECH is supported in TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/>, DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/>, and newer versions of the TLS and DTLS protocols.</t> </section> <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"> <name>Conventions and Definitions</name> <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. All TLS notation comes from <xref section="3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="overview"> <name>Overview</name> <t>This protocol is designed to operate in one of two topologies illustrated below, which we call "Shared Mode" and "Split Mode". These modes are described in the following section.</t> <section anchor="topologies"> <name>Topologies</name> <figure anchor="shared-mode"> <name>Shared Mode Topology</name> <artwork><![CDATA[ +---------------------+ | | | 2001:DB8::1111 | | | Client <-----> | private.example.org | | | | public.example.com | | | +---------------------+ Server (Client-Facing and Backend Combined) ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>InShared Mode,shared mode, the provider is the origin server for all the domains whose DNS records point to it. In this mode, the TLS connection is terminated by the provider.</t> <figure anchor="split-mode"> <name>Split Mode Topology</name> <artwork><![CDATA[ +--------------------+ +---------------------+ | | | | | 2001:DB8::1111 | | 2001:DB8::EEEE | Client <----------------------------->| | | public.example.com | | private.example.org | | | | | +--------------------+ +---------------------+ Client-Facing Server Backend Server ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>InSplit Mode,split mode, the provider is not the origin server for private domains. Rather, the DNS records for private domains point to the provider, and the provider's server relays the connection back to the origin server, who terminates the TLS connection with the client. Importantly, the service provider does not have access to the plaintext of the connection beyond the unencrypted portions of the handshake.</t> <t>In the remainder of this document, we will refer to the ECH-service provider as the "client-facing server" and to the TLS terminator as the "backend server". These are the same entity inShared Mode,shared mode, but inSplit Mode,split mode, the client-facing and backend servers are physically separated.</t> <t>See <xref target="security-considerations"/> for more discussion about the ECH threat model and how it relates to the client, client-facing server, and backend server.</t> </section> <section anchor="encrypted-clienthello-ech"> <name>Encrypted ClientHello (ECH)</name> <t>A client-facing server enables ECH by publishing an ECH configuration, which is an encryption public key and associated metadata. Domains which wish to use ECH must publish this configuration, using the key associated with the client-facing server. This document defines the ECH configuration's format, but delegates DNS publication details to <xref target="RFC9460"/>. See <xreftarget="ECH-IN-DNS"/>target="RFCYYY1"/> for specifics about how ECH configurations are advertised in SVCB and HTTPS records. Other delivery mechanisms are also possible. For example, the client may have the ECH configuration preconfigured.</t> <t>When a client wants to establish a TLS session with some backend server, it constructs a privateClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, referred to as theClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. The client then constructs a publicClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, referred to as theClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. TheClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> contains innocuous values for sensitive extensions and an "encrypted_client_hello" extension (<xref target="encrypted-client-hello"/>), which carries the encryptedClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. Finally, the client sendsClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to the server.</t> <t>The server takes one of the following actions:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>If it does not support ECH or cannot decrypt the extension, it completes the handshake withClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. This is referred to as rejecting ECH.</t> </li> <li> <t>If it successfully decrypts the extension, it forwards theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> to the backend server, which completes the handshake. This is referred to as accepting ECH.</t> </li> </ol> <t>Upon receiving the server's response, the client determines whether or not ECH was accepted (<xref target="determining-ech-acceptance"/>) and proceeds with the handshake accordingly. When ECH is rejected, the resulting connection is not usable by the client for application data. Instead, ECH rejection allows the client to retry with up-to-date configuration (<xref target="rejected-ech"/>).</t> <t>The primary goal of ECH is to ensure that connections to servers in the same anonymity set are indistinguishable from one another. Moreover, it should achieve this goal without affecting any existing security properties of TLS 1.3. See <xref target="goals"/> for more details about the ECH security and privacy goals.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="ech-configuration"> <name>Encrypted ClientHello Configuration</name> <t>ECH usesHPKEHybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) for public key encryption <xreftarget="HPKE"/>.target="RFC9180"/>. The ECH configuration is defined by the following <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure.</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ opaque HpkePublicKey<1..2^16-1>; uint16 HpkeKemId; // Defined inRFC9180RFC 9180 uint16 HpkeKdfId; // Defined inRFC9180RFC 9180 uint16 HpkeAeadId; // Defined inRFC9180RFC 9180 uint16 ECHConfigExtensionType; // Defined in Section 11.3 struct { HpkeKdfId kdf_id; HpkeAeadId aead_id; } HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite; struct { uint8 config_id; HpkeKemId kem_id; HpkePublicKey public_key; HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suites<4..2^16-4>; } HpkeKeyConfig; struct { ECHConfigExtensionType type; opaque data<0..2^16-1>; } ECHConfigExtension; struct { HpkeKeyConfig key_config; uint8 maximum_name_length; opaque public_name<1..255>; ECHConfigExtension extensions<0..2^16-1>; } ECHConfigContents; struct { uint16 version; uint16 length; select (ECHConfig.version) { case 0xfe0d: ECHConfigContents contents; } } ECHConfig; ]]></artwork> <t>The structure contains the following fields:</t> <dl><dt>version</dt><dt>version:</dt> <dd> <t>The version of ECH for which this configuration is used. The version is the same as the code point for the "encrypted_client_hello" extension. Clients MUST ignore any <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure with a version they do not support.</t> </dd><dt>length</dt><dt>length:</dt> <dd> <t>The length, in bytes, of the next field. This length field allows implementations to skip over the elements in such a list where they cannot parse the specific version ofECHConfig.</t><tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t> </dd><dt>contents</dt><dt>contents:</dt> <dd> <t>An opaque byte string whose contents depend on the version. For this specification, the contents are an <tt>ECHConfigContents</tt> structure.</t> </dd> </dl> <t>The <tt>ECHConfigContents</tt> structure contains the following fields:</t> <dl><dt>key_config</dt><dt>key_config:</dt> <dd> <t>A <tt>HpkeKeyConfig</tt> structure carrying the configuration information associated with the HPKE public key (an "ECH key"). Note that this structure contains the <tt>config_id</tt> field, which applies to the entireECHConfigContents.</t><tt>ECHConfigContents</tt>.</t> </dd><dt>maximum_name_length</dt><dt><tt>maximum_name_length</tt>:</dt> <dd> <t>The longest name of a backend server, if known. If not known, this value can be set to zero. It is used to compute padding (<xref target="padding"/>) and does not constrain server name lengths. Names may exceed this length if, e.g., the server uses wildcard names or added new names to the anonymity set.</t> </dd><dt>public_name</dt><dt>public_name:</dt> <dd> <t>The DNS name of the client-facing server, i.e., the entity trusted to update the ECH configuration. This is used to correct misconfigured clients, as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t> </dd> <dt/> <dd> <t>See <xref target="auth-public-name"/> for how the client interprets and validates the public_name.</t> </dd><dt>extensions</dt><dt>extensions:</dt> <dd> <t>A list of ECHConfigExtension values that the client must take into consideration when generating aClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> message. Each ECHConfigExtension has a 2-octet type and opaque data value, where the data value is encoded with a 2-octet integer representing the length of the data, in network byte order. ECHConfigExtension values are described below (<xref target="config-extensions"/>).</t> </dd> </dl> <t>The <tt>HpkeKeyConfig</tt> structure contains the following fields:</t> <dl><dt>config_id</dt><dt><tt>config_id</tt>:</dt> <dd> <t>A one-byte identifier for the given HPKE key configuration. This is used by clients to indicate the key used forClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> encryption. <xref target="config-ids"/> describes how client-facing servers allocate this value.</t> </dd><dt>kem_id</dt><dt>kem_id:</dt> <dd> <t>The HPKE Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) identifier corresponding to <tt>public_key</tt>. Clients MUST ignore any <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure with a key using a KEM they do not support.</t> </dd><dt>public_key</dt><dt><tt>public_key</tt>:</dt> <dd> <t>The HPKE public key used by the client to encryptClientHelloInner.</t><tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t> </dd><dt>cipher_suites</dt><dt>cipher_suites:</dt> <dd> <t>The list of HPKEKDFKey Derivation Function (KDF) andAEADAuthenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) identifier pairs clients can use for encryptingClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. See <xref target="real-ech"/> for how clients choose from this list.</t> </dd> </dl> <t>The client-facing server advertises a sequence of ECH configurations to clients, serialized as follows.</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ ECHConfig ECHConfigList<4..2^16-1>; ]]></artwork> <t>The <tt>ECHConfigList</tt> structure contains one or more <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures in decreasing order of preference. This allows a server to support multiple versions of ECH and multiple sets of ECH parameters.</t> <section anchor="config-ids"> <name>Configuration Identifiers</name> <t>A client-facing server has a set of knownECHConfig values,<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values with corresponding private keys. This set SHOULD contain the currently published values, as well as previous values that may still be in use, since clients may cache DNS records up to a TTL or longer.</t> <t><xref target="client-facing-server"/> describes a trial decryption process for decrypting theClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. This can impact performance when the client-facing server maintains many knownECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values. To avoid this, the client-facing server SHOULD allocate distinct <tt>config_id</tt> values for eachECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> in its known set. The RECOMMENDED strategy is via rejection sampling, i.e., to randomly select <tt>config_id</tt> repeatedly until it does not match any knownECHConfig.</t><tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t> <t>It is not necessary for <tt>config_id</tt> values across different client-facing servers to be distinct. A backend server may be hosted behind two different client-facing servers with colliding <tt>config_id</tt> values without any performance impact. Values may also be reused if the previousECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> is no longer in the known set.</t> </section> <section anchor="config-extensions"> <name>Configuration Extensions</name> <t>ECH configuration extensions are used to provide room for additional functionality as needed. The format is as defined in <xref target="ech-configuration"/> and mirrors <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>. However, ECH configuration extension types are maintained by IANA as described in <xref target="config-extensions-iana"/>. ECH configuration extensions follow the same interpretation rules as TLS extensions: extensions MAY appear in any order, but there MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type in the extensions block. Unlike TLS extensions, an extension can be tagged as mandatory by using an extension type codepoint with the high order bit set to 1.</t> <t>Clients MUST parse the extension list and check for unsupported mandatory extensions. If an unsupported mandatory extension is present, clients MUST ignore the <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t> <t>Any future information or hints that influenceClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> SHOULD be specified asECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> extensions. This is primarily because the outerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> exists only in support of ECH. Namely, it is both an envelope for the encrypted innerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> and an enabler for authenticated key mismatch signals (see <xref target="server-behavior"/>). In contrast, the innerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> is the trueClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> used upon ECH negotiation.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="encrypted-client-hello"> <name>The "encrypted_client_hello" Extension</name> <t>To offer ECH, the client sends an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in theClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. When it does, it MUST also send the extension inClientHelloInner.</t><tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ enum { encrypted_client_hello(0xfe0d), (65535) } ExtensionType; ]]></artwork> <t>The payload of the extension has the following structure:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ enum { outer(0), inner(1) } ECHClientHelloType; struct { ECHClientHelloType type; select (ECHClientHello.type) { case outer: HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suite; uint8 config_id; opaque enc<0..2^16-1>; opaque payload<1..2^16-1>; case inner: Empty; }; } ECHClientHello; ]]></artwork> <t>The outer extension uses the <tt>outer</tt> variant and the inner extension uses the <tt>inner</tt> variant. The inner extension has an empty payload, which is included because TLS servers are not allowed to provide extensions in ServerHello which were not included inClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. The outer extension has the following fields:</t> <dl><dt>config_id</dt><dt><tt>config_id</tt>:</dt> <dd> <t>TheECHConfigContents.key_config.config_id<tt>ECHConfigContents.key_config.config_id</tt> for the chosenECHConfig.</t><tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t> </dd><dt>cipher_suite</dt><dt><tt>cipher_suite</tt>:</dt> <dd> <t>The cipher suite used to encryptClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. This MUST match a value provided in the corresponding <tt>ECHConfigContents.cipher_suites</tt> list.</t> </dd><dt>enc</dt><dt>enc:</dt> <dd> <t>The HPKE encapsulatedkey,key used by servers to decrypt the corresponding <tt>payload</tt> field. This field is empty in aClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> sent in response to HelloRetryRequest.</t> </dd><dt>payload</dt><dt>payload:</dt> <dd> <t>The serialized and encryptedEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> structure, encrypted using HPKE as described in <xref target="real-ech"/>.</t> </dd> </dl> <t>When a client offers the <tt>outer</tt> version of an "encrypted_client_hello" extension, the server MAY include an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions message, as described in <xref target="client-facing-server"/>, with the following payload:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ struct { ECHConfigList retry_configs; } ECHEncryptedExtensions; ]]></artwork> <t>The response is valid only when the server used theClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. If the server sent this extension in response to the <tt>inner</tt> variant, then the client MUST abort with an "unsupported_extension" alert.</t> <dl><dt>retry_configs</dt><dt>retry_configs:</dt> <dd> <t>AnECHConfigList<tt>ECHConfigList</tt> structure containing one or moreECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures, in decreasing order of preference, to be used by the client as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>. These are known as the server's "retry configurations".</t> </dd> </dl> <t>Finally, when the client offers the "encrypted_client_hello", if the payload is the <tt>inner</tt> variant and the server responds with HelloRetryRequest, it MUST include an "encrypted_client_hello" extension with the following payload:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ struct { opaque confirmation[8]; } ECHHelloRetryRequest; ]]></artwork> <t>The value of ECHHelloRetryRequest.confirmation is set to <tt>hrr_accept_confirmation</tt> as described in <xref target="backend-server-hrr"/>.</t> <t>This document also defines the "ech_required" alert, which the client MUST send when it offered an "encrypted_client_hello" extension that was not accepted by the server. (See <xref target="alerts"/>.)</t> <section anchor="encoding-inner"> <name>Encoding the ClientHelloInner</name> <t>Before encrypting, the client pads and optionally compressesClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> intoa EncodedClientHelloInneran <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> structure, defined below:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ struct { ClientHello client_hello; uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]; } EncodedClientHelloInner; ]]></artwork> <t>The <tt>client_hello</tt> field is computed by first making a copy ofClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> and setting the <tt>legacy_session_id</tt> field to the empty string. In TLS, this field uses theClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> structure defined in <xref section="4.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>. In DTLS, it uses theClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> structured defined in <xref section="5.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9147"/>. This does not include Handshake structure's four-byte header in TLS, nor twelve-byte header in DTLS. The <tt>zeros</tt> field MUST be all zeroes of length <tt>length_of_padding</tt> (see <xref target="padding"/>).</t> <t>Repeating large extensions, such as "key_share" with post-quantum algorithms, betweenClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> andClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> can lead to excessive size. To reduce the size impact, the client MAY substitute extensions which it knows will be duplicated inClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It does so by removing and replacing extensions fromEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> with a single "ech_outer_extensions" extension, defined as follows:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ enum { ech_outer_extensions(0xfd00), (65535) } ExtensionType; ExtensionType OuterExtensions<2..254>; ]]></artwork> <t>OuterExtensions contains the removed ExtensionType values. Each value references the matching extension inClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. The values MUST be ordered contiguously inClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, and the "ech_outer_extensions" extension MUST be inserted in the corresponding position inEncodedClientHelloInner.<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>. Additionally, the extensions MUST appear inClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> in the same relative order. However, there is no requirement that they be contiguous. For example, OuterExtensions may contain extensions A, B, and C, whileClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> contains extensions A, D, B, C, E, and F.</t> <t>The "ech_outer_extensions" extension can only be included inEncodedClientHelloInner,<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> and MUST NOT appear in eitherClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> orClientHelloInner.</t><tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t> <t>Finally, the client pads the message by setting the <tt>zeros</tt> field to a byte string whose contents are all zeros and whose length is the amount of padding to add. <xref target="padding"/> describes a recommended padding scheme.</t> <t>The client-facing server computesClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> by reversing this process.FirstFirst, it parsesEncodedClientHelloInner,<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, interpreting all bytes after <tt>client_hello</tt> as padding. If any padding byte is non-zero, the server MUST abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t><t>Next<t>Next, it makes a copy of the <tt>client_hello</tt> field and copies the <tt>legacy_session_id</tt> field fromClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It then looks for an "ech_outer_extensions" extension. If found, it replaces the extension with the corresponding sequence of extensions in theClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. The server MUST abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert if any of the following are true:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Any referenced extension is missing inClientHelloOuter.</t><tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t> </li> <li> <t>Any extension is referenced in OuterExtensions more than once.</t> </li> <li> <t>"encrypted_client_hello" is referenced in OuterExtensions.</t> </li> <li> <t>The extensions inClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> corresponding to those in OuterExtensions do not occur in the same order.</t> </li> </ul> <t>These requirements prevent an attacker from performing a packet amplificationattack,attack by crafting aClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> which decompresses to a much largerClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. This is discussed further in <xref target="decompression-amp"/>.</t> <t>Implementations SHOULD construct theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> in linear time. Quadratic time implementations (such as may happen via naive copying) create adenial of servicedenial-of-service risk. <xref target="linear-outer-extensions"/> describes a linear-time procedure that may be used for this purpose.</t> </section> <section anchor="authenticating-outer"> <name>Authenticating the ClientHelloOuter</name> <t>To prevent a network attacker from modifying the <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> while keeping the same encrypted <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> (see <xref target="flow-clienthello-malleability"/>), ECH authenticatesClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> by passingClientHelloOuterAAD<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> as the associated data for HPKE sealing and opening operations. TheClientHelloOuterAAD<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> is a serializedClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> structure, defined in <xref section="4.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/> for TLS and <xref section="5.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9147"/> for DTLS, which matches theClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> except that the <tt>payload</tt> field of the "encrypted_client_hello" is replaced with a byte string of the same length but whose contents are zeros. This value does not include Handshake structure's four-byte header in TLS nor twelve-byte header in DTLS.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="client-behavior"> <name>Client Behavior</name> <t>Clients that implement the ECH extension behave in one of two ways: either they offer a real ECH extension, as described in <xreftarget="real-ech"/>;target="real-ech"/>, or they send a Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) <xref target="RFC8701"/> ECH extension, as described in <xref target="grease-ech"/>. Clients of the latter type do not negotiate ECH. Instead, they generate a dummy ECH extension that is ignored by the server. (See <xref target="dont-stick-out"/> for an explanation.) The client offers ECH if it is in possession of a compatible ECH configuration and sends GREASE ECH (see <xref target="grease-ech"/>) otherwise.</t> <section anchor="real-ech"> <name>Offering ECH</name> <t>To offer ECH, the client first chooses a suitableECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> from the server'sECHConfigList.<tt>ECHConfigList</tt>. To determine if a given <tt>ECHConfig</tt> is suitable, it checks that it supports the KEM algorithm identified by <tt>ECHConfig.contents.kem_id</tt>, at least one KDF/AEAD algorithm identified by <tt>ECHConfig.contents.cipher_suites</tt>, and the version of ECH indicated by <tt>ECHConfig.contents.version</tt>. Once a suitable configuration is found, the client selects the cipher suite it will use for encryption. It MUST NOT choose a cipher suite or version not advertised by the configuration. If no compatible configuration is found, then the client SHOULD proceed as described in <xref target="grease-ech"/>.</t> <t>Next, the client constructs theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> message just as it does a standardClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, with the exception of the following rules:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>It MUST NOT offer to negotiate TLS 1.2 or below. This is necessary to ensure the backend server does not negotiate a TLS version that is incompatible with ECH.</t> </li> <li> <t>It MUST NOT offer to resume any session for TLS 1.2 and below.</t> </li> <li> <t>If it intends to compress any extensions (see <xref target="encoding-inner"/>), it MUST order those extensions consecutively.</t> </li> <li> <t>It MUST include the "encrypted_client_hello" extension of type <tt>inner</tt> as described in <xref target="encrypted-client-hello"/>. (This requirement is not applicable when the "encrypted_client_hello" extension is generated as described in <xref target="grease-ech"/>.)</t> </li> </ol> <t>The client then constructsEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>. It also computes an HPKE encryption context and <tt>enc</tt> value as:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ pkR = DeserializePublicKey(ECHConfig.contents.public_key) enc, context = SetupBaseS(pkR, "tls ech" || 0x00 || ECHConfig) ]]></artwork> <t>Next, it constructs a partialClientHelloOuterAAD<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> as it does a standardClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, with the exception of the following rules:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>It MUST offer to negotiate TLS 1.3 or above.</t> </li> <li> <t>If it compressed any extensions inEncodedClientHelloInner,<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, it MUST copy the corresponding extensions fromClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. The copied extensions additionally MUST be in the same relative order as inClientHelloInner.</t><tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t> </li> <li> <t>It MUST copy the legacy_session_id field fromClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. This allows the server to echo the correct session ID for TLS 1.3's compatibility mode (see <xref section="D.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>) when ECH is negotiated. Note that compatibility mode is not used in DTLS 1.3, but following this rule will produce the correct results for both TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3.</t> </li> <li> <t>It MAY copy any other field from theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> exceptClientHelloInner.random.<tt>ClientHelloInner.random</tt>. Instead, It MUST generate a freshClientHelloOuter.random<tt>ClientHelloOuter.random</tt> using a secure random number generator. (See <xref target="flow-client-reaction"/>.)</t> </li> <li> <t>It SHOULD place the value of <tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt> in the "server_name" extension. Clients that do not follow this step, or place a different value in the "server_name" extension, risk breaking the retry mechanism described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/> or failing to interoperate with servers that require this step to be done; see <xref target="client-facing-server"/>.</t> </li> <li> <t>When the client offers the "pre_shared_key" extension inClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, it SHOULD also include a GREASE "pre_shared_key" extension inClientHelloOuter,<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>, generated in the manner described in <xref target="grease-psk"/>. The client MUST NOT use this extension to advertise a PSK to the client-facing server. (See <xref target="flow-clienthello-malleability"/>.) When the client includes a GREASE "pre_shared_key" extension, it MUST also copy the "psk_key_exchange_modes" from theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> into theClientHelloOuter.</t><tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t> </li> <li> <t>When the client offers the "early_data" extension inClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, it MUST also include the "early_data" extension inClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. This allows servers that reject ECH and useClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to safely ignore any early data sent by the client per <xref section="4.2.10" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>.</t> </li> </ol> <t>The client might duplicate non-sensitive extensions in both messages. However, implementations need to take care to ensure that sensitive extensions are not offered in theClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. See <xref target="outer-clienthello"/> for additional guidance.</t> <t>Finally, the client encrypts theEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> with the above values, as described in <xref target="encrypting-clienthello"/>, to construct aClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It sends this to theserver,server and processes the response as described in <xref target="determining-ech-acceptance"/>.</t> <section anchor="encrypting-clienthello"> <name>Encrypting the ClientHello</name> <t>Given anEncodedClientHelloInner,<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, an HPKE encryption context and <tt>enc</tt> value, and a partialClientHelloOuterAAD,<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt>, the client constructs aClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as follows.</t> <t>First, the client determines the length L of encryptingEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> with the selected HPKE AEAD. This is typically the sum of the plaintext length and the AEAD tag length. The client then completes theClientHelloOuterAAD<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> with an "encrypted_client_hello" extension. This extension value contains the outer variant ofECHClientHello<tt>ECHClientHello</tt> with the following fields:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t><tt>config_id</tt>, the identifier corresponding to the chosenECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure;</t> </li> <li> <t><tt>cipher_suite</tt>, the client's chosen cipher suite;</t> </li> <li> <t><tt>enc</tt>, as given above; and</t> </li> <li> <t><tt>payload</tt>, a placeholder byte string containing L zeros.</t> </li> </ul> <t>If configuration identifiers (see <xref target="ignored-configs"/>) are to be ignored, <tt>config_id</tt> SHOULD be set to a randomly generated byte in the firstClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> and, in the event of a HelloRetryRequest (HRR), MUST be left unchanged for the secondClientHelloOuter.</t><tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t> <t>The client serializes this structure to construct theClientHelloOuterAAD.<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt>. It then computes the final payload as:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ final_payload = context.Seal(ClientHelloOuterAAD, EncodedClientHelloInner) ]]></artwork> <t>Including <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> as the HPKE AAD binds the <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to the <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, thus preventing attackers from modifying <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> while keeping the same <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, as described in <xref target="flow-clienthello-malleability"/>.</t> <t>Finally, the client replaces <tt>payload</tt> with <tt>final_payload</tt> to obtainClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. The two values have the same length, so it is not necessary to recompute length prefixes in the serialized structure.</t> <t>Note this construction requires the "encrypted_client_hello" be computed after all other extensions. This is possible because theClientHelloOuter's<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>'s "pre_shared_key" extension is eitheromitted,omitted or uses a random binder (<xref target="grease-psk"/>).</t> </section> <section anchor="grease-psk"> <name>GREASE PSK</name> <t>When offering ECH, the client is not permitted to advertise PSK identities in theClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. However, the client can send a "pre_shared_key" extension in theClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. In this case, when resuming a session with the client, the backend server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension in its ServerHello. This would appear to a network observer as if the server were sending this extension without solicitation, which would violate the extension rules described in <xref target="RFC8446"/>. When offering a PSK inClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, clients SHOULD send a GREASE "pre_shared_key" extension in theClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to make it appear to the network as if the extension were negotiated properly.</t> <t>The client generates the extension payload by constructing an <tt>OfferedPsks</tt> structure (see <xref section="4.2.11" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>) as follows. For each PSK identity advertised in theClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the client generates a random PSK identity with the same length. It also generates a random, 32-bit, unsigned integer to use as the <tt>obfuscated_ticket_age</tt>. Likewise, for each inner PSK binder, the client generates a random string of the same length.</t> <t>Per the rules of <xref target="real-ech"/>, the server is not permitted to resume a connection in the outer handshake. If ECH is rejected and the client-facing server replies with a "pre_shared_key" extension in its ServerHello, then the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t> </section> <section anchor="padding"> <name>Recommended Padding Scheme</name> <t>If theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> is encrypted without padding, then the length of the <tt>ClientHelloOuter.payload</tt> can leak information about <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. In order to preventthisthis, the <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> structure has a padding field. This section describes a deterministic mechanism for computing the required amount of padding based on the following observation: individual extensions can reveal sensitive information through their length. Thus, each extension in the innerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> may require different amounts of padding. This padding may be fully determined by the client's configuration or may require server input.</t> <t>By way of example, clients typically support a small number of application profiles. For instance, a browser might support HTTP with ALPN values ["http/1.1", "h2"] and WebRTC media with ALPNs ["webrtc", "c-webrtc"]. Clients SHOULD pad this extension by rounding up to the total size of the longest ALPN extension across all application profiles. The target padding length of mostClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> extensions can be computed in this way.</t> <t>In contrast, clients do not know the longest SNI value in the client-facing server's anonymity set without server input. Clients SHOULD use theECHConfig's<tt>ECHConfig</tt>'s <tt>maximum_name_length</tt> field as follows, where L is the <tt>maximum_name_length</tt> value.</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>If theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> contained a "server_name" extension with a name of length D, add max(0, L - D) bytes of padding.</t> </li> <li> <t>If theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> did not contain a "server_name" extension (e.g., if the client is connecting to an IP address), add L + 9 bytes of padding. This is the length of a "server_name" extension with an L-byte name.</t> </li> </ol> <t>Finally, the client SHOULD pad the entire message as follows:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>Let L be the length of theEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> with all the padding computed so far.</t> </li> <li> <t>Let N = 31 - ((L - 1) % 32) and add N bytes of padding.</t> </li> </ol> <t>This rounds the length ofEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> up to a multiple of 32 bytes, reducing the set of possible lengths across all clients.</t> <t>In addition to paddingClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, clients and servers will also need to pad all other handshake messages that have sensitive-length fields. For example, if a client proposes ALPN values inClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the server-selected value will be returned in an EncryptedExtension, so that handshake message also needs to be padded using TLS record layer padding.</t> </section> <section anchor="determining-ech-acceptance"> <name>Determining ECH Acceptance</name> <t>As described in <xref target="server-behavior"/>, the server may either accept ECH and useClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> or reject it and useClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. This is determined by the server's initial message.</t> <t>If the message does not negotiate TLS 1.3 or higher, the server has rejected ECH. Otherwise, it is either a ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest.</t> <t>If the message is a ServerHello, the client computes <tt>accept_confirmation</tt> as described in <xref target="backend-server"/>. If this value matches the last 8 bytes of <tt>ServerHello.random</tt>, the server has accepted ECH. Otherwise, it has rejected ECH.</t> <t>If the message is a HelloRetryRequest, the client checks for the "encrypted_client_hello" extension. If none is found, the server has rejected ECH. Otherwise, if it has a length other than 8, the client aborts the handshake with a "decode_error" alert. Otherwise, the client computes <tt>hrr_accept_confirmation</tt> as described in <xref target="backend-server-hrr"/>. If this value matches the extension payload, the server has accepted ECH. Otherwise, it has rejected ECH.</t> <t>If the server accepts ECH, the client handshakes withClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> as described in <xref target="accepted-ech"/>. Otherwise, the client handshakes withClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t> <!-- [rfced] In the following sentence, does "length other than 8" refer to bytes? If yes, may we update as follows? Current: Otherwise, if it has a length other than 8, the client aborts the handshake with a "decode_error" alert. Perhaps: Otherwise, if it has a length other than 8 bytes, the client aborts the handshake with a "decode_error" alert. --> </section> <section anchor="accepted-ech"> <name>Handshaking with ClientHelloInner</name> <t>If the server accepts ECH, the client proceeds with the connection as in <xref target="RFC8446"/>, with the following modifications:</t> <t>The client behaves as if it had sentClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> as theClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. That is, it evaluates the handshake using theClientHelloInner's<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>'s preferences, and, when computing the transcript hash (<xref section="4.4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>), it usesClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> as the firstClientHello.</t><tt>ClientHello</tt>.</t> <t>If the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest, the client computes the updatedClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> message as follows:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>It computes a secondClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> based on the firstClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, as in <xref section="4.1.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>. TheClientHelloInner's<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>'s "encrypted_client_hello" extension is left unmodified.</t> </li> <li> <t>It constructsEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>.</t> </li> <li> <t>It constructs a second partialClientHelloOuterAAD<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> message. This message MUST be syntactically valid. The extensions MAY be copied from the originalClientHelloOuter unmodified,<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> unmodified or omitted. If not sensitive, the client MAY copy updated extensions from the secondClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> for compression.</t> </li> <li> <t>It encryptsEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> as described in <xref target="encrypting-clienthello"/>, using the second partialClientHelloOuterAAD,<tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt>, to obtain a secondClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It reuses the original HPKE encryption context computed in <xref target="real-ech"/> and uses the empty string for <tt>enc</tt>. </t> <t> The HPKE context maintains a sequence number, so this operation internally uses a fresh nonce for each AEAD operation. Reusing the HPKE context avoids an attack described in <xref target="flow-hrr-hijack"/>.</t> </li> </ol> <t>The client then sends the secondClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to the server. However, as above, it uses the secondClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> for preferences, and both theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> messages for the transcript hash. Additionally, it checks the resulting ServerHello for ECH acceptance as in <xref target="determining-ech-acceptance"/>. If the ServerHello does not also indicate ECH acceptance, the client MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t> </section> <section anchor="rejected-ech"> <name>Handshaking with ClientHelloOuter</name> <t>If the server rejects ECH, the client proceeds with the handshake, authenticating forECHConfig.contents.public_name<tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt> as described in <xref target="auth-public-name"/>. If authentication or the handshake fails, the client MUST return a failure to the calling application. It MUST NOT use the retry configurations. It MUST NOT treat this as a secure signal to disable ECH.</t> <t>If the server supplied an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions message, the client MUST check that it is syntactically valid and the client MUST abort the connection with a "decode_error" alert otherwise. If an earlier TLS version was negotiated, the client MUST NOT enable the False Start optimization <xref target="RFC7918"/> for this handshake. If both authentication and the handshake complete successfully, the client MUST perform the processing described below and then abort the connection with an "ech_required" alert before sending any application data to the server.</t> <t>If the server provided "retry_configs" and if at least one of the values contains a version supported by the client, the client can regard the ECH configuration as securely replaced by the server. It SHOULD retry the handshake with a new transportconnection,connection using the retry configurations supplied by the server.</t> <t>Clients can implement a new transport connection in a way that best suits their deployment. For example, clients can reuse the same server IP address when establishing the new transport connection or they can choose to use a different IP address if provided with options from DNS. ECH does not mandate any specific implementation choices when establishing this new connection.</t> <t>The retry configurations are meant to be used for retried connections. Further use of retry configurations could yield a tracking vector. In settings where the client will otherwise already let the server track the client, e.g., because the client will send cookies to the server in parallel connections, using the retry configurations for these parallel connections does not introduce a new tracking vector.</t> <t>If none of the values provided in "retry_configs" contains a supported version, the server did not supply an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions message, or an earlier TLS version was negotiated, the client can regard ECH as securely disabled by the server, and it SHOULD retry the handshake with a new transport connection and ECH disabled.</t> <t>Clients SHOULD NOT accept "retry_config" in response to a connection initiated in response to a "retry_config". Sending a "retry_config" in this situation is a signal that the server is misconfigured, e.g., the server might have multiple inconsistent configurations so that the client reached a node with configuration A in the first connection and a node with configuration B in the second. Note that this guidance does not apply to the cases in the previous paragraph where the server has securely disabled ECH.</t> <t>If a client does not retry, it MUST report an error to the calling application.</t> </section> <section anchor="auth-public-name"> <name>Authenticating for the Public Name</name> <t>When the server rejects ECH, it continues with the handshake using the plaintext "server_name" extension instead (see <xref target="server-behavior"/>). Clients that offer ECH then authenticate the connection with the publicname,name as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>The client MUST verify that the certificate is valid forECHConfig.contents.public_name.<tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt>. If invalid, it MUST abort the connection with the appropriate alert.</t> </li> <li> <t>If the server requests a client certificate, the client MUST respond with an empty Certificate message, denoting no client certificate.</t> </li> </ul> <t>In verifying the client-facing server certificate, the client MUST interpret the public name as a DNS-based reference identity <xreftarget="RFC6125"/>.target="RFC9525"/>. Clients that incorporate DNS names and IP addresses into the same syntax (e.g. <xref section="7.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3986"/> and <xref target="WHATWG-IPV4"/>) MUST reject names that would be interpreted as IPv4 addresses. Clients that enforce this by checkingECHConfig.contents.public_name<tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt> do not need to repeat the check when processing ECH rejection.</t> <t>Note that authenticating a connection for the public name does not authenticate it for the origin. The TLS implementation MUST NOT report such connections as successful to the application. It additionally MUST ignore all session tickets and session IDs presented by the server. These connections are only used to trigger retries, as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>. This may be implemented, for instance, by reporting a failed connection with a dedicated error code.</t> <t>Prior to attempting a connection, a client SHOULD validate the <tt>ECHConfig</tt>. Clients SHOULD ignore any <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure with a public_name that is not a valid host name in preferred name syntax (see <xref section="2" sectionFormat="of"target="DNS-TERMS"/>).target="RFC9499"/>). That is, to be valid, the public_name needs to be a dot-separated sequence of LDH labels, as defined in <xref section="2.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5890"/>, where:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>the sequence does not begin or end with an ASCII dot, and</t> </li> <li> <t>all labels are at most 63 octets.</t> </li> </ul> <t>Clients additionally SHOULD ignore the structure if the final LDH label either consists of all ASCII digits(i.e.(i.e., '0' through '9') or is "0x" or "0X" followed by some, possibly empty, sequence of ASCII hexadecimal digits(i.e.(i.e., '0' through '9', 'a' through 'f', and 'A' through 'F'). This avoids public_name values that may be interpreted as IPv4 literals.</t> </section> <section anchor="impact-of-retry-on-future-connections"> <name>Impact of Retry on Future Connections</name> <t>Clients MAY use information learned from a rejected ECH for future connections to avoid repeatedly connecting to the same server and being forced to retry. However, they MUST handle ECH rejection for those connections as if it were a fresh connection, rather than enforcing the single retry limit from <xref target="rejected-ech"/>. The reason for this requirement is that if the server sends a "retry_config" and then immediately rejects the resulting connection, it is most likely misconfigured. However, if the server sends a "retry_config" and then the client tries to use that to connect some time later, it is possible that the server has changed its configuration again and is now trying to recover.</t> <t>Any persisted information MUST be associated with theECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> source used to bootstrap the connection, such as a DNS SVCB ServiceMode record <xreftarget="ECH-IN-DNS"/>.target="RFCYYY1"/>. Clients MUST limit any sharing of persisted ECH-related state to connections that use the sameECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> source. Otherwise, it might become possible for the client to have the wrong public name for the server, making recovery impossible.</t> <t>ECHConfigs learned from ECH rejection can be used as a tracking vector. Clients SHOULD impose the same lifetime and scope restrictions that they apply to other server-based tracking vectors such as PSKs.</t> <t>In general, the safest way for clients to minimize ECH retries is to comply with any freshness rules (e.g., DNS TTLs) imposed by the ECH configuration.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="grease-ech"> <name>GREASE ECH</name> <t>The GREASE ECH mechanism allows a connection betweenandan ECH-capable client and a non-ECH server to appear to use ECH, thus reducing the extent to which ECH connections stick out (see <xref target="dont-stick-out"/>).</t> <section anchor="client-greasing"> <name>Client Greasing</name> <t>If the client attempts to connect to a server and does not have anECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure available for the server, it SHOULD send a GREASE <xref target="RFC8701"/> "encrypted_client_hello" extension in the firstClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> as follows:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Set the <tt>config_id</tt> field to a random byte.</t> </li> <li> <t>Set the <tt>cipher_suite</tt> field to a supported HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite. The selection SHOULD vary to exercise all supported configurations, but MAY be held constant for successive connections to the same server in the same session.</t> </li> <li> <t>Set the <tt>enc</tt> field to arandomly-generatedrandomly generated valid encapsulated public key output by the HPKE KEM.</t> </li> <li> <t>Set the <tt>payload</tt> field to arandomly-generatedrandomly generated string of L+C bytes, where C is the ciphertext expansion of the selected AEAD scheme and L is the size of theEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> the client would compute when offering ECH, padded according to <xref target="padding"/>.</t> </li> </ul> <t>If sending a secondClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> in response to a HelloRetryRequest, the client copies the entire "encrypted_client_hello" extension from the firstClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. The identical value will reveal to an observer that the value of "encrypted_client_hello" was fake, but this only occurs if there is a HelloRetryRequest.</t> <t>If the server sends an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in either HelloRetryRequest or EncryptedExtensions, the client MUST check the extension syntactically and abort the connection with a "decode_error" alert if it is invalid. It otherwise ignores the extension. It MUST NOT save the "retry_configs" value in EncryptedExtensions.</t> <t>Offering a GREASE extension is not considered offering an encryptedClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> for purposes of requirements in <xref target="real-ech"/>. In particular, the client MAY offer to resume sessions established without ECH.</t> <!-- [rfced] It seems that "client" was intended to be "clients" (plural) in the sentence below and updated as follows. Please let us know if that is not accurate. Original: Correctly-implemented client will ignore those extensions. Current: Correctly implemented clients will ignore those extensions. --> </section> <section anchor="server-greasing"> <name>Server Greasing</name> <t><xref target="config-extensions-iana"/> describes a set of Reserved extensions which will never be registered. These can be used by servers to "grease" the contents of the ECH configuration, as inspired by <xref target="RFC8701"/>. This helps ensure clients process ECH extensions correctly. When constructing ECH configurations, servers SHOULD randomly select from reserved values with the high-order bit clear.Correctly-implemented clientCorrectly implemented clients will ignore those extensions.</t> <t>The reserved values with the high-order bit set are mandatory, as defined in <xref target="config-extensions"/>. Servers SHOULD randomly select from these values and include them in extraneous ECH configurations.Correctly-implementedCorrectly implemented clients will ignore these configurations because they do not recognize the mandatory extension. Servers SHOULD ensure that any client using these configurations encounters a warning or error message. This can be accomplished in several ways, including:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>By giving the extraneous configurations distinctive config IDs or public names, and rejecting the TLS connection or inserting an application-level warning message when these are observed.</t> </li> <li> <t>By giving the extraneous configurations an invalid public key and a public name not associated with theserver,server so that the initialClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> will not be decryptable and the server cannot perform the recovery flow described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t> </li> </ul> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="server-behavior"> <name>Server Behavior</name> <t>As described in <xref target="topologies"/>, servers can play two roles, either as the client-facing server or as the back-end server. Depending on the server role, the <tt>ECHClientHello</tt> will be different:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>A client-facing server expectsaan <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>outer</tt>, and proceeds as described in <xref target="client-facing-server"/> to extract aClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, if available.</t> </li> <li> <t>A backend server expectsaan <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>inner</tt>, and proceeds as described in <xref target="backend-server"/>.</t> </li> </ul> <t>In split mode, a client-facing server which receives a <tt>ClientHello</tt> with <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>inner</tt> MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert. Similarly, in split mode, a backend server which receives a <tt>ClientHello</tt> with <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>outer</tt> MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t> <t>In shared mode, a server plays both roles, first decrypting the <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> and then using the contents of the <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. A shared mode server which receives a <tt>ClientHello</tt> with <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>inner</tt> MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert, because such a <tt>ClientHello</tt> should never be received directly from the network.</t> <t>If <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> is not a valid <tt>ECHClientHelloType</tt>, then the server MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t> <t>If the "encrypted_client_hello" is not present, then the server completes the handshake normally, as described in <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t> <section anchor="client-facing-server"> <name>Client-Facing Server</name> <t>Upon receiving an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in an initialClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, the client-facing server determines if it will acceptECH,ECH prior to negotiating any other TLS parameters. Note that successfully decrypting the extension will result in a newClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> to process, so even the client's TLS version preferences may have changed.</t> <t>First, the server collects a set of candidateECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values. This list is determined by one of the two following methods:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>CompareECHClientHello.config_id<tt>ECHClientHello.config_id</tt> against identifiers of each knownECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> and select the ones that match, if any, as candidates.</t> </li> <li> <t>Collect all knownECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values as candidates, with trial decryption below determining the final selection.</t> </li> </ol> <t>Some uses of ECH, such as local discovery mode, may randomize theECHClientHello.config_id<tt>ECHClientHello.config_id</tt> since it can be used as a tracking vector. In such cases, the second method SHOULD be used for matching theECHClientHello<tt>ECHClientHello</tt> to a knownECHConfig.<tt>ECHConfig</tt>. See <xref target="ignored-configs"/>. Unless specified by the application profile or otherwise externally configured, implementations MUST use the first method.</t> <t>The server then iterates over the candidateECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values, attempting to decrypt the "encrypted_client_hello" extension as follows.</t> <t>The server verifies that theECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> supports the cipher suite indicated by theECHClientHello.cipher_suite<tt>ECHClientHello.cipher_suite</tt> and that the version of ECH indicated by the client matches theECHConfig.version.<tt>ECHConfig.version</tt>. If not, the server continues to the next candidateECHConfig.</t><tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t> <t>Next, the server decryptsECHClientHello.payload,<tt>ECHClientHello.payload</tt>, using the private key skR corresponding toECHConfig,<tt>ECHConfig</tt>, as follows:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ context = SetupBaseR(ECHClientHello.enc, skR, "tls ech" || 0x00 || ECHConfig) EncodedClientHelloInner = context.Open(ClientHelloOuterAAD, ECHClientHello.payload) ]]></artwork><t>ClientHelloOuterAAD<t><tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> is computed fromClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as described in <xref target="authenticating-outer"/>. The <tt>info</tt> parameter to SetupBaseR is the concatenation "tls ech", a zero byte, and the serializedECHConfig.<tt>ECHConfig</tt>. If decryption fails, the server continues to the next candidateECHConfig.<tt>ECHConfig</tt>. Otherwise, the server reconstructsClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> fromEncodedClientHelloInner,<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>. It then stops iterating over the candidateECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values.</t> <t>Once the server has chosen the correctECHConfig,<tt>ECHConfig</tt>, it MAY verify that the value in theClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> "server_name" extension matches the value ofECHConfig.contents.public_name,<tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt> and abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert if these do not match. This optional check allows the server to limit ECH connections to only use the public SNI values advertised in its ECHConfigs. The server MUST be careful not to unnecessarily reject connections if the sameECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> id or keypair is used in multiple ECHConfigs with distinct public names.</t> <t>Upon determining theClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the client-facing server checks that the message includes a well-formed "encrypted_client_hello" extension of type <tt>inner</tt> and that it does not offer TLS 1.2 or below. If either of these checks fails, the client-facing server MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t> <t>If these checks succeed, the client-facing server then forwards theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> to the appropriate backend server, which proceeds as in <xref target="backend-server"/>. If the backend server responds with a HelloRetryRequest, the client-facing server forwards it, decrypts the client's secondClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> using the procedure in <xref target="client-facing-server-hrr"/>, and forwards the resulting secondClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. The client-facing server forwards all other TLS messages between the client and backend server unmodified.</t> <t>Otherwise, if all candidateECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values fail to decrypt the extension, the client-facing server MUST ignore the extension and proceed with the connection usingClientHelloOuter,<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> with the following modifications:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>If sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY include an "encrypted_client_hello" extension with a payload of 8 random bytes; see <xref target="dont-stick-out"/> for details.</t> </li> <li> <t>If the server is configured with any ECHConfigs, it MUST include the "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions with the "retry_configs" field set to one or moreECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures with up-to-date keys. Servers MAY supply multipleECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values of different versions. This allows a server to support multiple versions at once.</t> </li> </ul> <t>Note that decryption failure could indicate a GREASE ECH extension (see <xref target="grease-ech"/>), so it is necessary for servers to proceed with the connection and rely on the client to abort if ECH was required. In particular, the unrecognized value alone does not indicate a misconfigured ECH advertisement (<xref target="misconfiguration"/>). Instead, servers can measure occurrences of the "ech_required" alert to detect this case.</t> <section anchor="client-facing-server-hrr"> <name>Sending HelloRetryRequest</name> <t>After sending or forwarding a HelloRetryRequest, the client-facing server does not repeat the steps in <xref target="client-facing-server"/> with the secondClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. Instead, it continues with theECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> selection from the firstClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as follows:</t> <t>If the client-facing server accepted ECH, it checks that the secondClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> also contains the "encrypted_client_hello" extension. If not, it MUST abort the handshake with a "missing_extension" alert. Otherwise, it checks thatECHClientHello.cipher_suite<tt>ECHClientHello.cipher_suite</tt> andECHClientHello.config_id<tt>ECHClientHello.config_id</tt> are unchanged, and thatECHClientHello.enc<tt>ECHClientHello.enc</tt> is empty. If not, it MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t> <t>Finally, it decrypts the newECHClientHello.payload<tt>ECHClientHello.payload</tt> as a second message with the previous HPKE context:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ EncodedClientHelloInner = context.Open(ClientHelloOuterAAD, ECHClientHello.payload) ]]></artwork><t>ClientHelloOuterAAD<t><tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> is computed as described in <xref target="authenticating-outer"/>, but using the secondClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. If decryption fails, the client-facing server MUST abort the handshake with a "decrypt_error" alert. Otherwise, it reconstructs the secondClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> from the newEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>, using the secondClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> for any referenced extensions.</t> <t>The client-facing server then forwards the resultingClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> to the backend server. It forwards all subsequent TLS messages between the client and backend server unmodified.</t> <t>If the client-facing server rejected ECH, or if the firstClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> did not include an "encrypted_client_hello" extension, the client-facing server proceeds with the connection as usual. The server does not decrypt the secondClientHello's ECHClientHello.payload<tt>ClientHello</tt>'s <tt>ECHClientHello.payload</tt> value, if there is one. Moreover, if the server is configured with any ECHConfigs, it MUST include the "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions with the "retry_configs" field set to one or moreECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures with up-to-date keys, as described in <xref target="client-facing-server"/>.</t> <t>Note that a client-facing server that forwards the firstClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> cannot include its own "cookie" extension if the backend server sends a HelloRetryRequest. This means that the client-facing server either needs to maintain state for such a connection or it needs to coordinate with the backend server to include any information it requires to process the secondClientHello.</t><tt>ClientHello</tt>.</t> <!-- [rfced] May we rephrase the following text for an improved sentence flow? Original: The backend server embeds in `ServerHello.random` a string derived from the inner handshake. Perhaps: A string derived from the inner handshake is embedded into `ServerHello.random` by the backend server. --> </section> </section> <section anchor="backend-server"> <name>Backend Server</name> <t>Upon receipt of an "encrypted_client_hello" extension of type <tt>inner</tt> in aClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, if the backend server negotiates TLS 1.3 or higher, then it MUST confirm ECH acceptance to the client by computing its ServerHello as described here.</t> <t>The backend server embeds inServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> a string derived from the inner handshake. It begins by computing its ServerHello as usual, except the last 8 bytes ofServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> are set to zero. It then computes the transcript hash forClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> up to and including the modified ServerHello, as described in <xref section="4.4.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>. Let transcript_ech_conf denote the output. Finally, the backend server overwrites the last 8 bytes of theServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> with the following string:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ accept_confirmation = HKDF-Expand-Label( HKDF-Extract(0, ClientHelloInner.random), "ech accept confirmation", transcript_ech_conf, 8) ]]></artwork> <t>where HKDF-Expand-Label is defined in <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>, "0" indicates a string of Hash.length bytes set to zero, and Hash is the hash function used to compute the transcript hash. In DTLS, the modified version of HKDF-Expand-Label defined in <xref section="5.9" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9147"/> is used instead.</t> <t>The backend server MUST NOT perform this operation if it negotiated TLS 1.2 or below. Note that doing so would overwrite the downgrade signal for TLS 1.3 (see <xref section="4.1.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>).</t> <section anchor="backend-server-hrr"> <name>Sending HelloRetryRequest</name> <t>When the backend server sends HelloRetryRequest in response to theClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, it similarly confirms ECH acceptance by adding a confirmation signal to its HelloRetryRequest. But instead of embedding the signal in the HelloRetryRequest.random (the value of which is specified by <xref target="RFC8446"/>), it sends the signal in an extension.</t> <t>The backend server begins by computing HelloRetryRequest as usual, except that it also contains an "encrypted_client_hello" extension with a payload of 8 zero bytes. It then computes the transcript hash for the firstClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, denoted ClientHelloInner1, up to and including the modified HelloRetryRequest. Let transcript_hrr_ech_conf denote the output. Finally, the backend server overwrites the payload of the "encrypted_client_hello" extension with the following string:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ hrr_accept_confirmation = HKDF-Expand-Label( HKDF-Extract(0, ClientHelloInner1.random), "hrr ech accept confirmation", transcript_hrr_ech_conf, 8) ]]></artwork> <t>In the subsequent ServerHello message, the backend server sends theaccept_confirmation<tt>accept_confirmation</tt> value as described in <xref target="backend-server"/>.</t> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="deployment"> <name>Deployment Considerations</name> <t>The design of ECH as specified in this document necessarily requires changes to client, client-facing server, and backend server. Coordination between client-facing and backend server requires care, as deployment mistakes can lead to compatibility issues. These are discussed in <xref target="compat-issues"/>.</t> <t>Beyond coordination difficulties, ECH deployments may also induce challenges for use cases of information that ECH protects. In particular, use cases which depend on this unencrypted information may no longer work as desired. This is elaborated upon in <xref target="no-sni"/>.</t> <section anchor="compat-issues"> <name>Compatibility Issues</name> <t>Unlike most TLS extensions, placing the SNI value in an ECH extension is not interoperable with existing servers, which expect the value in the existing plaintext extension.ThusThus, server operators SHOULD ensure servers understand a given set of ECH keys before advertising them. Additionally, servers SHOULD retain support for anypreviously-advertisedpreviously advertised keys for the duration of their validity.</t> <t>However, in more complex deployment scenarios, this may be difficult to fully guarantee.ThusThus, this protocol was designed to be robust in case of inconsistencies between systems that advertise ECH keys and servers, at the cost of extra round-trips due to a retry. Two specific scenarios are detailed below.</t> <section anchor="misconfiguration"> <name>Misconfiguration and Deployment Concerns</name> <t>It is possible for ECH advertisements and servers to become inconsistent. This may occur, for instance, from DNS misconfiguration, caching issues, or an incomplete rollout in a multi-server deployment. This may also occur if a server loses its ECH keys, or if a deployment of ECH must be rolled back on the server.</t> <t>The retry mechanism repairs inconsistencies, provided the TLS server has a certificate for the public name. If server and advertised keys mismatch, the server will reject ECH and respond with "retry_configs". If the server does not understand the "encrypted_client_hello" extension at all, it will ignore it as required by <xref section="4.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>. Provided the server can present a certificate valid for the public name, the client can safely retry with updated settings, as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t> <t>Unless ECH is disabled as a result of successfully establishing a connection to the public name, the client MUST NOT fall back to using unencrypted ClientHellos, as this allows a network attacker to disclose the contents of thisClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, including the SNI. It MAY attempt to use another server from the DNS results, if one is provided.</t> <t>In order to ensure that the retry mechanism workssuccessfullysuccessfully, servers SHOULD ensure that every endpoint which might receive a TLS connection is provisioned with an appropriate certificate for the public name. This is especially important during periods of server reconfiguration when different endpoints might have different configurations.</t> </section> <section anchor="middleboxes"> <name>Middleboxes</name> <!--[rfced] How may we update this sentence to make it clear whether all the requirements or only some of the requirements require proxies to act as conforming TLS client and server? For background, in general, the RPC recommends using nonrestrictive "which" and restrictive "that". (More details are on https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/tips/) However, edits to that usage have not been made in this document. In this specific sentence, we are asking about the usage because it can affect the understanding of the statement. Original: The requirements in [RFC8446], Section 9.3 which require proxies to act as conforming TLS client and server provide interoperability with TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports ECH but the proxy does not, as detailed below. Option A (all requirements require it): The requirements in [RFC8446], Section 9.3, which require proxies to act as conforming TLS client and server, provide interoperability with TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports ECH but the proxy does not, as detailed below. Option B (some requirements require it): The requirements in [RFC8446], Section 9.3 that require proxies to act as conforming TLS client and server provide interoperability with TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports ECH but the proxy does not, as detailed below. --> <t>The requirements in <xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/> which require proxies to act as conforming TLS client and server provide interoperability with TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports ECH but the proxy does not, as detailed below.</t> <t>The proxy must ignore unknownparameters,parameters and generate its ownClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> containing only parameters it understands. Thus, when presenting a certificate to the client or sending aClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> to the server, the proxy will act as if connecting to theClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> server_name, which SHOULD match the public name (see <xreftarget="real-ech"/>),target="real-ech"/>) without echoing the "encrypted_client_hello" extension.</t> <t>Depending on whether the client is configured to accept the proxy's certificate as authoritative for the public name, this may trigger the retry logic described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/> or result in a connection failure. A proxy which is not authoritative for the public name cannot forge a signal to disable ECH.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="no-sni"> <name>Deployment Impact</name> <t>Some use cases which depend on information ECH encrypts may break with the deployment of ECH. The extent of breakage depends on a number of external factors, including, for example, whether ECH can be disabled, whether or not the party disabling ECH is trusted to do so, and whether or not client implementations will fall back to TLS without ECH in the event of disablement.</t> <t>Depending on implementation details and deployment settings, use cases which depend on plaintext TLS information may require fundamentally different approaches to continue working. For example, in managed enterprise settings, one approach may be to disable ECH entirely via group policy and for client implementations to honor this action. Server deployments which depend on SNI -- e.g., for load balancing -- may no longer function properly without updates; the nature of those updates is out of scope of this specification.</t> <t>In the context of <xref target="rejected-ech"/>, another approach may be to intercept and decrypt client TLS connections. The feasibility of alternative solutions is specific to individual deployments.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="compliance"> <name>Compliance Requirements</name> <t>In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, a compliant ECH application MUST implement the following HPKE cipher suite:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>KEM: DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) (see <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of"target="HPKE"/>)</t>target="RFC9180"/>)</t> </li> <li> <t>KDF: HKDF-SHA256 (see <xref section="7.2" sectionFormat="of"target="HPKE"/>)</t>target="RFC9180"/>)</t> </li> <li> <t>AEAD: AES-128-GCM (see <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="of"target="HPKE"/>)</t>target="RFC9180"/>)</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="security-considerations"> <name>Security Considerations</name> <t>This section contains security considerations for ECH.</t> <section anchor="goals"> <name>Security and Privacy Goals</name> <t>ECH considers two types of attackers: passive and active. Passive attackers can read packets from the network, but they cannot perform any sort of active behavior such as probing servers or querying DNS. A middlebox that filters based on plaintext packet contents is one example of a passive attacker. In contrast, active attackers can also write packets into the network for malicious purposes, such as interfering with existing connections, probing servers, and querying DNS. In short, an active attacker corresponds to the conventional threat model <xref target="RFC3552"/> for TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t> <t>Passive and active attackers can exist anywhere in the network, including between the client and client-facing server, as well as between the client-facing and backend servers when running ECH inSplit Mode.split mode. However, forSplit Modesplit mode in particular, ECH makes two additional assumptions:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>The channel between each client-facing and each backend server is authenticated such that the backend server only accepts messages from trusted client-facing servers. The exact mechanism for establishing this authenticated channel is out of scope for this document.</t> </li> <li> <t>The attacker cannot correlate messages between a client and client-facing server with messages between client-facing and backend server. Such correlation could allow an attacker to link information unique to a backend server, such as their server name or IP address, with a client's encryptedClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. Correlation could occur through timing analysis of messages across the client-facing server, or via examining the contents of messages sent between client-facing and backend servers. The exact mechanism for preventing this sort of correlation is out of scope for this document.</t> </li> </ol> <t>Given this threat model, the primary goals of ECH are as follows.</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>Security preservation. Use of ECH does not weaken the security properties of TLS without ECH.</t> </li> <li> <t>Handshake privacy. TLS connection establishment to a server name within an anonymity set is indistinguishable from a connection to any other server name within the anonymity set. (The anonymity set is defined in <xref target="intro"/>.)</t> </li> <li> <t>Downgrade resistance. An attacker cannot downgrade a connection that attempts to use ECH to one that does not use ECH.</t> </li> </ol> <t>These properties were formally proven in <xref target="ECH-Analysis"/>.</t> <t>With regards to handshake privacy, client-facing server configuration determines the size of the anonymity set. For example, if a client-facing server uses distinctECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values for each server name, then each anonymity set has size k = 1. Client-facing servers SHOULD deploy ECH in such a way so as to maximize the size of the anonymity set where possible. This means client-facing servers should use the sameECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> for as many server names as possible. An attacker can distinguish two server names that have differentECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values based on theECHClientHello.config_id<tt>ECHClientHello</tt>.<tt>config_id</tt> value.</t> <t>This also means public information in a TLS handshake should be consistent across server names. For example, if a client-facing server services many backend origin server names, only one of which supports some cipher suite, it may be possible to identify that server name based on the contents of the unencrypted handshake message. Similarly, if a backend origin reuses KeyShare values, then that provides a unique identifier for that server.</t> <t>Beyond these primary security and privacy goals, ECH also aims to hide, to some extent, the fact that it is being used at all. Specifically, the GREASE ECH extension described in <xref target="grease-ech"/> does not change the security properties of the TLS handshake at all. Its goal is to provide "cover" for the real ECH protocol (<xref target="real-ech"/>), as a means of addressing the "do not stick out" requirements of <xref target="RFC8744"/>. See <xref target="dont-stick-out"/> for details.</t> </section> <section anchor="plaintext-dns"> <name>Unauthenticated and Plaintext DNS</name> <t>ECH supports delivery of configurations through the DNS using SVCB or HTTPSrecords,records without requiring any verifiable authenticity or provenance information <xreftarget="ECH-IN-DNS"/>.target="RFCYYY1"/>. This means that any attacker which can inject DNS responses or poison DNS caches, which is a common scenario in client access networks, can supply clients with fake ECH configurations (so that the client encrypts data to them) or strip the ECH configurations from the response. However, in the face of an attacker that controls DNS, no encryption scheme can work because the attacker can replace the IP address, thus blocking client connections, or substitute a unique IP address for each DNS name that was looked up. Thus, using DNS records without additional authentication does not make the situation significantly worse.</t> <t>Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense against this form of attack, but encrypted DNS transport is also a defense against DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common case whereClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> and SNI encryption are desired. Moreover, as noted in the introduction, SNI encryption is less useful without encryption of DNS queries in transit.</t> </section> <section anchor="client-tracking"> <name>Client Tracking</name> <t>A malicious client-facing server could distribute unique, per-clientECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures as a way of tracking clients across subsequent connections. On-path adversaries which know about these unique keys could also track clients in this way by observing TLS connection attempts.</t> <t>The cost of this type of attack scales linearly with the desired number of target clients. Moreover, DNS caching behavior makes targeting individual users for extended periods of time, e.g., using per-clientECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures delivered via HTTPS RRs with high TTLs, challenging. Clients can help mitigate this problem by flushing any DNS orECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> state upon changing networks (this may not be possible if clients use the operating system resolver rather than doing their own resolution).</t><t>ECHConfig<t><tt>ECHConfig</tt> rotation rate is also an issue for non-malicious servers, which may want to rotate keys frequently to limit exposure if the key is compromised. Rotating too frequently limits the client anonymity set. In practice, servers which service many server names and thus have high loads are the best candidates to be client-facing servers and so anonymity sets will typically involve many connections even with fairly fast rotation intervals.</t> </section> <section anchor="ignored-configs"> <name>Ignored Configuration Identifiers and Trial Decryption</name> <t>Ignoring configuration identifiers may be useful in scenarios where clients and client-facing servers do not want to reveal information about the client-facing server in the "encrypted_client_hello" extension. In such settings, clients send a randomly generatedconfig_id<tt>config_id</tt> in theECHClientHello.<tt>ECHClientHello</tt>. Servers in these settings must perform trial decryption since they cannot identify the client's chosen ECH key using theconfig_id<tt>config_id</tt> value. As a result, ignoring configuration identifiers may exacerbate DoS attacks. Specifically, an adversary may send maliciousClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> messages, i.e., those which will not decrypt with any known ECH key, in order to force wasteful decryption. Servers that support this feature should, for example, implement some form of rate limiting mechanism to limit the potential damage caused by such attacks.</t> <t>Unless specified by the application using (D)TLS or externally configured, implementations MUST NOT use this mode.</t> </section> <section anchor="outer-clienthello"> <name>Outer ClientHello</name> <t>Any information that the client includes in theClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> is visible to passive observers. The client SHOULD NOT send values in theClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> which would reveal a sensitiveClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> property, such as the true server name. It MAY send values associated with the public name in theClientHelloOuter.</t><tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t> <t>In particular, some extensions require the client send a server-name-specific value in theClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. These values may reveal information about the true server name. For example, the "cached_info"ClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> extension <xref target="RFC7924"/> can contain the hash of a previously observed server certificate. The client SHOULD NOT send values associated with the true server name in theClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It MAY send such values in theClientHelloInner.</t><tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t> <t>A client may also use different preferences in different contexts. For example, it may send different ALPN lists to different servers or in different application contexts. A client that treats this context as sensitive SHOULD NOT send context-specific values inClientHelloOuter.</t><tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t> <t>Values which are independent of the true server name, or other information the client wishes to protect, MAY be included inClientHelloOuter.<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. If they match the correspondingClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, they MAY be compressed as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>. However, note that the payload length reveals information about which extensions are compressed, so inner extensions which only sometimes match the corresponding outer extension SHOULD NOT be compressed.</t> <t>Clients MAY include additional extensions inClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to avoid signaling unusual behavior to passive observers, provided the choice of value and value itself are not sensitive. See <xref target="dont-stick-out"/>.</t> </section> <section anchor="inner-clienthello"> <name>Inner ClientHello</name> <t>Values which depend on the contents ofClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, such as the true server name, can influence how client-facing servers process this message. In particular, timing side channels can reveal information about the contents ofClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. Implementations should take such side channels into consideration when reasoning about the privacy properties that ECH provides.</t> </section> <section anchor="related-privacy-leaks"> <name>Related Privacy Leaks</name> <t>ECH requires encrypted DNS to be an effective privacy protection mechanism. However, verifying the server's identity from the Certificate message, particularly when using the X509 CertificateType, may result in additional network traffic that may reveal the server identity. Examples of this traffic may include requests for revocation information, such asOCSPOnline Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) orCRLCertificate Revocation List (CRL) traffic, or requests for repository information, such as authorityInformationAccess. It may also include implementation-specific traffic for additional information sources as part of verification.</t> <t>Implementations SHOULD avoid leaking information that may identify the server. Even when sent over an encrypted transport, such requests may result in indirect exposure of the server's identity, such as indicating a specific CA or service being used. To mitigate this risk, servers SHOULD deliver such information in-band when possible, such as through the use of OCSP stapling, and clients SHOULD take steps to minimize or protect such requests during certificate validation.</t> <t>Attacks that rely on non-ECH traffic to infer server identity in an ECH connection are out of scope for this document. For example, a client that connects to a particular host prior to ECH deployment may later resume a connection to that same host after ECH deployment. An adversary that observes this can deduce that the ECH-enabled connection was made to a host that the client previously connected to and which is within the same anonymity set.</t> </section> <section anchor="cookies"> <name>Cookies</name> <t><xref section="4.2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/> defines a cookie value that servers may send in HelloRetryRequest for clients to echo in the secondClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. While ECH encrypts the cookie in the secondClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the backend server's HelloRetryRequest is unencrypted.This means differences in cookies between backend servers, such as lengths or cleartext components, may leak information about the server identity.</t> <t>Backend servers in an anonymity set SHOULD NOT reveal information in the cookie which identifies the server. This may be done by handling HelloRetryRequest statefully, thus not sending cookies, or by using the same cookie construction for all backend servers.</t> <t>Note that, if the cookie includes a key name, analogous to <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5077"/>, this may leak information if different backend servers issue cookies with different key names at the time of the connection. In particular, if the deployment operates inSplit Mode,split mode, the backend servers may not share cookie encryption keys. Backend servers may mitigate thisbyeither by handling key rotation with trialdecryption,decryption or by coordinating to match key names.</t> </section> <section anchor="attacks-exploiting-acceptance-confirmation"> <name>Attacks Exploiting Acceptance Confirmation</name> <t>To signal acceptance, the backend server overwrites 8 bytes of itsServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> with a value derived from theClientHelloInner.random.<tt>ClientHelloInner.random</tt>. (See <xref target="backend-server"/> for details.) This behavior increases the likelihood of theServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> colliding with theServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> of a previous session, potentially reducing the overall security of the protocol. However, the remaining 24 bytes provide enough entropy to ensure this is not a practical avenue of attack.</t> <t>On the other hand, the probability that two 8-byte strings are the same is non-negligible. This poses a modest operational risk. Suppose the client-facing server terminates the connection (i.e., ECH is rejected or bypassed): if the last 8 bytes of itsServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> coincide with the confirmation signal, then the client will incorrectly presume acceptance and proceed as if the backend server terminated the connection. However, the probability of a false positive occurring for a given connection is only 1 in 2^64. This value is smaller than the probability of network connection failures in practice.</t> <t>Note that the same bytes of theServerHello.random<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> are used to implement downgrade protection for TLS 1.3 (see <xref section="4.1.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>). These mechanisms do not interfere because the backend server only signals ECH acceptance in TLS 1.3 or higher.</t> </section> <section anchor="comparison-against-criteria"> <name>Comparison Against Criteria</name> <t><xref target="RFC8744"/> lists several requirements for SNI encryption. In this section, were-iteratereiterate these requirements and assess the ECH design against them.</t> <section anchor="mitigate-cut-and-paste-attacks"> <name>Mitigate Cut-and-Paste Attacks</name> <t>Since servers process eitherClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> orClientHelloOuter,<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>, and becauseClientHelloInner.random<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.random is encrypted, it is not possible for an attacker to "cut and paste" the ECH value in a different Client Hello and learn information fromClientHelloInner.</t><tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t> </section> <section anchor="avoid-widely-shared-secrets"> <name>Avoid Widely Shared Secrets</name> <t>This design depends upon DNS as a vehicle for semi-static public key distribution. Server operators may partition their private keys however they see fit provided each server behind an IP address has the corresponding private key to decrypt a key. Thus, when one ECH key is provided, sharing is optimally bound by the number of hosts that share an IP address. Server operators may further limit sharing of private keys by publishing different DNS records containingECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values with different public keys using a short TTL.</t> </section> <section anchor="sni-based-denial-of-service-attacks"> <name>SNI-Based Denial-of-Service Attacks</name> <t>This design requires servers to decryptClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> messages withECHClientHello<tt>ECHClientHello</tt> extensions carrying valid digests. Thus, it is possible for an attacker to force decryption operations on the server. This attack is bound by the number of valid transport connections an attacker can open.</t> </section> <section anchor="dont-stick-out"> <name>Do Not Stick Out</name> <t>As a means of reducing the impact of network ossification, <xref target="RFC8744"/> recommends SNI-protection mechanisms be designed in such a way that network operators do not differentiate connections using the mechanism from connections not using the mechanism. To that end, ECH is designed to resemble a standard TLS handshake as much as possible. The most obvious difference is the extension itself: as long as middleboxes ignore it, as required by <xref target="RFC8446"/>, the rest of the handshake is designed to look very much as usual.</t> <t>The GREASE ECH protocol described in <xref target="grease-ech"/> provides a low-risk way to evaluate the deployability of ECH. It is designed to mimic the real ECH protocol (<xref target="real-ech"/>) without changing the security properties of the handshake. The underlying theory is that if GREASE ECH is deployable without triggering middlebox misbehavior, and real ECH looks enough like GREASE ECH, then ECH should be deployable as well. Thus, the strategy for mitigating network ossification is to deploy GREASE ECH widely enough to disincentivize differential treatment of the real ECH protocol by the network.</t> <t>Ensuring that networks do not differentiate between real ECH and GREASE ECH may not be feasible for all implementations. While most middleboxes will not treat them differently, some operators may wish to block real ECH usage but allow GREASE ECH. This specification aims to provide a baseline security level that most deployments can achieveeasily,easily while providing implementations enough flexibility to achieve stronger security where possible. Minimally, real ECH is designed to be indifferentiable from GREASE ECH for passive adversaries with following capabilities:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>The attacker does not know theECHConfigList<tt>ECHConfigList</tt> used by the server.</t> </li> <li> <t>The attacker keeps per-connection state only. In particular, it does not track endpoints across connections.</t> </li> </ol> <t>Moreover, real ECH and GREASE ECH are designed so that the following features do not noticeably vary to the attacker, i.e., they are not distinguishers:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>the code points of extensions negotiated in the clear, and their order;</t> </li> <li> <t>the length of messages; and</t> </li> <li> <t>the values of plaintext alert messages.</t> </li> </ol> <t>This leaves a variety of practical differentiators out-of-scope. including, though not limited to, the following:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>the value of the configuration identifier;</t> </li> <li> <t>the value of the outer SNI;</t> </li> <li> <t>the TLS version negotiated, which may depend on ECH acceptance;</t> </li> <li> <t>client authentication, which may depend on ECH acceptance; and</t> </li> <li> <t>HRR issuance, which may depend on ECH acceptance.</t> </li> </ol> <t>These can be addressed with more sophisticated implementations, but some mitigations require coordination between the client and server, and even across different client and server implementations. These mitigations are out-of-scope for this specification.</t> </section> <section anchor="maintain-forward-secrecy"> <name>Maintain Forward Secrecy</name> <t>This design does not provide forward secrecy for the innerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> because the server's ECH key is static. However, the window of exposure is bound by the key lifetime. It is RECOMMENDED that servers rotate keys regularly.</t> </section> <section anchor="enable-multi-party-security-contexts"> <name>Enable Multi-party Security Contexts</name> <t>This design permits servers operating inSplit Modesplit mode to forward connections directly to backend origin servers. The client authenticates the identity of the backend origin server, thereby allowing the backend origin server to hide behind the client-facing server without the client-facing server decrypting and reencrypting the connection.</t> <t>Conversely, if the DNS records used for configuration are authenticated, e.g., via DNSSEC, spoofing a client-facing server operating inSplit Modesplit mode is not possible. See <xref target="plaintext-dns"/> for more details regarding plaintext DNS.</t> <t>Authenticating theECHConfig<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure naturally authenticates the included public name. This also authenticates any retry signals from the client-facing server because the client validates the server certificate against the public name before retrying.</t> </section> <section anchor="support-multiple-protocols"> <name>Support Multiple Protocols</name> <t>This design has no impact on application layer protocol negotiation. It may affect connection routing, server certificate selection, and client certificate verification. Thus, it is compatible with multiple application and transport protocols. By encrypting the entireClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, this design additionally supports encrypting the ALPN extension.</t> </section> </section> <section anchor="padding-policy"> <name>Padding Policy</name> <t>Variations in the length of theClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> ciphertext could leak information about the corresponding plaintext. <xref target="padding"/> describes a RECOMMENDED padding mechanism for clients aimed at reducing potential information leakage.</t> </section> <section anchor="active-attack-mitigations"> <name>Active Attack Mitigations</name> <t>This section describes the rationale for ECH properties and mechanics as defenses against active attacks. In all the attacks below, the attacker is on-path between the target client and server. The goal of the attacker is to learn private information about the innerClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, such as the true SNI value.</t> <section anchor="flow-client-reaction"> <name>Client Reaction Attack Mitigation</name> <t>This attack uses the client's reaction to an incorrect certificate as an oracle. The attacker intercepts a legitimateClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> and replies with a ServerHello, Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished messages, wherein the Certificate message contains a "test" certificate for the domain name it wishes to query. If the client decrypted the Certificate and failed verification (or leaked information about its verification process by a timing side channel), the attacker learns that its test certificate name was incorrect. As an example, suppose the client's SNI value in its innerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> is "example.com," and the attacker replied with a Certificate for "test.com". If the client produces a verification failure alert because of the mismatch faster than it would due to the Certificate signature validation, information about the name leaks. Note that the attacker can also withhold the CertificateVerify message. In that scenario, a client which first verifies the Certificate would then respond similarly and leak the same information.</t> <figure anchor="flow-diagram-client-reaction"> <name>Clientreaction attack</name>Reaction Attack</name> <artwork><![CDATA[ Client Attacker Server ClientHello + key_share + ech ------> (intercept) -----> X (drop) ServerHello + key_share {EncryptedExtensions} {CertificateRequest*} {Certificate*} {CertificateVerify*} <------ Alert ------> ]]></artwork> </figure><t>ClientHelloInner.random<t><tt>ClientHelloInner.random</tt> prevents this attack. In particular, since the attacker does not have access to this value, it cannot produce the right transcript and handshake keys needed for encrypting the Certificate message. Thus, the client will fail to decrypt the Certificate and abort the connection.</t> </section> <section anchor="flow-hrr-hijack"> <name>HelloRetryRequest Hijack Mitigation</name> <t>This attack aims to exploit server HRR state management to recover information about a legitimateClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> using its own attacker-controlledClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. To begin, the attacker intercepts and forwards a legitimateClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> with an "encrypted_client_hello" (ech) extension to the server, which triggers a legitimate HelloRetryRequest in return. Rather than forward the retry to the client, the attacker attempts to generate its ownClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> in response based on the contents of the firstClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> and HelloRetryRequest exchange with the result that the server encrypts the Certificate to the attacker. If the server used the SNI from the firstClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> and the key share from the second (attacker-controlled)ClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, the Certificate produced would leak the client's chosen SNI to the attacker.</t> <figure anchor="flow-diagram-hrr-hijack"> <name>HelloRetryRequesthijack attack</name>Hijack Attack</name> <artwork><![CDATA[ Client Attacker Server ClientHello + key_share + ech ------> (forward) -------> HelloRetryRequest + key_share (intercept) <------- ClientHello + key_share' + ech' -------> ServerHello + key_share {EncryptedExtensions} {CertificateRequest*} {Certificate*} {CertificateVerify*} {Finished} <------- (process server flight) ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>This attack is mitigated by using the same HPKE context for bothClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> messages. The attacker does not possess the context's keys, so it cannot generate a valid encryption of the second innerClientHello.</t><tt>ClientHello</tt>.</t> <t>If the attacker could manipulate the secondClientHello,<tt>ClientHello</tt>, it might be possible for the server to act as an oracle if it required parameters from the firstClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> to match that of the secondClientHello.<tt>ClientHello</tt>. For example, imagine the client's original SNI value in the innerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> is "example.com", and the attacker's hijacked SNI value in its innerClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> is "test.com". A server which checks these for equality and changes behavior based on the result can be used as an oracle to learn the client's SNI.</t> </section> <section anchor="flow-clienthello-malleability"> <name>ClientHello Malleability Mitigation</name> <t>This attack aims to leak information about secret parts of the encryptedClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> by adding attacker-controlled parameters and observing the server's response. In particular, the compression mechanism described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/> references parts of a potentially attacker-controlledClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to constructClientHelloInner,<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, or a buggy server may incorrectly apply parameters fromClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to the handshake.</t> <t>To begin, the attacker first interacts with a server to obtain a resumption ticket for a given test domain, such as "example.com". Later, upon receipt of aClientHelloOuter,<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>, it modifies it such that the server will process the resumption ticket withClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. If the server only accepts resumption PSKs that match the server name, it will fail the PSK binder check with an alert whenClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> is for "example.com" but silently ignore the PSK and continue whenClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> is for any other name. This introduces an oracle for testing encrypted SNI values.</t> <figure anchor="tls-clienthello-malleability"> <name>MessageflowFlow formalleableMalleable ClientHello</name> <artwork><![CDATA[ Client Attacker Server handshake and ticket for "example.com" <--------> ClientHello + key_share + ech + ech_outer_extensions(pre_shared_key) + pre_shared_key --------> (intercept) ClientHello + key_share + ech + ech_outer_extensions(pre_shared_key) + pre_shared_key' --------> Alert -or- ServerHello ... Finished <-------- ]]></artwork> </figure> <t>This attack may be generalized to any parameter which the server varies by server name, such as ALPN preferences.</t> <t>ECH mitigates this attack by only negotiating TLS parameters fromClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> and authenticating all inputs to theClientHelloInner (EncodedClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> (<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> andClientHelloOuter)<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>) with the HPKE AEAD. See <xref target="authenticating-outer"/>. The decompression process in <xref target="encoding-inner"/> forbids "encrypted_client_hello" in OuterExtensions. This ensures the unauthenticated portion ofClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> is not incorporated intoClientHelloInner.<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. An earlier iteration of this specification only encrypted and authenticated the "server_name" extension, which left the overallClientHello<tt>ClientHello</tt> vulnerable to an analogue of this attack.</t> </section> <section anchor="decompression-amp"> <name>ClientHelloInner Packet Amplification Mitigation</name> <t>Client-facing servers must decompress EncodedClientHelloInners. A malicious attacker may craft a packet which takes excessive resources to decompress or may be much larger than the incoming packet:</t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>If looking up aClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> extension takes time linear in the number of extensions, the overall decoding process would take O(M*N) time, where M is the number of extensions inClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> and N is the size of OuterExtensions.</t> </li> <li> <t>If the sameClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> extension can be copied multiple times, an attacker could cause the client-facing server to construct a largeClientHelloInner<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> by including a large extension inClientHelloOuter,<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> of lengthL,L and an OuterExtensions list referencing N copies of that extension. The client-facing server would then use O(N*L) memory in response to O(N+L) bandwidth from the client. Insplit-mode,split mode, anO(N*L) sizedO(N*L)-sized packet would then be transmitted to the backend server.</t> </li> </ul> <t>ECH mitigates this attack by requiring that OuterExtensions be referenced in order, that duplicate references be rejected, and by recommending that client-facing servers use a linear scan to perform decompression. These requirements are detailed in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>.</t> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="iana-considerations"> <name>IANA Considerations</name> <section anchor="update-of-the-tls-extensiontype-registry"> <name>Update of the TLS ExtensionType Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created the following entries in the existingregistry for"TLS ExtensionType Values" registry (defined in <xref target="RFC8446"/>):</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li><t>encrypted_client_hello(0xfe0d),<t>encrypted_client_hello (0xfe0d), with "TLS 1.3" column values set to "CH, HRR, EE", "DTLS-Only" column set to "N", and "Recommended" column set to"Yes".</t>"Y".</t> </li> <li><t>ech_outer_extensions(0xfd00),<t>ech_outer_extensions (0xfd00), with the "TLS 1.3" column values set to "CH", "DTLS-Only" column set to "N", "Recommended" column set to"Yes","Y", and the "Comment" column set to "Only appears in inner CH."</t> </li> </ol> </section> <section anchor="alerts"> <name>Update of the TLS Alert Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created an entry,ech_required(121)ech_required (121) in the existing "TLS Alerts" registryfor Alerts(defined in <xref target="RFC8446"/>), with the "DTLS-OK" column set to "Y".</t> </section> <section anchor="config-extensions-iana"> <name>ECH Configuration Extension Registry</name> <t>IANAis requested to createhas created a new"ECHConfig"TLS ECHConfig Extension" registry in a new "TLS Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) Configuration Extensions"page.registry group. New registrationsneed towill list the following attributes:</t> <dl spacing="compact"> <dt>Value:</dt> <dd> <t>The two-byte identifier for the ECHConfigExtension, i.e., the ECHConfigExtensionType</t> </dd> <dt>Extension Name:</dt> <dd> <t>Name of the ECHConfigExtension</t> </dd> <dt>Recommended:</dt> <dd> <t>A "Y" or "N" value indicating if the extension is TLS WG recommends that the extension be supported. This column is assigned a value of "N" unless explicitly requested. Adding a value with a value of "Y" requires Standards Action <xref target="RFC8126"/>.</t> </dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd> <t>The specification where the ECHConfigExtension is defined</t> </dd> <dt>Notes:</dt> <dd> <t>Any notes associated with the entry</t> </dd> </dl> <t>New entries in the"ECHConfig"TLS ECHConfig Extension" registry are subject to the Specification Required registration policy (<xref section="4.6" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8126"/>), with the policies described in <xref section="17" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8447"/>. IANA[shall add/has added]has added the following note to theTLS"TLS ECHConfigExtensionExtension" registry:</t> <t>Note: The role of the designated expert is described in RFC 8447. The designated expert <xref target="RFC8126"/> ensures that the specification is publicly available. It is sufficient to have an Internet-Draft (that is posted and never published as an RFC) or a document from another standards body, industry consortium, university site, etc. The expert may provide morein depthin-depth reviews, but their approval should not be taken as an endorsement of the extension.</t> <t>This document defines several Reserved values for ECH configuration extensions to be used for "greasing" as described in <xref target="server-greasing"/>.</t> <t>The initial contents for this registry consists of multiple reservedvalues,values with the following attributes, which are repeated for each registration:</t> <dl spacing="compact"> <dt>Value:</dt> <dd> <t>0x0000, 0x1A1A, 0x2A2A, 0x3A3A, 0x4A4A, 0x5A5A, 0x6A6A, 0x7A7A, 0x8A8A, 0x9A9A, 0xAAAA, 0xBABA, 0xCACA, 0xDADA, 0xEAEA, 0xFAFA</t> </dd> <dt>Extension Name:</dt> <dd> <t>RESERVED</t> </dd> <dt>Recommended:</dt> <dd> <t>Y</t> </dd> <dt>Reference:</dt> <dd><t>This document</t><t>RFC 9849</t> </dd> <dt>Notes:</dt> <dd><t>Grease entries.</t><t>GREASE entries</t> </dd> </dl> </section> </section> </middle> <back> <displayreference target="RFC9180" to="HPKE"/> <displayreference target="RFC9499" to="DNS-TERMS"/> <displayreference target="I-D.kazuho-protected-sni" to="PROTECTED-SNI"/> <references anchor="sec-combined-references"> <name>References</name> <references anchor="sec-normative-references"> <name>Normative References</name> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7918.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9180.xml"/> <referenceanchor="RFC2119"> <front> <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title> <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/> <date month="March" year="1997"/> <abstract> <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7918"> <front> <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start</title> <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/> <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/> <author fullname="B. Moeller" initials="B." surname="Moeller"/> <date month="August" year="2016"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies an optional behavior of Transport Layer Security (TLS) client implementations, dubbed "False Start". It affects only protocol timing, not on-the-wire protocol data, and can be implemented unilaterally. A TLS False Start reduces handshake latency to one round trip.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7918"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7918"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8446"> <front> <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title> <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/> <date month="August" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t> <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9147"> <front> <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title> <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/> <date month="April" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t> <t>The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.</t> <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6347.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8174"> <front> <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title> <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/> <date month="May" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9460"> <front> <title>Service Binding and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS Resource Records)</title> <author fullname="B. Schwartz" initials="B." surname="Schwartz"/> <author fullname="M. Bishop" initials="M." surname="Bishop"/> <author fullname="E. Nygren" initials="E." surname="Nygren"/> <date month="November" year="2023"/> <abstract> <t>This document specifies the "SVCB" ("Service Binding") and "HTTPS" DNS resource record (RR) types to facilitate the lookup of information needed to make connections to network services, such as for HTTP origins. SVCB records allow a service to be provided from multiple alternative endpoints, each with associated parameters (such as transport protocol configuration), and are extensible to support future uses (such as keys for encrypting the TLS ClientHello). They also enable aliasing of apex domains, which is not possible with CNAME. The HTTPS RR is a variation of SVCB for use with HTTP (see RFC 9110, "HTTP Semantics"). By providing more information to the client before it attempts to establish a connection, these records offer potential benefits to both performance and privacy.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9460"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9460"/> </reference> <reference anchor="ECH-IN-DNS">anchor="RFCYYY1" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcYYY1"> <front> <title>Bootstrapping TLS Encrypted ClientHello with DNS Service Bindings</title> <author initials="B." surname="Schwartz" fullname="Benjamin M.Schwartz" initials="B. M." surname="Schwartz"> <organization>Meta Platforms, Inc.</organization>Schwartz"> <organization/> </author> <authorfullname="Mike Bishop"initials="M."surname="Bishop"> <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>surname="Bishop" fullname="Mike Bishop"> <organization/> </author> <authorfullname="Erik Nygren"initials="E."surname="Nygren"> <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>surname="Nygren" fullname="Erik Nygren"> <organization/> </author> <dateday="12" month="February" year="2025"/> <abstract> <t> To use TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) the client needs to learn the ECH configuration for a server before it attempts a connection to the server. This specification provides a mechanism for conveying the ECH configuration information via DNS, using a SVCB or HTTPS record. </t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech-07"/> </reference> <reference anchor="HPKE"> <front> <title>Hybrid Public Key Encryption</title> <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/> <author fullname="K. Bhargavan" initials="K." surname="Bhargavan"/> <author fullname="B. Lipp" initials="B." surname="Lipp"/> <author fullname="C. Wood" initials="C." surname="Wood"/> <date month="February" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes a scheme for hybrid public key encryption (HPKE). This scheme provides a variant of public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key. It also includes three authenticated variants, including one that authenticates possession of a pre-shared key and two optional ones that authenticate possession of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) private key. HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric KEM, key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption function. Some authenticated variants may not be supported by all KEMs. We provide instantiations of the scheme using widely used and efficient primitives, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), and SHA2.</t> <t>This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9180"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9180"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC6125"> <front> <title>Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title> <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/> <author fullname="J. Hodges" initials="J." surname="Hodges"/> <date month="March" year="2011"/> <abstract> <t>Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6125"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6125"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5890"> <front> <title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework</title> <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/> <date month="August" year="2010"/> <abstract> <t>This document is one of a collection that, together, describe the protocol and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA), superseding the earlier version. It describes the document collection and provides definitions and other material that are common to the set. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8126"> <front> <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title> <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/> <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/> <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/> <date month="June" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t> <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t> <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8447"> <front> <title>IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS</title> <author fullname="J. Salowey" initials="J." surname="Salowey"/> <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/> <date month="August" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes a number of changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries that range from adding notes to the registry all the way to changing the registration policy. These changes were mostly motivated by WG review of the TLS- and DTLS-related registries undertaken as part of the TLS 1.3 development process.</t> <t>This document updates the following RFCs: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5705, 5878, 6520, and 7301.</t> </abstract>year="2025" month="December"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="8447"/>value="YYY1"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC8447"/>value="10.17487/RFCYYY1"/> </reference> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9147.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9460.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9525.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5890.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8447.xml"/> </references> <references anchor="sec-informative-references"> <name>Informative References</name> <reference anchor="WHATWG-IPV4" target="https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-ipv4-parser"> <front> <title>URLLiving Standard- IPv4 Parser</title> <author><organization/><organization>WHATWG</organization> </author> <date year="2021" month="May"/> </front> <refcontent>WHATWG Living Standard</refcontent> </reference> <reference anchor="ECH-Analysis" target="https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/vincent.cheval/publis/BCW-ccs22.pdf"> <front> <title>A Symbolic Analysis of Privacy for TLS 1.3 with Encrypted Client Hello</title><author> <organization/> </author> <date year="2022" month="November"/> </front> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7301"> <front> <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension</title> <author fullname="S. Friedl" initials="S." surname="Friedl"/> <author fullname="A. Popov" initials="A." surname="Popov"/> <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/> <author fullname="E. Stephan" initials="E." surname="Stephan"/> <date month="July" year="2014"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which multiple application protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7301"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7301"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8484"> <front> <title>DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)</title> <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/> <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus"/> <date month="October" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document defines a protocol for sending DNS queries and getting DNS responses over HTTPS. Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into an HTTP exchange.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8484"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8484"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7858"> <front> <title>Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title> <author fullname="Z. Hu" initials="Z." surname="Hu"/> <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/> <author fullname="J. Heidemann" initials="J." surname="Heidemann"/> <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/> <author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels"/> <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/> <date month="May" year="2016"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in RFC 7626. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.</t> <t>This document focuses on securing stub-to-recursive traffic, as per the charter of the DPRIVE Working Group. It does not prevent future applications of the protocol to recursive-to-authoritative traffic.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7858"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7858"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8094"> <front> <title>DNS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title> <author fullname="T. Reddy" initials="T." surname="Reddy"/> <author fullname="D. Wing" initials="D." surname="Wing"/> <author fullname="P. Patil" initials="P." surname="Patil"/> <date month="February" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path between the DNS client and its server. These queries and responses can contain privacy-sensitive information, which is valuable to protect.</t> <t>This document proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS, to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks. As latency is critical for DNS, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to reduce DTLS round trips and reduce the DTLS handshake size. The proposed mechanism runs over port 853.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8094"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8094"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC9250"> <front> <title>DNS over Dedicated QUIC Connections</title> <author fullname="C. Huitema" initials="C." surname="Huitema"/> <author fullname="S. Dickinson" initials="S." surname="Dickinson"/> <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/> <date month="May" year="2022"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes the use of QUIC to provide transport confidentiality for DNS. The encryption provided by QUIC has similar properties to those provided by TLS, while QUIC transport eliminates the head-of-line blocking issues inherent with TCP and provides more efficient packet-loss recovery than UDP. DNS over QUIC (DoQ) has privacy properties similar to DNS over TLS (DoT) specified in RFC 7858, and latency characteristics similar to classic DNS over UDP. This specification describes the use of DoQ as a general-purpose transport for DNS and includes the use of DoQ for stub to recursive, recursive to authoritative, and zone transfer scenarios.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9250"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9250"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8701"> <front> <title>Applying Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) to TLS Extensibility</title> <author fullname="D. Benjamin" initials="D." surname="Benjamin"/> <date month="January" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes GREASE (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility), a mechanism to prevent extensibility failures in the TLS ecosystem. It reserves a set of TLS protocol values that may be advertised to ensure peers correctly handle unknown values.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8701"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8701"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3986"> <front> <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title> <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/> <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/><authorfullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/> <date month="January" year="2005"/> <abstract> <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/> </reference> <reference anchor="DNS-TERMS"> <front> <title>DNS Terminology</title> <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/> <author fullname="K. Fujiwara"initials="K."surname="Fujiwara"/> <date month="March" year="2024"/> <abstract> <t>The Domain Name System (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.</t> <t>This document updates RFC 2308 by clarifying the definitions of "forwarder" and "QNAME". It obsoletes RFC 8499 by adding multiple terms and clarifications. Comprehensive lists of changed and new definitions can be found in Appendices A and B.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="219"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9499"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9499"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC3552"> <front> <title>Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations</title> <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>surname="Bhargavan"> <organization>Inria</organization> </author> <authorfullname="B. Korver" initials="B." surname="Korver"/> <date month="July" year="2003"/> <abstract> <t>All RFCs are required to have a Security Considerations section. Historically, such sections have been relatively weak. This document provides guidelines to RFC authors on how to write a good Security Considerations section. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="72"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3552"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3552"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8744"> <front> <title>Issues and Requirements for Server Name Identification (SNI) Encryption in TLS</title>initials="V." surname="Cheval"> <organization>Inria</organization> </author> <authorfullname="C. Huitema"initials="C."surname="Huitema"/>surname="Wood"> <organization>Cloudflare</organization> </author> <datemonth="July" year="2020"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes the general problem of encrypting the Server Name Identification (SNI) TLS parameter. The proposed solutions hide a hidden service behind a fronting service, only disclosing the SNI of the fronting service to external observers. This document lists known attacks against SNI encryption, discusses the current "HTTP co-tenancy" solution, and presents requirements for future TLS-layer solutions.</t> <t>In practice, it may well be that no solution can meet every requirement and that practical solutions will have to make some compromises.</t> </abstract>year="2022" month="November"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="RFC" value="8744"/> <seriesInfoname="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC8744"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC7924"> <front> <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cached Information Extension</title> <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <date month="July" year="2016"/> <abstract> <t>Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes often include fairly static information, such as the server certificate and a listvalue="10.1145/3548606.3559360"/> <refcontent>CCS '22: Proceedings oftrusted certification authorities (CAs). This information can be of considerable size, particularly if the server certificate is bundled with a complete certificate chain (i.e.,thecertificates of intermediate CAs up to the root CA).</t> <t>This document defines an extension that allows a TLS client to inform a server of cached information, thereby enabling the server to omit already available information.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7924"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7924"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC5077"> <front> <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State</title> <author fullname="J. Salowey" initials="J." surname="Salowey"/> <author fullname="H. Zhou" initials="H." surname="Zhou"/> <author fullname="P. Eronen" initials="P." surname="Eronen"/> <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/> <date month="January" year="2008"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes a mechanism that enables the Transport Layer Security (TLS) server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per-client session state. The TLS server encapsulates the session state into a ticket and forwards it to the client. The client can subsequently resume a session using the obtained ticket. This document obsoletes RFC 4507. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5077"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5077"/> </reference> <reference anchor="I-D.kazuho-protected-sni"> <front> <title>TLS Extensions for Protecting SNI</title> <author fullname="Kazuho Oku" initials="K." surname="Oku"> </author> <date day="18" month="July" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t> This memo introduces TLS extensions2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer anda DNS Resource Record Type that can be used to protect attackers from obtaining the value of the Server Name Indication extension being transmitted over a Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3 handshake. </t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kazuho-protected-sni-00"/>Communications Security, pp. 365-379</refcontent> </reference> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9499.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.kazuho-protected-sni.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7301.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8484.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7858.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8094.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9250.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8701.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3552.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8744.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7924.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5077.xml"/> </references> </references> <?line2017?>2147?> <section anchor="linear-outer-extensions"><name>Linear-time<name>Linear-Time Outer Extension Processing</name> <t>The following procedure processes the "ech_outer_extensions" extension (see <xref target="encoding-inner"/>) in linear time, ensuring that each referenced extension in theClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> is included at most once:</t> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <t>Let I be initialized to zero and N be set to the number of extensions inClientHelloOuter.</t><tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t> </li> <li> <t>For each extension type, E, in OuterExtensions: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>If E is "encrypted_client_hello", abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert and terminate this procedure.</t> </li> <li> <t>While I is less than N and the I-th extension ofClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> does not have type E, increment I.</t> </li> <li> <t>If I is equal to N, abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert and terminate this procedure.</t> </li> <li> <t>Otherwise, the I-th extension ofClientHelloOuter<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> has type E. Copy it to theEncodedClientHelloInner<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> and increment I.</t> </li> </ul> </li> </ol> </section> <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements"> <name>Acknowledgements</name> <t>This document draws extensively from ideas in <xref target="I-D.kazuho-protected-sni"/>, but is a much more limited mechanism because it depends on the DNS for the protection of the ECH key.Richard Barnes, Christian Huitema, Patrick McManus, Matthew Prince, Nick Sullivan, Martin Thomson, and David Benjamin<contact fullname="Richard Barnes"/>, <contact fullname="Christian Huitema"/>, <contact fullname="Patrick McManus"/>, <contact fullname="Matthew Prince"/>, <contact fullname="Nick Sullivan"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Thomson"/>, and <contact fullname="David Benjamin"/> also provided important ideas and contributions.</t> </section><section anchor="change-log"> <name>Change Log</name> <ul empty="true"> <li> <t><strong>RFC Editor's Note:</strong> Please remove this section prior to publication of a final version of this document.</t> </li> </ul> <t>Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp.</t> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-16"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-16</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Keep-alive</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-15"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-15</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Add CCS2022 reference and summary (#539)</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-14"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-14</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Keep-alive</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-13"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-13</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Editorial improvements</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-12"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-12</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Abort on duplicate OuterExtensions (#514)</t> </li> <li> <t>Improve EncodedClientHelloInner definition (#503)</t> </li> <li> <t>Clarify retry configuration usage (#498)</t> </li> <li> <t>Expand on config_id generation implications (#491)</t> </li> <li> <t>Server-side acceptance signal extension GREASE (#481)</t> </li> <li> <t>Refactor overview, client implementation, and middlebox sections (#480, #478, #475, #508)</t> </li> <li> <t>Editorial iprovements (#485, #488, #490, #495, #496, #499, #500, #501, #504, #505, #507, #510, #511)</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-11"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-11</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Move ClientHello padding to the encoding (#443)</t> </li> <li> <t>Align codepoints (#464)</t> </li> <li> <t>Relax OuterExtensions checks for alignment with RFC8446 (#467)</t> </li> <li> <t>Clarify HRR acceptance and rejection logic (#470)</t> </li> <li> <t>Editorial improvements (#468, #465, #462, #461)</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-10"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-10</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Make HRR confirmation and ECH acceptance explicit (#422, #423)</t> </li> <li> <t>Relax computation of the acceptance signal (#420, #449)</t> </li> <li> <t>Simplify ClientHelloOuterAAD generation (#438, #442)</t> </li> <li> <t>Allow empty enc in ECHClientHello (#444)</t> </li> <li> <t>Authenticate ECHClientHello extensions position in ClientHelloOuterAAD (#410)</t> </li> <li> <t>Allow clients to send a dummy PSK and early_data in ClientHelloOuter when applicable (#414, #415)</t> </li> <li> <t>Compress ECHConfigContents (#409)</t> </li> <li> <t>Validate ECHConfig.contents.public_name (#413, #456)</t> </li> <li> <t>Validate ClientHelloInner contents (#411)</t> </li> <li> <t>Note split-mode challenges for HRR (#418)</t> </li> <li> <t>Editorial improvements (#428, #432, #439, #445, #458, #455)</t> </li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-09"> <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-09</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>Finalize HPKE dependency (#390)</t> </li> <li> <t>Move from client-computed to server-chosen, one-byte config identifier (#376, #381)</t> </li> <li> <t>Rename ECHConfigs to ECHConfigList (#391)</t> </li> <li> <t>Clarify some security and privacy properties (#385, #383)</t> </li> </ul> </section> </section></back> <!-- ##markdown-source:H4sIAAAAAAAAA8y9a3PcyJE2+r1+BZaKEyLt7h6RI81IGo93KYozYoxur6jx rMPrVwS70SSsbqANoEm1ZZ3ffvJalVVAk5S9H45i1xqRuBSqsrLy8uST4/HY dWW3KJ5m71+eZsfVtNmsumKWHS3KouqyF8ViUbv8/Lwprm68ZFZPq3wJj5k1 +bwbl0U3H3eLdly0VTk+eOSmeVdc1M3madZ2M+fKVfM065p12x08ePDkwYFr 1+fLsm3Luuo2K3jMyfH7n1zeFPnT7PT4yF3XzceLpl6v4K5F6z4WG/jJDC6r uqKpim78HF/rXNvl1exDvqgreMamaN2qfJr9pauno6ytm64p5i3812aJ//FX 5/J1d1k3T102dhn/Kav2aXY8yd4V7bRuFrn+nD/uuCmnvV/VzUVelf/IOxg8 jmhWrAr4n6rTC4plXi6eZsXH5r+abr6cTOulS1/5yyR783Edv+2X/B/ry9r+ PH7VT3nbLTbJWz7STfXH9X9d4A8GX/Z6kp2uF4vyKq/iN74upx97v4pfeoSr X180+epykx3VVbtedGV1kb18eZSMpCqnl/UibyetPPD3KBU3DOtokh1Ost/q ehaP6uiyKduuXl0WTXpBMrZFvZ7NFyA2yVCm+fV/XRb5CgZ6XnbtBCTGOVfV zRLuvCpAALJ3Px0d7O8/kf/8/sn+46cgptXcXvPbi8P3v/08Pnn7p4f4z0x2 zs6v715mL8srnIZTFMC8mWXj7OTt1cPsbd60RbNDV+fNRdE9zS67btU+/eab dbOYtKtiOrm+zLvriwl8yzf3pnU1LVawgVZXD8cruhnvncH2eZq9yjfZwYOD ffjJ8dGL8WGVLzZt2dJY/GAOs9PN8rxegKTqBVk9z942sATTTQYfRPt4f/Jt dl12l1s29A4/Mxny9fX1ZNpO6k+TfDpZf/xmVdSrRfENfPkU7pxML4urfPHN an2+KNtvnh39Np5O24ODyWo2p8fxV7yur4rlOawlfMoB/Zy3oXxHFqTCb41n lzCQ3MgkLjzutabMh2/60wTEBkdz5zuOYsni641EOTcej7P8vO2afAri8/4S JhbU3nqJkzYDpdCU50Wb5dmymF6CVLZLeHD2vsmrdgW6J3uZb+CjT4vpuim7 TbYLq7CHy+EKXgEUn1wWgdYAHtS2+UWRrUGdNPA7EIYr+A+a32kGSnDCg1qW s9kCRngP9WFTz9ZT3A/Z53sl/vOLc4cLmOD1xaVf+c+f/wOk/PHDh999+ZLJ +9tsWbcdykp3WWTwBbP2Mv9YjOArpov1DIcHv3AyiGnRdOW8RL0+wp83RQaz BEOEX+aL7DrftPj515egBbK8yuoKxBnELe+6fPoRHwCruSjypspWKJpdkfnd BmPPz+t1RwOBHVEV9EGT7D38e7XI4bOKTx1MJY3kNSgJB2oXx4K37p6+PtnL 4IKiwvMERzEwqXAO8NhgDB9behNLOxxloDQq2ih5dgFbvzJjgNlos1XRXOYr vonmrMVXoZaw3wBfN+9g7Qq/wVAceAEmqfygIoDpJPmpimu6zn/CCCZrsYAH bDl8d0Eb7OEq5F0GF9bXbTal38MQa11eHG3ZRFMBv8RPwHfxqk54VKum7uBz +QNhNmH9ZlmNi5yt4DdVV8JbNuarYeCLGZ6sa1xsus8drlYLXRIW/bfw2Hpa L7LXYArAM3i1Dl++fb3nQGF0IJX/ibr32wf7X77A/q3Hixrlayaja1lhwWKA TsNh0Aw1FQ3mqmzL8wV9jIMr5uXFuqE3tDT68+Iyvyrrxkpzu17hxoTn48P9 pdOSTpp2XXYF/cRd1tf4SZusKWArwyUwcfCYeolP4Zk2IgLzgDKAQp9XdbVZ 4m5vi26S7b6G2XO0TOUSFCeuPI1xLMs/zeDILKeFmcogx2DwFA2+EWeBRcmp MMMvs1mJc4AXzlHT5jBEGGdTgLEyGy9oBWBT4elU4gtg/+H3wPENF7pZOZ/D Hh6e0zB5Be4G3BnbVqQ//ZO97FfSYqRYQLqCegSjssgXrQiuziRcopNZXTj4 hDyDg7Arp2vQw/RimCGU0asSJmSUnYOimNUwB1XdySNla4uqmjf1kkQyWo4M PhMWMMdFTvXM82K1qDe0MXGhRIxb/QQ3L/JuLRpvVrbTddvy9v78eeZvBRl2 DnYmfhAODX4NtkexmMPazmGt6WPh82S30SBKtBtxgKKFw7ZU9ZSJelqCLQBz V8Pi+HXqLhvS8rxVcZarYhFkyQXVKVP9/PVp9vd1gQKBEqTPkXk7eZvlsxnI SFu0k+xFfY26feSCPsPb/Wq2/jX44xof8OL9+7ensqsfP3z88MuXUeZ/CZLy zXNUPbLrHz96DGeRXPzgCV2Mm8/f8H9+PTmS3z85ePTgyxcnMmDHgLJpdB+Z U2AE4EMWaBWD1iZxAAsQfQo8+leq2XHzL/NqYxRim12ifl+ikQsbVia/dbDL aHng6DHTNGErC46yuikv4LpolVgyCtJFJbwKBL5eLuGcCKKsmz4nOQbjD4Xj 02YC5zr/rqiuyqauULzakVfPTUGjIhmHw3SZNxvYxii3JZws5QXs5gysp3KR k5TUWX2unwf/mBW8EwpzvN9vvSgGIQ76MhxkkSUBqxv/+Mn+w+91HeFUg0X0 mlYEHK/HeacbV3JAtBO0ZcC5uMIhqF5+XszLqqR/O9oQYABl6Aa22c6rX0/f 74z47+z1G/rvd8cgMe+On+N/n744fPnS/4decfriza8v4fdO/ivcefTm1avj 18/5Zvhplvzo1eGfd1hgdt68fX/y5vXhyx2cFdIO/lBH9dDR2uO2a1ZNgZMH 66vWIs3ks6O32f5DmDFxQWgX0KTufw+7wF1fFiKcdQVKmf9Jx1G+WoEBhc8A dQ0KfVV2Oe53eEMLZ1aVoVkGThX8EvUyKCE+c0HuCtkH9FZcvRFapvTbb0lx 3cveXKGqLa5dMAro9C5p/CBVBR2ENVhDbL3B+FjLX6NpsaoX9QUqlnKxWKPR 3JHog3Uycqyerwuya2AdwLyHX76qZ8UOT+opCG/HPyCrr0VDa4bHMWpcO3so s/MajR460kWDw/jvZe/9GJz7f+GPN+31z+/HQ39+37vun+kP+KeD1x08eLD/ 9Pmzx0+f7sOf7dcNPU+Muj/QMP6I14lpPCk+5WgwoI/4Fc/rX8eug38cCMLX jC/9yV3nT/+wwW5+vctfPP4pn5L3A0v/DL0D+PuoXp6DTprt8dJ9fprda0lM xigI7O3+aCVHl3uzAw4P6EvzK9aUqmZRgPHfrKO9kYDmPggj/ka0PGy1GgQP zg7HVhRsgrrkQ7vsSCmzQeNfgUos2BH0IjUyQPY3oqB5GJO+UA7O5+/vOtWD q/bPuy7ooOz+c+BXx/CH747EddufP97p3QNyqe++dQv8e9/97815FguweKTm j4qziH6QZVRwsSh7ldeTZP+bviCjYTkszOpVizBP3LsczUJ+BNpDKtMDFwc5 t+/jQ8jKMJgJ8samWKDHHxvS2Tl8vT4lGiE637VLLPBk95BrQQ+kOYb9tkTz I6+6xWbkrWPrCzjvBoC/Atb5FDyp1n+FN37F9LDjLDY1f5r11x2+zhorPiYy oXXBH7HphYuh7o2e/iM8367h8INrwLXSYWDgLh03Gs34ux3+0vGcpYmnik9E 46rrrKHC4onbORcpkzvIX2jZPfFmqjgWZaIZ0Xsq+zIWjcSRBx29g0/i1eWm LacSDAAnDfUczM1pUYBh0Uqka0zu4awQfxDMG5S4ZR18pzjgg9YmeDLgYpFm XdDb0QUvOxIzEpfajHKUDc0bS2s8arYL0igKB0MoiOLc4eDDYPbQdm5pcKDI OcR5yYcW/TByeiW25Eq0XDUAg18ZQnc0urxt62lJp8Oy6HL02sH59KcPGUnw Gvhct255ZpZgS+nrWeCSN69bidTxW/wbXLKf4g9EK8sIr5uhsS37svd590lp LPNOnO9iUVzQsqBa4U9kQxNcC/A6WnTixSF4+N0DjO2AhDj4CW6Gk9djuO3H k/Hzic8atVfT8zE4dSIrGh1pRUpQGHqDajFdBJ7YFQYmxR0//dPRM5po9kRF 402yN+Qgw7hLuHpj/UeM9JLDtqpbcoYn2U8wAjl87N4g3470zOAcgY4s9Ae0 KX4Duz0EOa5zjc61Xc6LmYvfyfuBVqsFQz0R4RFsA4ywgEW9xhBd7nW3EeYR 65yGLXTREub3J6D5JKog4+kuOcxpHsuiestTnfn9m3XHghS9i36Kj+5Iqsuq Ahmr1212lS/WBUmSC5FEH+5inw92z47Xxx94rB8uKUERLnW7nz/7i8Yi3XTR ly97Guad5g2FOXAmiiEFIHPyU0mxr2ilYXhwTva+SZSQVy3v/T+yDg6J1vtD 8PPgouQcJHzq3D4caXPUav7YEg+bpKmmEDn+dFb4AK6NCZcYdESphJ1H+SV7 QrH8DC0O7HL4v2Qlm+JvHG/DV0/CyNo1naHzNap4GUc7MBBYxOscjYkhQaPB 8Vylsixro5+RnLJDo8WHYYRkimkyP2D366rGcOa04DRcWJf7rURt23j3+qgH KtqC9AHMOE43PNBd+1fAS3cxqsdXw7NRL435d3k1LUDESFLhLJ8WxawNZov/ DgdXg96BexebSUZ6QCIqPO3FbCS2hCZTYx8CB7VuKXZzvnHmG8hnMWF2Pj9O YBMXOTwTXyILW1eaGDC3w2Q2RQf6j4a8Xo27eowpuliR4efrOFkn74msa6jp os4XKOfyUZRyaNdke+RRYBx/peZDGSJoSVwW1TiYVGWLU7EGzUhfTtEK3FBw Ma7WBIyVpqhFI2K8Y72YwUxflgWpZBgIjQu/Dc+MfD4XCccIX/GJH5+pkYLr t8KToyBrz6dp2JTBJ8WGCx9sidXiH8YCwQlXupcCKsN2x1E02Z/voXhFC/CF A3BgALTZi7e/HLPBHgwJY17AkYpX/Eiht8d40tJC9Q4njuHgCa9uqVFQZ3A5 D+os4+MA1tJ6q/Uq//u6yF6sPhZvaRi/FJs/7E8mB/93/7vx/h9/oIvWYGzv f0cX/VIsT2Y/xD7YN99wPI/PaRlv78bZ/F+78RDkP73z1hv9Zx+ranu/WRU/ JDdqlGwfxMPR7TxH2WfvF/qhZx9n8w/l7IfoNzy2LIe//O++0G9ON0uwApty ekQZqFNMQP2w5R045seyqL1X0ISDbCx7v/HrJQL0AQQovmJoEJIS+8ApsT88 lKV++Ec7engoT9+2IQ/Pb4Z4nzAEkS3UZH94kIjUl4FHbHtZNCLcJh+mMrh4 Bpf5p3K5Xn5ApMmHRVFddJe9wchU4SUk5o8e/fGHG77K2DA3fQL8L2bM2ptW GKRSAuY/pD9Px9qCEQ737/rnT+TOPfPMDEwK8CMefJoXD2ZP+2MhM40HpTd8 Scf9AysCtnZUPQT7LtYlnBgGW0cG456SeSj/0kMDFRpbAn2HBlUVqL7ZxN7o JIRHjm2uYYdZIXELfB7aprebjhNRxW1GmYPyokLtjieE0YIufCadlLkfP0Xh Z7W13UBR8tLIp/I/MO0MmrbDxKtYhBWGImh+xM7hK/lHclq7OE3MB+jHcsUJ MTLD+Nd0nnL2KKNU+jUhMmh8bEU6AhPxrGmyOV4GERvnVAjgCw4r3QQ4eFxv SkBTXFQvyxjwlklOTB7KfhPlQ/R94qBK7IXvJZ+tMrOtohifPTiTN15zqwAG FYCflZ1FCiJ6EDgKG7UhE1E04A7junuLj05nczLvovuCAg7/2NmbZJj+Z6OI 52V48Gdeq5/x8NVMJlMvBD8woAPeam9WYLoGtJqKY11dgMtJyDpc97zvXs6z j1V9XZELgIJN/xrx1iSfjaA75wUn0evsH0VTw8Wd7lTOuy5X4HBkq3xGUAuw IeU/1V5Wn0d82TwEL2loPGhw1RHdw3nU4hMa2DwO2SvlfJQVk4vJyAWDnw2l 63IxmyIOr6L70VCezeBuxNbwj2QWY4iGc0bZy5RhUEOna1v4BKZtUkxGfl3g cYRuLWYY+1ivyKwejBMEJyfMHbg6oMqXZRsCCJrUHrk0fZha5/ANTzM2WxFX N+YPGuMXiAUrcBaPt9DcJLvcsMTlTGOydjrgweFko01EmsYqj3AGinMvwh5i Jhi9QueYwCkuigxSZjO7KCr69zYw3CQ7BiN/4JXukhLnB+Ma5qIjs4KTpsGi 4FGNgnI0P8UVgOMCDhGJlIVH4QRdUIwbZqnF5RXtIFIocoHPIj2v2AJUmY5Q O5MbpijOaFKCFLcLL/04zHjwu27QXbcoQa9ZaPnAmxqTWudUP1zV6NEpuDdS aKjJbhJZ8EkN4qJkIF7hI5B0DT7WLmbwWSaZ/9ZyBh/pApIS5XRos7V0OspL VClNUMUv+dPeqy5GQxe8rnwFjjXL2CsPPtr95fjVnv102neE7xLc0Vmwkc/u ZChkqaHgeAJYmOF9WwyG8B47eHOQyDzHzrsH9vWDWC4y2FX1y27lmXn+E+2O w+PD53YSVnnZBPQgYsQw8IzLF1CqrvdC0TdNkS9M2DasX4u4NrQZBIqFGhxG I/I8GHD3gdyWgK+whatpoQZjAvBDpanqEW4vQYP9g4EWvAda67365Qr/9RLG 4r0aNNWDhXsWXTS41yjKJ3GBQWFoCWBXTGF6SBRIJeCnrCiuhR8mW0piNB7p i+aehAQVgqSWdKtzQaglxSe1qMXlF5iPWWLcquW0RxxoOPFr3maf75kduDUF wvoVD/1aTAQzl6zMRooHtDtJ49MgyK18Jz5EIDcyjSza6wYhiAufXylm/sHw 8msQOIKxNcVVaSLIdMighdB2mG4juA2K7ShrEZjuZRAvmcLhEaU/3XpFMdDs /fuXuIxkIOEWArVkZ2HMswCibaHeHQqbBkYpwYNhwJaTqvpjAU6bXSPTgNsL LPwcDvtV0ZBtieOlc3CbpZFhcogEzxFWbXgh4AXwTVd1yfbSQE5PH8fL4LxG 5bgbjMiaoSFUnxXR6SugRhkFgVxh1ziDlsoY+nOxwfPiqsxNRLLFnAoMxRtP ddaANNdLSieiO+vsIOD4LdDeht+uQXQXUeQcrHLCmfcmBFO1nUZRqwIXB2OW +CkDX5hPmxpWL6Bh4zyoQc2dh6mawFkaW9EkanAFggcD4A9xUf7Jbvhkk/2z ABuMYnH9IfqAJnyrkRrHgjTJ/sSXWeRhU9ABUs4lnS/bx6wiTo+IvoKqwpIO aI/jkKbxysOYKhyxjJ0nm9kBTanWrmI4mxpOhjnb6QTyyxduvq6m/J8UVIVB ggOgoQB2xXDoeQhmgqL9/LkfQf3CWrJsmhrV3WcN4j2cHKAy8wBGg3K94QPI tuSv0M3Ix/PJ4evDCN7nyD7vzc+4zKsc3zYQmTXTxIeX84EOb6jzlc0aE9Lw uqhWoH1qH/Hq8M+CEsShoMjQ4cN5247MYIVMoqDQGQbqlKF8Bno+Z2wojoIM a1HY5k3noD8+TrJfq0X5sUiGNKIsuDfUUe2dI5754oJP6SXWTHU1bMtzby6l 803xHQ7v4A6gWbksEexMp+k55gDYH90HgY2MtRD5CI8kY4jQ/pfF9CMJ3roK AFc/IuPykEOMBtHQdbbeBLGS5CeM/NGD43BiNHaRWXEGoz2EdZmvyaqwNTBo QpVkVlPFQDVfsBHUS0TKUXpeaKiFpzXsb/sRartz9qZcoKKa5muZoRof6CJT HVMlLWNPKcjE9ggbGeyfY7q0pK14XneXDHm4AkdmRbvUxSnXEi3GyBnAZWB8 hcDw1piN7kqu/UD7F1xhUvCOwcxtttsKxAS15ljrE9BFQlQe2hRN3nZ87PVf yNFDB/ZZNJmsk9aYScR9WYUqFVgjd4+0ztaQYvDrPt/bkowGi7KGeUMwEDx/ IMN8p2y36ud+bpcyi3Io0oKQ9NMhgM9PdgCoygHHQa3kolovQ+B4eFC7HEfe G2W73z169O2jPQ0VR/kT523pVb5Z1PlM/eUwlMs89Vi97fzUWO48JhbR3Qd7 I17Z3f09CU+Hr+EXD8bV+xfGGQgbRzcGG14TR9I5lE6DeWp/rNmHWxMpP6R3 bc3pxOkIWIxeXqF/lUx2Ly9nB0/z1xv88XLVhaTQF5u4CBNifSSaA7OcFIAj LUe/QcsFzOSqU/ig7Mj+De6MfuNv4IM+vZr8EFAxOEz9TA2Romqj+i44e1Wt 2WoOPLPRECRHKzZAzFlGaT68gcvrFK0u9+oLksJCHmw6Fz3RdoPBGMnSJoHc ELOe+It9hGaKQfjY0LXSJQ+1xWze5toaOODDgdSGGNRsdSrgUxH3sYc3EJmf RAGIM/X24cU2wlH40Azr+ZEPdETlKQH9EjuWZ7L4Z1EahfMnGM0jAUGzp39i thz49NAQxELQr98hIOIdhhtowPIGGbSNLdCZpWfaMQcO0/kMamwULnZs4NAE DMVyNYTSg4zRyZFsrJDAueHsCDZMgM3C4NA2FFm++8kDzp7zOAbjBUh0djTw ScNu9MinTUz5hkz303AODalvH47JCL4iW6Q1impghOYc8ovOscPSFNbY+eHd MgBmI0OwC6XQLQPoyjaeKiNbvGixchsx5i4YAY6P63O0rjh8CItijM0P/uk7 oL8KihxGE8D5uniGevEqCkCZiFUwEkO8anR7wGokPvBAZDKRANdLUEhBD+pi djJFR3rA1g7DkuIo3w58rgfnJSESuze2yfHI+79ihpQMuk6WxR9SHthO+kY8 856O8HaW+7qt5HOGXyP8crTTvIiT8JfHfzVy3xuekXrOcrDZ3ld19pmZROhA J55dNs0HBrt9sJecDexzCYHIDh/DnaTE4jp3skYtuHgHZOJDA6Mom2Imgj3y aAC/wLQ30IqlcjicdFry4o4QUXahENVHp78i+wROpxDoXUmb4RhaGPyewsVr ZT/oHZls7dPvxyRIYOU/K+a4s0LAPDL1V/mslcQUxzYWG0qXcp1tHzxJVdz5 XY4Yj+jCHNINYhT5PHbCUnAMZnbbv3CW60M9/yAp3CBxw2MyQndmH38WzmbJ D5PqAKHCEtv8I6dJpvWKyp97E5FTeK3z2bczRJ1PNx8EMR3y5T5BTgYAYxbI LwRLkPPYbIQFQ9VOSNCYIagUhYz206AR1oI8p2eX3S3PnMWRKn3oo8m38kiu mPVo/KK1Jmf2wsN7/RPvw8fU64YTeZdFPuMIHg2nQlPxulhcFemvcbhssJ7R IuvMkSYDtY6VcPgLRkNKnvOsJwln6oiH5D7s+HcUqMVlWmDJehQI0grnHbRt qaBvh3Xhqm678d/XoIHBycsXF3UDP122IxgNfEJR9XceykMfZw7qYAGfSWbu J4z2Iqq8BZsNQ+JwXs7WU0HBwM8k+h7tTzSL2vV525UdIhiMWyAuBiMiWnct yYbZmhG4PY9AjQUJU2MsFikklvWVFjs2xWrBkWUb9sMc2bbtLqlpPJYXojzJ FgzGQRvZeypuIRf2dKuTP/AsdPFnDx7c5uJzYi2C9dHHB/PrDwcInHv4R9EN yW/jxDVNEVrV0QM1sUHpfz7MvDXCJzm5LDi127hfTIGCBNPpWDkv2MIB2xzH ASZHvW452pXOvy+B2zL15tW6leCrCi2a77tOIPalYIu2rfnEHfqQuBYm2BAv WY2+Ery3IyzQmsqncEMIKkGj3RIK5jSAHMZLtmoZv0HZjDA5BO5yvigmXU1K tElez4z0cJQ9G2VHdLov+ma180IQ3/NcbzseZT9JyvjW2Z9SDJuCm9Zhd1vm mNfVh8LDdBYlTk1/VutmKHo2VDxC5z2Jp7A5kXtrjrFIAdNZT8CRYawd4eVE ObMZwRcoIIpflS/rNVnFCsAiGpXZbGJVdZTIxGzocom8dTMP2mqnl8WyuClJ L8d432phTUfuKX0m8wegOsYKGzzvy47j8u02sR+FfAepS1S2G2LkmaOwJJYF 6DcZtoTpN/4zGOKCol2NcdpiJxh3KftcgveLyk/RuAQ1D4bG4oPPpwf36zVi OEsyXmgW1Xbptpk+lHGoV6XGu7aaMHQIDJ4l5DUilwnnY/PK3bYZaEbmSP0z 4hpKPHS0FKrnkbhYQVnoRRwiG3aN3/+vzC36apStSqqnqMYP4/Zwiv0uw7yJ PwNmcQqG2CSri8ETQO+NbjAPgnt6Ks1kxqYFPWGr13Hbw+ju95dpyHGgZs4u BBm1NUVt0wfC8SuYono6XUcqXzS9k4pgo9spS3VFPlkVWNlI7iStzPb4Cn8B F2GuXkG8jq8f4TafIvNmD67HX8AW06ww/g0puCVagWQcDqhRn6EKzErzdUNq WBiW9HEwkjGMi9zMkwQpHeAl4v4Mem8lZgIrTI92Jai67P+s8xnGG6YZ/jtL 4de7ar5y7SecEhVhGqocDlWHux8mYi/DwAnonBy+vCq5NkpLvpuy/TgBy5/f OqZdG4H8Iq0sV9FYSH/OfFmVIAww/uLmgrTOVusGDIqCM/aHIY024L3yAn2+ l0dX8YA4U+XFwwMaYylZgtc790jps/TZZ46P+Y9FsfIleVyIrmHTs3Q9zpz4 E3PY7pI8o001XiIBXn5eIhKAqjoJ+mQShf36TId12jlrgfR3h4fPNepkgNyE BsXJpOBsW+QLLX6vYaUpErbSMvbhOld8bikALgkVR8nUAW/9Fu/SE3Yih9J2 j5EuYyeUNx0Zw31X9I3kJzAA4jw6N4mkq9q9WcPRKTJTj8TaLEpeFoDchDcY MGXIjJEdzza9x4Xf6PNmW3ze7S6vI5eXeKXYLnsmSeMAFoiJ+TxcO5wSlGdO mY6Q6fKp2oloKjtO8aJNBXs/esJQeDxE/H/IOLWz4XRt7n5mLHSRvSNYlEXd HCKnyLolE1t+zJsj2/353fHh6fGeUql9j2yK7tZhXGCwt9AIrU6JrCR4DVTw jH4YnzROs+MFwwB80SmN/0IHDipwvVxuknnkiW4FRbstDDcDQRmDGz79iFpJ RJxwISB5Fefl97Jgm2oQGOt3y7kAEuDbsJJfiuqp4AFPD7gbi0r78BsOMmG8 l6eRniZKyU7RHpPsXZeqbd/gy6UeGdSqX9Ubkv4c+GJkLOmMddnlMiyJySt1 oY+Nuyi8TzC/wN+GRpMgty0Qlajb+NFcNY6QFxZ3V3ocMqsKBCn76EsABlOg LjxzMg0pSsRcn4FEdcjmighjGMgvz3/6hpDFX/OoOGU4cuppJ8ViCjDf+hy5 /mySvUG7NXd+XnuFZWIUR0CMhWc+jXKnZUdkLi6FQ5N53QXXUYDOeXx37Znv OADtWSqc5k5igD2V3lhJvWHoUQ5JzB6pRr9tn7MHE02A4YAYtJjUi/0bVnLA 4xWEmTP3OpbcmHtClk/OnIAmM5kPQrIJIYKZSt41YDAGXcN12Qc4nxTlDsZi gHb6+nMlRUiwmT6qGh7L1Buhqk/UU2UWgEBnnICcbB0oVvAvuSxAVU7g2z4Q IlocdmBYQCcX1Y0UTaFZKxXqXteL+knyDGgEae4Jc0OUo2MPoYgCa1iVjkGf xSYauJ6vNx70MQQQ1b+my3LinEiEaxsLB+h0WicbWhJIrvAXwBTj83xe7y7Z 6NafMz1Bx2clsr7nbuI72RZv7Scz02WgGaW0lo+G5JXHNygunLTTJ84unsHP Bc7rchuPXX18l/2YPS+88ejLtXcH9FyoGtmTaO505N/zY3ZadOvVM/j+0114 7mgrKR//2ekWLUaAd7J//jN78OnBA/zbv3SPo7asLMpISQg5L1g6W2xsryAy VRDuf0NBbFUO31Kx33l9VZhd5h3QWbq5tsddA4SOwjoYGkHgVOSUp2H7IWe2 4IiPiU/Q1slNUNfHoa3nHgdraSr7AeloS+s4Mw4r/Y/Glf6HcEODcSXjctOg AklIKEEBsahD6Hraed128ty2E7jf+gOLLFF8HhHcif46RHd5Vn7Knk8eRi7O Hm97pUrW9ZyZglmeefNwfrInR2EFpOyzDG8O4kO+McoQH+G404glv4i+iulX OKpGOFaVJ89PS4wgMt+Hf+bppigV2f5mggdPTnG64vwrzz+XPRgrWlfUGNJz GN9lcjeHs/huX2dGLCSFlFJk1Zp6LciDajGvWT8aL3sMqnLKWHnQlPyNakug n8eWmEIIhswuUyl6phhVVCwsR/TzwcJ7Om0lfMVLxusFM7Ea4V7m91PXhlCX ITWbclgMv2NE0ZbsHD7to0YgCFlCkukLAW+spsUBzPNyIRE4Ckkr462aBB6s hl8iR1z4Bi0WAbv4h4x3wjAiikTrtxuALaDBOGU6Q6W/szXN5bUXDk4WkQ4o D1FR5+bOjyRBozMkHLky+cucpHvYzFy1HwXwEwE50GiCTcsGWoSbojyFGMcw zrenv8Rcfylr3aAwD4WMwFVM51amo/XzQfK6dUoSSLVXtjvwkXjpB9jgIFIX xQeiKqYOKtu1AcE6BkPot4lBkTeLzQeMVd1RBMKYY5vvDs8xrGHmeEgEHveL L0VE/6gXb8I6xnxeYE7VF87i82gIHHYjEF0MJFthgLLPT/1wcjDZfyDYolBZ Xl5cdiEXT9meQVo5JOJA7a6tE0zNTxrurQrGy1LB+lTYvC231TBvHeOEnQKU tqZKOMzBIWAjuBrpCHVQF+tylnPaYSjD6Pu3UMTqJuAAxTvRNNKyygE2gQBb igc1Ej59Caf3o/14ZjiOndCmjujxRoEkrVWEjAdI9o3sm/jWKN7i2bQGQtuh AiP9COd+puhIfoPRd3fjnUMUNxrA21zrgVxJ3rpQrUw50m18dWzhUVj1JaXl wkxs+arA/cnxDZhm+kaM0QQXGvw7IXOlK9dLNcQDda5wiWhohmI8XX4hP48U vXhYltlvyEOgQ/ROGD4ZaFBVQkZioSNcvqRQTqGmMJIxALv0ePyxrbaU0qEt 7AD+TEow+CFE/QM9zkS0zuxq3m/1VhslontQvCg+y3E82q0/UPB/HML0I5Q6 NIsu6wVVvxlyHoPzfSnxdefAC0oiSKb8W+xzicZK6WRLRC3awEBq18AytRWp vu5MS+/yUMAb7ATOvwtTP4U8+7JPqWmpKbziAw8e1oOpZrsv3r3bGzl1l6TD Eh+7oTSiRebVPjgsPjC8k92qraa4v0jPbZHbiTsxIr5WCZ+jevYI48i5p199 0F/9qEplclrki90h1XGLx46xqOHdLt76iW901MvNwePPNP/FigB24nlZCVJl IJenGPZexg7Feu1zyeSBSJawTdKErv/YbEuKcOg1/UPiNotv+LT08IeQ9CKt cBYt0Bm3ScGdtIXiFnM/giLzLMAm44UNJyUHEVWeO+nJxPxIosYRV19+KgIr Zig0sSxY4g4zRRr/oiTaU3I5boa/M4BLULcMoUFIDbuug/WhQoAclYemU3G/ dTf5EK3mxepl2RHPaS38TKopSOpgLLuxy7Anh7z4KegGfL5nLpDamNokXaJF lllf4ZGJL479CnyctLcpmZ1j2ECz8Dh/iOeVpOducBVc3+aTQIv2jMD6Oylj oKCxuu6G/Dm8lOmtkjC2lIze4sMhOYOpZRNT/hrJUhXlRnpbU/zaGYjCTbYH Fde/4Us1ohJgpp6ToK2p55DlQM/4XVdlvVBWoHAfxfVcYoCaavx4kdkdHHJ0 PAGRnEiyQHfycruBWlqckyWxVHVmlnDsHgrhp8fMAsxQyIvOhFIWw+723NGD McVf6clwvjG7myvhz96wK/G2/dhaNkI5uIc9pH06wAMFDvOYI3jWiP/GxYTp Q0IbiX8Yvd/B0eOCoRlUYYiQ9+8eZd8ejM9LsHXXlfQUUrotIb3PteTtfL5u KfH3AXPCRfcBvLezSfay/FhgGnYU6Em4YhTHxdqFvsBt/4KtsAVYubdCtMhs C3CJzdhHUMIhnaMJIWfAbzLNXClqyK5PPIOyhqA82DiKfThfmcR0gALA+Co9 EBKHOi2m+AzfmBCJ34KDRFX9ziBI3wr08pQQpKC6FXRKluhwPKQ1wCDVJ3Kb SXN6yjU3aKhM/PEthQAfs35X0b51QSUckkELwCf2YvE1Wwwtw/Ek7HOKObUF qdKTKgJ2ef8W8Q0mFol0CXxKh4All0b1Mb1wIOCuFdrNAJFkFS4tkTFbflXO 1mCV2qwg9X6kTomDrUsz6SSIk1w2xrtbtyPeYqkKHWBZQISajN60l+TPaM13 yDTpVwmwTSnnxev17ZOCAxX5M3Vj3+e3ZAUzCfL5bIMwHYawCmZdT4zg9Cqz BRzDaEhq5Bw9kcCxjpXQc7BZRZ+C30lRCXTIzhtQs5ghp0iUPg07T/Aewkan YjG6v+xgS+Vv9if72E3u8mDnr7TXfyvO370/AnmYlXm4qc3+snNdnDfdFC+e juW//+pj6D7rn8/SeCrisBEpgDPLTFe4WF3d4dJjBYwifIQXFN9nDnbhQ8Lp sETzYRLIEubGlLqAgRURe+MmXCKRCFqTVJrn4Tpxd51A4qFLJUkCrL6Jxowt EKN8wJC6vN/GVJ/BZrGi4rMSMqNq93oPHwzeswF2VY/v9uetsky+VEz+4G1O uQv3tai4rxnFoS/I5BzOdOgZIDSl6DnKKjwfYSARaa53H4xgMOPs+Z7g6M0O dAfbXz8rZzTtWtCxfRC7RMUKdpECL4IxPvUNXcncrEzTzD0e4cvs99mT/sh8 6LlsY/1/62RU2UuGAAp36ZAvGO0bZdT1EJeoZgoW6CVIzUtiLrpMuT9vLteS tnJaiyG5TBJ7MIrmeUMLgI9/nf2YfbsPq7S7i2u1v5f9P2AgMWMuztLrgbXj Clva5ekcbRuWct553kC49tsDIajmIjnvjzPfn/cGhZjXagbZn7xtNWxNB6lo hL5FqVs6r2xzZ9QyaCZK3N3hugQnNZgkvusxBeHJ+/bH2NjSaLdx9x5HADnN LoB1TsA7o5eHsyjBxhv78CmjN7QEsCnABhAwL8eWE/oBigbIaJOvCJ9MfZLO WU6QiIjyuZh3ZqrCjHs4h3VHq+t5CJST9XjoA+Vgdd0QRXfusBf577EpReYt UTCzN8/PsSmfHoofD2TJDJXd1sSQwfrbg96gQbERLTZ9heNKCYC9DakTOADo MlAQJAmLV5FIWdTGdgRfpYZQ7EVwzEa/1BrN+LR+5XxvOIT/Tm3tkAOQaOHZ lqr61BuOq+oJbiSN5vjIszjvBeIvH3sV4c6s58++zllvInwx/MBE9CZq+GMH WBHsJzPc9GtI+Qn+WBUJRPNOqzfXcedeD3aMzIaN+TgaGHk7Sc8h5X7ewSqT WfGhQMpAdXTsiwbW9N9nS4jX1tm17QUKvnYhnfcqo4XUcA/d3PYCaX5i2l5H KQXIpRKr41As+fCkJQ/uh2DuwHOOClDLA6hWcnCEn+9FI7rrl/cbOhkfnsBY zsSqRkOpJQp9a/P4p1EUiEsJWokj0QrNOAc+BEFMDDNUm4jdZpa3AoUl73XP Mo0A00febw2TC7EzzkbMqxH7nmB/V7gCKxKgS6QlDyGmh5P9GMXl6Q/6h4GS YKXZn54Yxmwrt2oWm3phkv243GabJXdi7s0H0kVSwxr51+nYNV3M1mlaxBMj 3HrFQrIMBDi5E9JVMl0sUdRPUD/jayGsA0jioaf5abkJ3uk5+ekY19lWSDLm BTfgNEw78bCJbGmSlj4ilO7cgyQ9Yob7xeaLIcibmQlKKUh6wbes8NZgyuzA tvdqo9LSA3AOpw95IvEEM6WHftY8/uKuIGLCK23HWYSNe/sSjKQlHqeqBoU5 lA4TD3AbzW6KdeAJ4mS/9c0jcncx5+RgMiwrTKuMKewJcUK81/yiPtKTV1tS dw60iIkMcuSL7BhuR24bPk0SRwSERPtgWoSQLyER/I2T7F0RZjEaAZFiM5hJ y17T7UF5RTiQx5fl3+DXtD962HEFumzNNiftIUMyCTQGZfVjupibhC5V1gxg ShIXUXmGN7dSHT7JYjIJWw6E/BDagdCavfgosvWDb8Fg5NtwOqLb7bO8rS54 NGkWET8+3rWoTXyn6PQgvmt0+iYzQUthI/uifzL9jQqDbjcT/Ak8cnFxrU7k DcjZgSx3v4kLMxyYR3P8Mz79EbTa9ieSPVXcRfB7ATvQNSAOlG0KUb64xkUj YQygjanZ4is7at1MO1k6BhAemal7UV3NylbL3HoGAIZNF+Wdab3uwkiYTIEw PnORD/l60SHlmBEwzryk2ZGeAA76Cy6UCAp1NOIdEUxkq42IlMwnDfvDxSll dmRyi3+CjQNbqsuRgxlU9rL8h3SORGP0+yf7jwU/SAsQp5dQbbhEcPRDg+Qo Zitq/tofl5AE0KAE14cClLayIWV5MwlExADnmP/hnDnUNN+MKPu002mv/24s SZ6ydCciSeR26hgIQjSbFiwKwblEgTykLHR6C5TfEUY1hQbA/rrAEjiJGafF pa1shsUm1E/L8/SYOPE1fEyCOJSMoy5WpNgpxRDm1NgObohDMWyv+K2hBlpa UkgJ9PY3Ma8qJlVoI52DaU51lnSOlAgHXy3qDT4kaaA9NS8ieyTkXHkwLoSG GR/hO2Treb51TFo+jQshdZgdsXpjxs1noMzzy3kQE5pa5uRjW9A9f31KjZts l4mKOnlRgZ920YtRwwjsK6fcVbhyydipvOXaDHmijKQDa0X9BYqce/0o1eac 4mpgbGFLsNBZFyaZKTIoZQ7SPPjEKUExNpypwCmc0nl4BQ+pGZsixEQtJy9s r2EKdXqFBgoOtPxsA1uos5uOnhntD27PZjFE9oEE1JjW9UfT184nZKiDDRzr C/ulIxcMu8GPFMOnLQZvt/wCnRQBeSmPpoP0SWVaeItysFTIqWoxisMrDG3Y E8VrNKlC+3FzN/JeTePfeNhJiXw4Z9wdzhnei6S4yBAzakrOal+nbNHcpU+g 3FVVWRgEPoE2l7zBKCF5KjFxcag5muidlF03NyvsOFwsbkt8VfyUSQaWqRwv ya+cZiPBi1z7kuvc2zDKmxGQH1GzvoGmhJwUplSFT7pgfTGsX9txLCNW1LV/ iyI0sELrkrKAFda+SacYe74cagJUmAWiyXbb73sWcIfohKSNKjOtP3DBeiex 9bZjG6CLvrsM7r6LJl9dmnZ7ouEvhyQsmIM+ReNfR4sT6m/g7KREPQg6mluJ DeusDcvW/2HfDscbuLyWWlgIE05kaAvIcJsTwHWw8EDtyrM1/ubx825byrLk wr+b+lro5qBlIUwckXqwfWWIcAbNLBoFfy2+ehRHxMa9Ai14eznfBEGfIkZs zs/3rNkIVslucWi4ALeiG0wB1TZ70HHiGFawqVcN1+aLFzfOUoeMAoJtEBcz yL65KpFFtTrhRRy4ODJf5rXorACpw9Wr6oGHc6KTp0iXOIIceHq8GwbkPLtd ujjsNYHxMeYApHf+A8ru8+f/AGP/u/2DR5asRdrETOsGtgd+j3Yu5TxrsHto t4IjFiwv9IA+cQLfBDK/5zAm0sh8++TxdxL5+fz5txeH73/7eXzy9k8PQTSd zC8l+6S3KrEtk7VxbvoWcZ3+ydurh2Ekk5h+p0AQ0lRQzgiFRGdNkps3iJkT bIhWbHGvMJ5zcvfIkjRuCm4d34ksQKvhnsRnt2eLVxx2tYJONJsQeVX0Yg61 cdgTHb/EXvROnmg1ohizFkveuuCJ+ba1iZ/erybXSjuyshhWzLjJVpiUtYbb tyvqOyPvyY6KBgOPJF5N6SXhwBS94OaoaJS2wwxHKf172SrMy08GnpqoUAKi iigkcUp4GTBgERm9amGALSaEMHwaoB+OwM2m5KMBuYuWq95ijoLiEHtDO9/S FEQdmhLDxBQx3tT90zaOz5RUhCRFFCi2h2MhKhFYhvsckX6V3ZJ8IOiOJG6w /0Td8P743avTH5H/6+GTJ3RAUFIoo2Z/VLIjOjfIKw+EkAbiUsDk1d24LfCs JjSKIXt8+fxFtsjBiac1dYN0ZQeTbzkLhOro0eMnDygRhsc98TOyKMkj/T45 Ly5K8tWKoI6zw9OjkxMcDZmWcC/KLb+eOU87QpNl332bUVPe1piLkezHS0Qj 8MsiiG0u0oHvc/QCzfWLMUbgGny7DAk2L/xsF1sUZvcf3M8EGpndf3J/D7+i bN3Og087+J87D/57R45VaWNS41kr2JkNnzijaJbpJe4S3OMZuJNLbCZ5wwtH 2f3c/GB+nw3x+4f3nf/hT/f3tJsohbqjxU87Zsba2al2XpTws3zRivl0wj0q MaNFhj6s/E/cruwoqAbTdO3wz+R0W0DpAlySStM7eWZz0aQouf2Zs6qm0w6W pvFjjCNLIgckOeeFWHhTPQlgxHEphyhItNSEAyz0pOR+ZXWq9TRLS0UQmoKw ugT2j6IMHJ9hPofDVN3sIi3KJZ4MOAmDbTHQyG/BifEBvIQxh7VIHDHVOpDY g5G4HkZzCE7acdDpb57dKsT67XdQRNTRVsNGfotN7NmYify6URjrh84JDcyw hVnrGGjHEPemw3KRRuE4Hn6Wul7oSkj5n8NtkwTcLigpVs1Y86InuhHZQUwV h74OuZEmOWKzSGi1zNBQRHpr2tR81msQNqfNlc7rusOep6vEvg3c92TcZad/ OnpGqZFyWrxCx4xRXmDbwaPHJ6/HcJG17mgwLD8UfrrMtWghDB7vJNoYmA04 RrvCTC3vKZy+KOiWfkeCHHHsuJ4juL8Iy+CbUMmS1qEG7rqpkdfcWEjaA1Bj B9LqQVZggzaAPHfiAr9dG+uMeJsKepjmPG9NMMtpMCs9svEdtkivnBdEq0q2 0BRbFcKGwHZtrMwC8bl3dRlHpK4ZmuYuiRm1fonfnv4ieEguN1lI9CefI2AZ w6aUTFbLt84wh7ZEPDZ/J+8RKqKnegBsT8Qn5YaVT4XhS65JEdgtytT79y/b PflWb8whg2FML+eIsTAQHIbaOmEshLvMb0N5gu9Pbaww7c8g8ZzxNF8x2R59 nJTIIxsDPiqQCoWyKhRHyaqtUeEZ8Ck5yNSIhmvJJKTuxZnYIbGSRu2klDNS 6whZGrKfpaORzxUoEoxNxNZqIooYhYMl2C8k6bmp+jYVWfkVWKm53SEq9CFY FhenRSydd+7+2IejpB79qTiWtl7bUMxr9eWG3Fl7ua1Zt3eEDMi27obc+1lb KOJgvWEttHyfCjgXW3FK/PPi0BeTNzEoBB52iQMgXApGwnFWxRnCkpXEXEjt Adv6IFOPJ/5cYnPozctiMw7162yrR73qRLt9LBCXAIK2WnvuEgIb/HL8Kn5N wq+77VWhEO3l748Eji3hsyPnMfC8RIRmKD6tctuiN/A7ECCCGfxJfH0dglR9 SKRlG2TFBurJj9eK5et+3S3jleGB+RRPMDlgTacBDuv5XN4A1qEfqx1Gfmks NHDoK2j/DlvHA3xo86T92DW8MgUbnKG1lKGQMimuWvDVsd4MUUqs7VsX4+5z RANIz+VSeukSVbtWkXLzjXywB+HJkKF11+w4+zb956K7MpBI2J4tN5AtF6O6 SMN/ZWo8U4JeJ7FBCmKE9BK7bwnyNYYZtGJwuDQJ40uBBr4PpvNNKCcWFRwB 7aTUpS2pIYwpPq5MfaIRHTLVhXe95cybodhPezpijo3QXFPQJFFlrUONlxKJ ispqQw7UFEdyvBxPNwbYmNNte8/xqApRajveFSRbEUGh1G7jDqjQ3ucqhws0 MxvpwI4+kjHDoq6dbocNih2VCab81mqZNDM+YkBRuyqFDtqeiuLNgnSvWmVf UstJInoxv3TrhNJvsZES8qiguvd2bEslI+cDy3kWE+kGTJqj0WkSJzqE/MFE Hvs25KCiwLABA1THMDYxrij56WMUMWerzwnf6XW0iNyKXlqR98M1PWHAST2N Pjkb+mTHeVQZALlRgUBsmXF3H7ixwHxPf1on7qY5aJNJkEijTYJJ1tiRHS4R XvQaLio8w3AuBvqvU1ov+jRhA+boLhjQsgY+P9N/MQJk1xgXaQnk0DD3f8MB RudRryyYsgnw8MMeGbRHsVE6bhs4OZAffiQTB4+hwNizDdL7GCtXJzEZxwzr g6tpJ7YOemkYr6W8i/GwBBUo7pE8FUPNMTaCO1GxMsPTOoSQxwsY7MJ/qQJ5 lY1XmnXK6TebfM0nIJ6EVbyMGN6MLd2FOsu4iRQZHfC01YKWlKgYLloV1MPx sc6iOKP2DiaDHINDmT1JYd2kXh89fomJiEuKENAQxnbZtgIEVb3aTAA8qTR3 N1Rp1dWrelFfgAmDAVNVPihIqwVCaq7hBKgXuK5ah9QaLEaSZao9vh5rSsaB ImTinhcrMbrqOI9ZLyQjdRYTZJ1lvqud4mW4087wq8H8LBgsnjyH+qWfEVUo tyoeyfx7uORd+wSz34COdkccoH0EPmK51O3i1j4pVcpdhlkqzdBtw+wVZJGb 38Je6oiUNuQVksniIxVErCip8iPiITjjwqPbxmfTp5rJ3A59zU7LJcxLQ0Df dIzxHLmbR5fdMjpe5MEOxjcAc3HeiLDCD0qxe7ALWkY5yz5gf1f2s0LcBgil fMAxZN8T6yO6S+gfMpAZM5JtK+a+ak7+hRUbebIlDiQli9BekitGBpkjg4xG NoPNysdscHGEp4bdh+ExJsmo5CLsucjFgpXFsXztCt/eSIZ0MCcgDc+HaTDn +QNdwFZUGKMlWGp/g5rGrBTn4o8a/8SbURT253uD6sa5X1fEqIUTK2b/3Rwt OufoSIrpzbeqbUPoKLkFqn/2pbXgV2MG0xmKc0XCciQSD3g/5a0F7Vjgbrpn bJk8ubeYBWA0J0K1rE9OVChkX9Phi6Qo5nPutxG8zNQoSHcstFk4Mh8TWvql XSwKrTQiPwTOvxknYENQWrt+kqW1wI7mJRq3lhXEQPTw4DTldwWY1jMp+TpC 9nDpd262go+Oca4An2+YEZEwBKtLuE15CPhR9chMTWVK8lchrdZNL0fSwI7k 039XS3X+R/zhFARLHuxNbXuTlhYiJZxfTa7UYYi1KcIw+U0fhYPZP8Xg/Voc VJItDVQv6inlHFsxfFgRE5UKOQRiaLut0wZqdko8WVtD8hG+FF7rCC+mskCR IF4pwyfpsa6+p6vmXGL5zF0yg8qq2yOznGS/Vgt0FQW3G+LjA+wuVFPmgxG4 ZRpt1B0wfilbMKlGza1wiIm/Sxw6Hzqi/uXCQVVfabBtq/CPLIIByydYBG5W rIbCJVCAReMg/FKpUpuktGxLoLgNjum+4/prEjXxkcNYI2U3tPExkT1b8xxW VW7WAr9EkSgIz3O0fQIvvD+fUbsbr4W1di/+Dl9kbVB8TXmFz0Pvpf34zvUY Yf2LEnidMoBO+7053u0m76UmHu2N/Tpua9VxAzOooR19A57Bv0g76ulHB6dM 2EeHykVt4/fBBqdbyp+KtD+hJMvPMFl7Fg5BXIQwtRLwxtwXChp3DAuzh+Ym 0uNSmD30dTbUm0apnMxd0Ly2tuomGRza0xOXlMN7NKOpve0XAWIwZjtj9e0F vr5xbAuuZ+tY/ZBfeLv+wZhpNbUAXsm6E4ExW9jcQcNsgJJTOCmOlHkNtjCi byX0sTrBB9xvBgSOTFj6Lt1mJdQlQSZ6oRgdXBIChyRHwgc7pHBaXhKtNiOl UDlWIBzs8HRVbRaTL5aihvjImlhlrUgEJKFHFCAOElOnlfLKlh7dESXFykBp GCYMTBw84ECPrfKS0OvaQMVD000WnmZPA1Eaw6Go00Ss5dT+6EvoViPYtKKj veppRUJrhmt4zhgjNFjKdec+Vc73qdIzqDR4co6z95uJwemihLVzjQzSCF2v nDL5kH/JL/KPZ4s9rspIXkC7F6bhOm+47rhf+xugoR48HTv5SslqoxukZLeQ zPQ4Z+9Gz+AGP8CPHck+/bEb+RNbKqmdPYO1Ce7WkBFTqfD+t/MVAE9uS621 pa/fNvhAR4XOj6+2VhCEyZ5RnXY8fRF/Q0xaQzxaW1UwnTi4vtb2M41Jtk66 RQJH94R2DDbUaspo1oN9c+9Ec/K7LMr2buHw0BHCKeH70qBTc4c9rvBaYcyF vfrYAhpa6rPjsm09REFf4W6eyEjNYMrWWPgBcRO0YShhMJmQuw36huot33o9 61WUMV5A6PXJ0224F/lAzwF50Ho17uoxyhGH2tuQ68HJlpKzvqpXWYPpNH2W 2PCGyZJsh4cAhdNPqS79I/UmRO1Ku/QQnEjsKMrmUVjLkwHkFnxk6AVxUZMu rJZl3TeAJJCIT0XeKOWcNllsND4e8Gysy0t2Vq5zj8ScDeVw3bryeSlJ2MFE 4XL5I8d8XYSo5Io7tQPQnUQudHNJzl259kx3MJswWMJs4BwSnEDiLxLojAur xdTpuGHsVKAI6Iv7LDLv2D5WYDhYRorWuUPkkvfbvfa68sbNPxwRg7lynOPz 1RvYQau9MT9g8kSo1QfY+v28DVdsmZ3kgUsaR93asML6dxGWLPkmS8qVsG1s Pe6kvZRpa3JnzrRuoMbK9Woyd0C8UL1/8LcPMZwlnYJvc/S3B9ZAOn2PjpE3 yNIHwicS8R5i5G/4mj4z9Q0JEMP6WXax0YHBzmEH1rNWcGRKUqGqon19o2WV MU7+//897767OOxjE2DJ9ciIBvbXPFXqQ5ay61vKQ8tJcCF81nbqvbJzkbs8 PLjgOYf13tId6XYHeoCUqacTEOaM1oIPhM/6oI67mfYGm7/FyHexZUn+fWSj tutzLjPpyM25xVB1NxmqN6k3W8dBxee+xCaFp0rFuwu23h202vbDwt1Gz7du 1/mCLXpzvNBRbIzoAVfg/rZYoDT9ihB7cMRP3Cuwx+qBmoh/0Zr8X7Il/3ct SbQjhyJNw4dyXFC5TerzLpb6vtAwRMPLDH4zRvt3mDEimpFBf1XAkgOwykwp 6/LKRMCHQQ4cEdC6OaccZhlXWAgk+TJGxeNW6EKtHQwYLSLtGmrH6oIhHfbG JqpDKX1b0dYk5bYoI7LmsmcyET7dmbj4NtG54nZbd8p0pm3AMXEYJzyHV8Iz T7RbuHkr38x8ysypKeVY1AaUu6QoV2XS3CISU4dbVbRvCgtZnuPywCf0eXKp XXXDhEYN5dj9SUJf7iyzktQ0treOipTSSDoB08OYstd5Vu+hkTS+vxrGq0Ms N6K/DDxvjrg6USx7h4fwfnsgnx5pqu1j2uI+tetAp5mHE4JoInl5GMIH9Dxw HbmSnvUa4+QnWUTEniwJqtHrptSPSgiN6TEDMzQQk+DFC3bZACsvmGQvfnn+ 0/gYMfSz8UusBd0VG0x+QbAjJM7vhYr4zXtqs6Grpbl7+44dvWBgbvRXj8Vu Y5x/b0jMjm3QnL1F+B6XYJTtPNjxXiYqvVBM8AKJ/4QNmefSyBNb5HiJVgiw /KwrfroWemsBQCxsQip4ws23R7E0mZRf77Nc+k1P9h9+H77p0eQJ+HYhNE0e 3PA29ojwgOSLSSTnrIp9X6YQ93US9zXRiZqkp5aqBy+P9GEzOHwumnzmyexM 93MNTwxsEfhtqES6ycse4IQ2HCSDZ1v/MUklRRKQHyEzQauwMJXVNlW2oMiE uz+P5Dmw+BHv3sC5+mzdeTYThE+gjvV6Ru6Wrlv9u2U/79pEj8SsyyRzb3A+ xDzsDCGnf0teGQ95UHiGFHd/TgdUN/Ivd1nsqt/tCB2KXuJG5EPgVvWeefU+ aDNJQzTWu32HaH90+yEwUISSqHfkOR9Q8dkdVLxLVLyZhrtFOoKFu13bb+Fh /3c0/n5P5cNLsq9Q+3bOUtV/IqC34LRZwyFishzUAjgbQ98rkci7YFixlYRS 9mFZPxXACLIFO0no76Q8FB4Iu0zBHLndnMqdNauna3panKMUO5bjQdTyghd6 NGh9jwbyKAihEnPaFKAmCZCB9Et4N5hU4sz4T16WLbb5bp00Dpux2b5cwUu4 oyiooFawaIqIR9zUum1DnQVePubraFafFZuaGe7CeDG4jrHjjuhSiALND4Ox c8qNi+R0ME8LPLqLliqN1q3ybdXzpGNXzh05wDvA8G6bxqlduJU16ozA4Rz5 xoO2CvVN9sE4oKrmZktNhqBSiZeUUgjEDTyKBcZ06Hxdr9hF/fy5qsdtVQpX P0Pw/Gye0CxhbDmaNXBMKmQeYLoPPFxDEGVETY9VX0Vtn7get1fKxSxLZAtg DQCpjuITJbNVwlrNijJK3IAMtCGxXO9CG+yoJ/W69dYr2Rx1Wnni4/VrbEaI hawzMM+4v7NAH3Hs6GIr76kmBORblyltc1qvVLBDKokYah+PrAYSq1xsxgZp QO/R82PmG6iR/i0bpo2BBYI1C1wPFYcKGI77ye6bdlpUsLVrCvkFXh8v5LiN CIjqLtY5aMOuKGTS6HKU1npaLyjFwkpFaBSKrKnP12zQoNgi5sMw5k1LE81q N/CjpTjyoc+rn1XTZgjRdBIuajtHHeFASXP7pDEcIysYxlpqUIU75P11Hdg+ /feyAqBUopLdion3Kkne0Otj7TotGtKrvTyPw77SlvDCk2/bFFHcOIlmi/gZ LKOgtM7C9aDcEPfHDPRK5M8iaUA6BlDEOWMueUsKqSRNvjADN3jyrgU2TGm/ scfTBd5Xz/NE+owGQalutQQWVDIpqJeMI0y1XGIkTLbHEmXhnN9dsG6Pq1oi LtXAWdAUiHJps0R2RoHIEx+BisawE+YR490A7deEc9yeHSDZXw4mVYDAJiAo iOu/CVZKirYCL10as5sk6WmfIAuKxN3RaMoJbzzyOHPBBJRk2/oek1R5aR2X g6SNxVs7Z6GOSgH88bw5TxOYzl6/o3I+Z34aXDuJPc6EkooZaUcDUfpePZZA fKWNqmeWpAUVpDt8TwSPjxh6oxCeEORtG7Z3O+cYbydxJDILfI45S21wjCOo XZRG9w2FpWs6JWhhRy6UriQuXynbJNoWmfBwJHKR9OGfFTTsGZAry18SEpyo AXhqWordSdsl3RxcpeNbo8qB5gOm6WbDT2njCRYt5eIjkcn+CHIORsgKvO5O jmEmnJHSFpiguI7R6dhQqkNUPQI93bZ1nbdZSKsTsBs5UxqimIATEacTjvKy ntGsW4hmUJPcMCcgJfQzWsv1Gn6dlsbqUTGbLYrz+hNsbNFeafV4L6DwBMMJ vjaJ+53Cx39iViVHhXKceagb6itOMxhASVpjxSucGQuJDDMuRIN7xtp0gaZD XkBFIHIitz1mVw8cJ2pS5jvgwW18+kUM7+TcfO+vIz0v6mldMbw/lLlwgZ4y ZviMQJQ0YHecqx5hacPN1HDDq85WGto64YYkDSZawEhQHHeuA9QhT4tlOJ/E Xkv4binr6YREbNpjMOvl/w0KVm1T2Tx0pKTyrNw3gWZgb6QkAa5AOnLRDndA Ebi4ZBRmpruM2UDipBaaSVMfzKYPxta85gxA3buGsTTUFv5qcEca01HpJINy wTrZqYnnD2h+bjYYCpmMEheIEdjPuhwaTULv4NaRaZEw/ArbSJnwV9zE4l7k Pgtf3ud74v+EApwtDpj1t8iN0Y5CZE032MbaRz16lpFpqEQ/ouupLyI9H5OU eM74bsZazuLAU0ZnxRwi0kNdufp1+am0n8t79EwNv4QbcCo5ltN0SuisTAsY U27WrfRDn4ElLRHn+H5lwUiLamj3RCcsajNDgeG9tCv5fBkhmaCJOCfMq4ID ZHYn49GoxREWzKULFlxBYnRN3GXVynNQNjm9jwrx9CxwdFjlDGmvPSSJDs8S e95GDRPQ98orWE/kICKqRnRtglmEB7Y+UL2vWD6FIgcbcJV5dgGuzgr8CxDx jYJktfgmnX3kdasr5SLMuZxMc4o2akHz48L8oG8+HjMNOskUxfjO8wX4HrgY 8Ls4ruDTDSs6ixZ8DOEasyHY/sAojpxotsgUQgNJfkmp+DUbd8TlpraSum3K e3ZSBZvqE12f6pKRt5T6k8rRBFJ3LDOMI5DJiw0V6Y09R0oWiXgQryjtPVQ3 rq0Xa0Hpt8G/7LgrkvRsN3NMMbojopigEP07aylwFIV/88V/Zn7eKs8om0hp A++MDkLk/ef3EzmiL3wDkzvTx4rDYh7BuAXfKiROvzE4yhSOESfZL8evnmbP X8Bfu/998OjR/pMRh11PXxwePPpuLyW7/Z65ZfFZSDMN9z//6am9o3/DQXwD kmA9hf89He8fPB7/fPSqf8e39g4idAA3FVcrjoFKl+VW+Qc15N/q5dM4ZCpu Ox8N/pkoNW+xjAy23s81uMXIvId/fyHiQ/+QlipZMdHObLTiG7RPQcUy8xn5 nEQMAk6Z/kwvk040OXaOI8bnXl24klFxsxRLg0HckhhEwvfSC5xSWfiiUZCe cxNAQxX+93XB1JrUNOUQbGAxbAXnUS7IAGPaxEiB8hCDm8OoGtV/3Ol7lXwh xTan2iDe8Tjj7+egA+fudBaQ9NzOglSYgkhzxwJhcRo5/VDa70IAFccOzUYf pfPB55vOCLeRIaqDuiF64ywZbxYqCX39GDwfDzSuPOouqaUW1uYuhBrp20eP DgTOrgnIuPL9bU9QkvmhT8HlZiNejlEvH94mcFtqG7ZE61sq2MG/zX23xual 1U+zrnwna4RlEGEFkqMG3lmKgodfSJsYD8amSBF1lcUdFJihkVlmvVxpicK+ 1HqA21oVCz9UKvbuj5V+nCQT4HCxhO8z3hzeMU5xDeiIaKfZ0KOPdiVbR4P1 G63admhOBi+bjLReZ6FoOE4/LT0ZPbOwpmcmOhlBHFkjkFQuTF+EsKTbxMD5 QBfslS13bRcCsCyY+57fiz42VwZQsCT0a9Sau+pjZHmtq/LvGrlN655kQzsK cXtMEhr4MB2hMcJIk7O+JGmQ840hIMxutZCuTwwXoBinUnFjczb60HyxaUvS 5H5O8mlTt+3A3tARw7jQWkM1GCrrbCzIP4oCb3dNgt0gUZgtEA+Ye99gwx6k ZTCfeQdpcj+XTBRBaJKguNQnLpdYo0Gnnk8fNkVcpr4/CWfmionQpNXBr9ze KurKdQ3+jqcN8XehGYkpNua6TN0GknptCim13VOM9cesWX6XLbUsxAoPPhef yfknsBurzRJfjkkdjDBVXDZ5sYYHMCkss5/HQUZEJ3lSDyua8miy5OyzJ9nu +/Rn1IQ4AQpRhys4DPbwW5977ArMZ8lJADioq962DyCXeKBMvRVR5QpzrwJK BUAjqyK/5NhOW9gVIRb1uVC4UCCqkIQhEggfyn6hY+w33I/cm4rdkXTJhtPG cbjNGa4VBoj8w1OGJDMbu15gewzX1RGXhi+K7ZfraVtaSSn44LEcMbGoUDsk HNLH7MdsX6mrk5NA46fsEegJKcBTJJRuCWGIVNL5p1J5O+ynuvitfOx75m2L hx08ioR9yG1hD58zDdmS7McgxFRjGl5yWDkrb5nZIHRgR3eSPMVhVNeb6qhJ 99YaFLp4IkY8WYb8pRLqicC2lQSdg6gJ79I5cQlowy7R4HbEA+IzDF7Hv0pm yoHpUg3NjWKiJ46EK7YySChPzoFc+c46WZTeEW81MObXSmkjdfhWxdjZc/Z0 sWiAMBGe+dASi83DeevkE6TR9C/F5hRZtTyRScdYtrzT6DNmQOTcDrw70v3A DzXgKDrRJHyGtNatEnXABwvbgbTOeblkxVEisQ1WK+KscbSMjyQMg2WmHSx3 kGAeG8qawedqGMGDmkKFomFUStJTtlIx6EUGvtx0Wmk+Msy7juMEFgc/kJnh fQh/h8h7dnwAEyPBNDSfXd9NwsOUEeMtgA4WWz8+TiwsCJ5dfcdFaQmKmjA/ 68OHTCU6xL2e1NqiI/xrFdvM5A97TxBTUZ/vec9wPKvUL/YiD3ZESUkjsksi oklvdV1y4yvOxFGXBRjHi/fv3546brHQ+vC4ROqUV4vYKkpmi9RxUuCmkUOK muBZZZE2a0iLCqhvrSo83r7UYbXCkJPm3girSV70qi5beCr+fErxwVGIV1Ms ZokQTEEgYOm+GuKUb1PnrR1xTpULffkSqehAIuoBptZst61dUgURgtCm2e6S Wt4g3G6lCrfXf1OIY/2X2Z4hle44H5TyFj2+nVz6GgxDmIGRq2rTmF65zPHL yHe3LUWjM0U669IvTt46b9pTe4HzRc2kVJp8tn48hTjOQYS7NRXqimYKDwkH u7ZW43FfE5NW/ZHAT1Rbsm61ZIwXmeTOxzStXxq3YzatZj/qCa4tKDH5QFqo 6jA+WjdUunuEdMOoluBFp8dH2W4ZtTbQplYc5r7EWB9V6O2xTIHBCMoLbANh PyOznQJBPu7EsaJwHOAHhfa7ep7mTh7lidTwOn4C4WtD9EEOa6Ye8wEHDiFb QSfUj7Dfm0wbfgfGl41swBnjPCItlGPlNJUKSaRUJ7V8ZZRL8gxw6Ak8ADKF DCu6VOYKmBH8JgzslNLwEqeh7CaGZzB7r51I3KGJLW0xUtGsQBsITg0UORa4 EQbjxrJ+A10mpK86Gn1o2SnNmm50NUwCmDSKSr+pxqsc+4AjYgVRmT4fhblW rMzkyGCrw2EIlXriyMJLTX71dQL3dDgcZOMjkmCfdjY1eeI4aCUkwvskTM8l RV7gYKvn2NgEPHwS7VDfIWscklmuy5uLQkPwrV18VaI4FB/BlNAQ3UQIpxBq h3VvGGNJBzqCXAwGAHvFSFtX2ddDa2Qq6JwcVVgGAX48nT/Zu3eih7Hwibq1 jDzAkzI/RzKpqMeQ8DwDc728wDyqouUwtYXzPF+sBbMCRwx+Kwec/TgwbkNA TLI38EI9Hdyuz7YKTbK3FTE/LSNQ1Sp1FCi0BLJDtV4v0Ig1La+kbIKjK5iP p4sou7Fne/pkYI+wLmukkyjrjoqhZqResVVM2DcaUpUMHA76Wlpi07NEOucN izp36mE6puITfJdp+4bdOqQOGo4ohGpNsnc0HsrF1/Yh9ATLThNcNkd+ImJr G+qBUAQ0ptjnbNwPuUJkwq5bR04NyQDmxRhKSFFDLDYIzI+Cgxx0x7iJYx27 kpIvhe0kvRnK6goXi8diiaEw1OPEJChxj82x1MovDwW+r7QDXHbCbIrZUQRr PDFMmTia98RQ+TyUgn++l9IwOkePkgi6eZZl3RQPRhRxWRnMJZ8GXtNVW8Km yuPlRYWbeFjLzeu54QimnBh3Il4QNzzkjXV8iBRxodFLFhq9BM+0HPRcPWNL qQTs+nRH+Bhf6pSQggodp03sGOfPUC0Jexs6CchnGLElRz5zdhjAcyPG5fRW z6Wrh+HFojmnHrS1twJSPwrNPzmENnQbzVfY+/bQ12gnDGFSTEaS/rVdKkxh t5ZaB3JQ3PxkfnokG7eZBcOtIykLUxjmXrh0GVNNZ9y84PwzBwQStETIhVIT OzWiSNORPiGuJB9y7WrHeorCojX6o7SW+RKxG2TbclMNCvHIDHqI400sprKa u8/38AiWA61PYNrDWnhEI+t+PCO4lSpoAKY4sCvy+R7xRMgZSNviCzfT65Ul WPiQErtt4wDE7tKlRi6cJv608U5rObpsn3hqqiUhoS2P1p4mZMiIRsBwLlpw +I5etax45ZvAlttRJdZaYV6KBGbApR3CUB8DCyuSCrgelwal7m0+i0QpVEB4 aImZUuknJkWD+PixoglcVMgQKZj3trUHg1a260iHH51FHx1FukhVksc6+4AP 2IkkJTQO4rDB908OHn75QjaO5NHpAVTXxuleX7fge054k9m24b5dFIbWIf2W rYsRLSyJwFYBk4yQ0z4JAfaOeymgQC1LdlnF8FCMeSQhRCfxPBpBuPjw5dvX RIbdMtJHf27y8fbhzuqG8CI/Vt6jmKkRcLLCY/LWbI8ww1RqqRd5WTOTMyDW f5ImNrQFc8o3M1pIUFtDCzPyNMyJSvFkwdfYbUVDYVj1NJLGcapnZoPDEVj9 hvGU3FkjIvPt1VPy5fJssiCLtu1z6bgh6lUf/ah8lXFnCh+lLpu3X2u/1PH+ 0+okrwPyxo6BKdBIYZlr+CYKHqMKQfcFa0EUPhp/LilyUyxgNlP0uZO4x6+n qwjRDDOCgYn3LX0d4ygZKk+VtcFFw8VMtX5SrIGYVo4gMZ9srhse8cDFYk4z RBFMld5tMUoxb2n24sONZjQ53CIhtuVzcWa2Lz3m/Oip0pFEBMGhI7DWJTjh w0Zt4P0oPYhgkh4YknRGGJHCG1oJi91kA8vw3cDwJ4hnjQwFyYd0lBsh0zd6 G8JsXISHEnQH9TYmn9W/WMP2JgJuKxkpR8CL9I772nr81MsiB1/Wcb9UKexM glTc47zKClCEDIExr+skLuEtskmod6NA8CYQPuH8g9HMZm5n2mwcGaC4lum6 sBwYu4ibkfz3owdP7F3YZkP49gOA2e8np0ClrsnnhA7Uxt3aljBA73Vwk+yY T482hFf4bqoF003bcGk3hzThafVUPT8vH0Fu3xydvkVlfPTupT4MlbNLHgL+ dknNuAYfomDrzUn47SEFrumkhcE5KXwVtp9I6sI5o3NBGcegeqxgcyvjFsHn uBikKSi2H4CgiUiLyuOG44uCOxT3DFmaQOtPaYLqGDPYtNSExqi5LMzIow+Y ynz4mYuXHuNRSKXtfPCing/LYJhX4fzgkgQ/S0eHmdBggqp0IacFll/to0os Hk3ZfkxLSjXTwm+xh1JZjc8Fv135yJFVcSENs2awBklP2+WrBUHMA2rIJ7VZ kxDVo+2FzHkXIquMJ01qdHq1Zrq6hxJ2pkVTfk/tQez3EoraPGAu/O725cTO hi+b4jboS2wT59a80idxV3ujsEHdozvfyMkXV4OTcFAfdG0ImdshdbW4qGjE 0nNy4uKMH8IgD+9n0x1ysLau0wZ2s4KqzW0viHFRcfmceeU1pfhngrKid3ru bvlcY7zLjVInQjIjySwDbaHRxygMqRZHjq/WRRWJB0lFogBeOGmA14sdYLLH bbCgwUDrc3skjbixYEYN/AFyrey3y5JR9c7nx/gApbdvvdEQoceArPsDLCpZ XI4/MVlFNerFgeDXeohdwuPXmj4vZGWSa0D9Kcm+R8uurvDL+QhCvTdggA4d Ms49SwCcQyAoY0gOmB9lZaZOvHMfSbIU+6aUGEtQEA1xvqH0+GKQr8VR+JvK DyXtJ8bgjENXNGfkXZzb0BdJoiykp5fEaaCTRkpQLJTOsNx53jMvCJ7AHuNr 2pIgX9QXGNqi/sherDGRgY7xowfff48VCD4+ny4IviS4eymElmLoTkVCePv1 Yh1Fq/Xv6BLo6RJ2eI81Qj7LVh2tpHdNhNAdku2QZKDmajI0m1JjeupUlPCu +IiCdRIaPl11Clv6ePVghyRa4UC9wRV37AP52WBdo+fF8Sf4Sg7UHQYypCND qeIcHJ9SBRb4km7jMjMUZkibtI3CLBft1aOc20I/Nsl2T4l0KuVziaAXe7x7 vIMFoknAFKFYKz/CSX9Z10rBMzQ67NVVzjwKHu8buCqK3WTSuxjMYY1tUoE3 HDO633CCiKtUYTAijYpaMa4zjqspllLWefBQ5lMBMEVFNkeB+d3VJipU5kpf bnQnGRuwq3Ow19Ym5Ug9TnhQXsp8Eee5VMbKUXddZ4/H+H6hHQrpG1IgJZbo V+OquFiUFwZaxw2ic4qptl3gJwNBQgMMwc+rlS/6HspJaD1u0SabNtvloLjU 23lSVlJw6EwXs72noqBcyqmX0BSGJQc5wbm1/KopD9jIdZdxZQCTC1S+ATPB d8lyCfvJth7ItUdJSkHrP3bW01BWKqL1IQGcgxNROHJFKIZAvOgoNaTFM6Zd MXOn/dj3UZ8d/N/vHsp6SUChdS3CVDXROfBK9dH6VaekIjVNGHGiemmx1Ibb yB+FgS84RC5gdI0jm5LRDfM1Chkdx3+dd359ykxLXooIYDNUzsAiQGwLzqwu fHKP4dPw/zSEcDoUjMgR6kdQ285ZRJnENrWDcgQ+o/KPCLkx4XK3UJ01yq7R vx1LkzVJoEVPoaqYtlUWVbaY8YMMEKZYej4XOYqO1t0YicPeYtZIDw3nTinn lkZp5LzqZRViXk7pqkFAfel2vUXZE2GBmoQjbXqAlVuWKiYpktiZrjsKj61w yDv+YwNvkjERBMASUDZoKMbFyQTuGoh74zQdku/8G+gMEI5T7qYKctcUnVbP CWmY1iUTPIFQQqgXrwowAOUr2mJZjtGIAzdN0iaYvfdIGVuGGkiX0Gwg00XD xGVjm7a17pIVBwdzcYfMyy5EFg1gGw/LEkWkMsUhhNMmRycKntq2cKZDC9l9 wjDAvjKarZKKRLWi7x2RccR0O9RsilHx50hIpMm9ULyNLpdmJsmmioa4ZVLm 64ZkkfON+jp4mozdMfXUhueaYSVBLAyAzXIrpEhslxicYd1asbFzLoFD3IuS Yb4+GT8jCPLzogILYVzPx6cCn/Dby4qOj/QZ7iOd8aF0MZ9ecXLdmSD1NG+4 bJGpamblBcYXdNnKPhVTsr8oi2xbw/ljvU3IiaR7CgOc0BwbXl8ahwvwOovZ yONiDXxXJRP5vEYO0+yUELugU5CyLw51Uxtyg/mNLLGSCQvMYYbfrOGyUQT3 JRDtckk7GNdvKJTacvN1YfOK6xRIduU1LsipHD9efpjJxXx98NNM2VJDloq/ iMmR+hdS0IspZ9CuU34gQzeGRUZLAv76mmiXYLBhL2n9qymaEKK6+pyt3uCf K5tuyH5ycuIpt13F/dCGMlm0FZSSaZRwMsH0/4ePeLDV0xRMXsZ5Ux1i8k2I SM0ILa0DZ1J8BuCZHjseJn4TgN0g9hf19RhtVl5P2FCoAXIlySVP0dhHRFHB rGZ2dEtQRlP5GIar+3G4GK7usZgeytZtBc/HM0IL5IjyZaHhfIpPiwoF09NM Q9n6wQtXIEU/mJEE7fBQ1LwsW/WnRkLjJd+Ak96qQ0JEhuENUgCBBpMvKbGv lOJZVT/0lR2aMBfc1Eh8YgPmc3afSlWAVAiZD7vmM1kGxeQQaLPALrsq/wH6 K2y6BSeClV5kcHm81vI9xo/R2+L5DZt7y57WalD/WJw+M1jMAwgukckTVPOi YxFH7TUaRzvQbiWPCKKPQSdlGUZB/IkIq4gPyWuqQaoZIR5Gt6b2L4iApipU F0YqKj2imPDlJuqZ5lRig0jWILALMEIWHBamkVsiDapcn16WcEmGX4+DvaaP 5CeSnZDkLnhd3XxRfFKqCeLl4aeABDHFhn9/Wvn1CuPtDMnyn01dtiM2Rkwz +HX0xYxm4aiGVKvOLbgYme0CNcQ0X7FygN+FSmx/sHkAPKGRFRpHhsZLLFhX WJTNvqTP+FhgJoEAusEnY0gsei69Dl6mNaRj0l6QgMDnJYBqi6J2punHNkFm fkiZw7YOjl+YC8GTwVzzToH/B9MHZncDhkCz8R0d5cMC+A1MSM1xmxI6ZIig GWWPGd1D/gJh/RGjx1ChawgWLX3fAxcxvAiT+0EfJRAFU3T8A2Ev5dehb1xg deBmY3q5Vt7Ba67oBLlC0eDjwQdlIj2BuxK0LxqElG6ZGJIih4oZFBl+PZm0 JKOjeG7DRHgicR/EGECd/jB4NQMjwMrxv0ab4Epo7cM8apkO6pGAC4g51ekR CiaOij7udLdO+It37yjQy2HH22/09bdC4CSeggKiiNa1rVeXKEVclJWoFy7/ oKo5PX8sEG06QMVsA0KBcY7li4DHsqMM/KlHT9dT9fwVdgjo/lgZCSm5lPaH vHht2/IT95xh33S6SXxTVT+qwKVDDWpPvNrX2JUpZsTZeIlP1waHL2N/dpLF 8SuQ1RkounoeUr6pd4D3L8o5gXjUknp3fPTm1avj18+Pn0fJLmdR8U1xwSgE mYJjSuhlr4iwlcm6LN0N4cLi6VhhFK4L7laoBoiC/+IK0URZc5yT2QzKH6xy jfGctjiQjWefk5WyyMGH0EQ2BdYYqWLdeq2TUlD18HvBVpU/b/5ti8aq0yc0 C02hEakApNaIpXNHSOfSgCGw8Yki61bToUaJyJg3GP17WzCpFShYUcLlXiMH fmI9F9rCoQ/ZtmRCgRfMAEZIxeWXnEkgJaFsaVyMT5EPvZQobsDBjNrIxWd3 qIxhDi+KcQyst8D2XES1G6q24zu42xqSBGos0mdMBpfM7tBeeZzJclr6RxMP tM2vlaibXo+lOxLQELT4K22F+lZs5mRfXVJpmve7Y3KuRb5h9DFb23rMcHZO gDKEaLIh56am5hWjoW/wfS0t+CJGT1h0TBT9UAp8ZU/3TV7tiMlw0JiFrzrG zN4mS7ZFQVx0UUsSgVHwzOSG59z5ut/kIQSAtayVMPVvpWHJW2K2Q7BeU8pB IVZOMGOGcmpCVyaJcXTOMPvqtuHlohCgboQJbiAeB2ET2JvGZjxWX8sVCf2K L2opl1x57iM0PoEWDWbBLI+SwGR4G8fMNGBd9nnLwpDIs5MEVGAZN750Tt0v aYTTlntBUX1n67dERCvF/QbQSQsWa8v0rqPIiEXXouYaxMheiCr5jCXAJwRV vStlR3gSVVFQlFrDsMPr1Tut+5h+NPOc8kTcC/Wc7wrmPexPbvb53hxDIaJr Grnwi9JM8PVrzbT62hu9kFExIVsW6x2K99VgHC8E6R4+W1kIKRZTXJQYM+76 RbJYCO2RAHnU28sZCOLI4hH/RMhH1hM/gV8ITsXMFN+Q66jwd6M/tE1qaIWT 7YBS7XYGyZhnNWZyBXxvUdzEmYbwbGdUtBy0kgi0iEtir2QeYavAsl0knERS oNnA9kVzJrpaEzZoPwzBZ/c4/eynn+RNA0gYjKeiPTMsJu/J27CyXEVVBVx/ 28v13m/jhhYlldamuGQQqx15yAQ082gnUw54PzxedWXGjuYL55+WBe8N7PIe uIW10aStovnRLt3s0ukZKntRee6pflCTpLimXNpMfFwuXTc6rckWCKi90Zad S5OJi9lym65AUxDFwpntDz75sl70BIWFOrCXnAidkdYVGrAeO1TcVYlnQXav HT9/XMeYZjoFXGipJYmzjwYRED5sIi2KRLds+3Oonxb/4R2MIQrrd8A/f4/2 /gdOCNE/sS+R/hnTnz/yP3a98tgLv/xj9t/Z7gxU/567uQexUSE3X5gMKP3z eaBz6ZfBC820C7jrd4MXDly/5cLPPcEYuvAPPGv4i0OU+/4VMq20np+fZnwU zMr8osmX6ZEAaqVbFD/uyLL7H7MI73xxW5O+QsqmXQMYrJLGr3zRp98Tzvux VGos/CAUTlJoAzf4FvJP3vpsFBB7vek3hhom5BjIscS+puKxJJbZACDehrOF 5VlYncuFzd8NaffQJzpyp/B47qMmX5R/Gz6gL5tmfEm/TM5mjdYWjPtS2xlj LBwuZOZlJX9Dd+0qrkYSiOTWc5iTUUpTr8szFqKTRcwrOEFwGXWkS00mc+Iz Y7N0et72Wt8afVv98i5oiD1T8iORRnWoWQ1K6gNPBPOeLS0HQZ+D6/DOkAJo RICTCJ2PZwpSOPlGSyx3I7+/bXDo+WRFREynjKF+wtTpsjf84pNwMnmOdQHk B6gOy0WE+LWimsRpk74tjgE8l9yyyruow8PTgA/pznAxI4rd7oAE7aXOVDw2 2dszObX0aHJpKTiOLf2Of+u0wj//CydWtitytBf/GlTv1hEN/unDhL/ufv5z y8lm/qRHrT9Uxrecsulc3W0092+9FKb4vvnBvziN/OfOlsDW0dx1Gu2fO9sN 2+7/SnPiDo/5uvvvZnzc6UnqnX39/V4Mt16xqz6RdgtaoFGwN2zrhNNVzZy+ ipXfB3snQcMo2ns2gMhnLnkpSUaT47wGNW33iE8zbUklYoxToX7yINB73HAM C87UDgp9ZXIBBMXsT0ER910zrClLwhMcRQITolytFwqP6JeGMGsjWV2Gi8ep s6x42FqbyPiwgHQ29kgR0+gmPmSsdRkw8FwJNN8yqpTLcplflFURnxwcWc8X sec6GG9JPdcdn230jjU8kMWkmN3VFTa+7KEetsKyd1lwARgmjchO/fs6XyhZ pDQfDZj4iEVUTn9OmPHhHU07Qmso5pR671HgiEf5CrHDCobZFjoim2y8NJdu sVN79SBsfVJuqiOXwBs/gw3IbF/nAVPUCBDOUqDysiktF3j90tLjy1AsHsHB bquRzwwrgv+IPLOFAwPD7RE2SDMVzjQMFF8R/vt8fXHhaZkwlG7B6jkxJqb7 aOg9XQQzctsMd7bxyBDIp50PxYU9XZ9TTpIZdpif3iFmr+givDrFmDhsFiKX 0X6aZC9zghITqpbap624iUNvnljhcLdn6okVU9f7BBj4aKHknI1iHmEmI6Sv GSgXj5oWRtT35ivfnv4iQbRASxCVxWurQvYT4bdwR3aOvBENb2/v5XBkikC2 vag+0xnGc8UZ7XJBYCDF3ckbCC0dWvLc9MzA2m3SVMoxSBF0JxqDdHnBnSNC TbBXcu3Ed67OskFr+wYTG/+ImX0nS8AgGlEB00re1YTozeRdb1STA6zN6Cut Adk3CclkDa+gf34gTMaHAGcBW6Xgu2Yf4AF7/t745wMjHd9qARsTfus1dzHW 72LtJh+75YK7fv7Q7fGVt/kL9s/tM3Xrny1RtDuPoG5usFe3//l3/RT9M5lM /sX71U7/itv9bvEGd7dot9oKanW/khwMGhba2QYvWkShodT4lqJatnwX5T+0 WNscgxoNCgr6ipF95xsXaWw9mCg9a6iOmALSG/lRMJM4Q/GI8GluoQ5NTuFe hJTjgzHkgDCi1Wrd+T466V1u9xiNj2I2+Lj0pNwL1W/khWA/KQJKgBETv3pM +5IpoBErYe0gPUQJU53aPmjnn5ezdjvVINxGgwkurxw1XOPIh/M6YdbGtLl4 LUMUa1zpBYbPSnq2E2dLv7DnEBsWNPBjuKtTMhelFYmRr7iILhxuyepIAGyH 5YV6WxoSRQ04Loo52yBSGhrZrlfrRSV93DlxyuXUa9/tLdRyJlY4L/BbbjR1 iA3N/KgjkzxatjGccj4wn1LxEAljuDzbIlTEsuUJDUMKETfdtMnnVJTKw5I9 Rvy0xSeUF8ytI48qUZlIoFze5+pGNy5B+xeYOzcVitSqm6AD9PCnzv0OrTLE phMPyCpuXvom4X/iUVCBOHPw+u5Qnnc3M4DSkV0yGqUURrHYXweyoDe7r/7n d6/3hE2XksnwpFdaKhH3qLyBRwqF67XcBQ/QJhfpNpHP9pGEGz5Z0JHTeoW5 Uw9yId6skcvi2hv6oBRKlMCuIl8k5xVyWV8qz5WShyFcdJ0Z18DX43DgYwXN 8pId6bynJKiI0ntW+PTX/HniIlI7F0Nj+n7bl5hsJ37xm93X//O7l3vg3S2Z 6gce4+Px8NXw+9/Dr5Ej5rqcIcFsjMliwlTEoY2XxBuQ4xP0qS2dQLonwpux /yKmpOAMET4RXvqkg9QtB02g+yfHI50x7C6vhxa5qgSDHvHFszXjnQrrrdId XG0tRZybzNdH6Xu2cNRSV27dYC0KINYNCLFrpIq0WjcuYfWYPC3X6VHPYT/D k8PXh71ehtiKgTpnarQAD1w/EchJlb0Dbxakd+McPaFslX2HZx8pBCSiFeDs MC7PjI4hCG2W18izqNVo/JrdqGNRKHPaY/z28Jm4++DTvHgwkzbH2Y7UG+8g T8F6WSkgHRlIuL/SDtbevHj3bpQdH++Msp3n2N76DRxY/ha+Ntt5LYGpnXe6 isXMXkT1AXDdn4t2hwoPBm1yGN/swQMdHx18N44RB7gzopHePLRtw/JjCmE1 +my6tutd+abiYAdIXsu0UxRdezHZ2SIbZL17mYCjklxu4nO+QTqIAQuuH9Es aZxyd/9gf2+rjFDck17XbhcOO7E8Yb8k3+h2/rzD0DhUCDFvtZdA+0GMvB2H RRyXYF/c9oFgtV5nOwHl6h+9E4SewjtwnSMZOE4aykm59S48Y2/bONsd0IiY SH8NT5HnCrQRM/FMed6mxSWg9ritABaFEHXhU/eU1Hx3XTOBRah/8Ngs/y3H wTjzVSeu/1vcxS5s6uw1HLT4ntd5oJfp3+WcEWS8/BDEdwcjdCDmPvLrec0E Mm2OxZbE8refM1ON6pmownXnhRI4E/MZk5uSmJREDsvFOXmo+sDXr4liGfH4 aLh1i01Ye7DnJHwqt0S8LXj/n3dCkfKpVJK27pDxHszIsH/ALTrf6Tmi6xIb 1FymNTx/ptcb00q0NIkVse1s4b2lrYjeZLuig+jHHcL2Tjt0CUGyUvV9i1jj +dOuz/Hw0+P4NBr/O81LWInVxtO7sp9hLjw7hXs4STY3XYxDSgpTRRV8H4gt 9r9H3wv3qvtLix0VMM79DcKs4e9i9tdkbzAVax3Ovv6n6kbbPKWQFU7y04yW qakXXrQZtUwTDfJSNFrmGkYLQ81wrBo/eD94119kMv5qvDqNx0azWrbyHAaj ox6/AhsgJwi/FIe0ayS4KwW1wgigCswuZAEvuvFz9DzkKbsMY6SaZnXbKiJJ EC4An/yAAe5xCF0J79gv5+do02wtnsYSlhlRrs/WJC5oDKNPul6OsK8I1VAh Sxi1LSu6qZ0emRPic5AyHCpBKIk7gslyy+K69V2MS+nWDdtQHiP1tVJI2lGD SP4OUBXYOcdWuFok+XtL6efp5ZSK5F0hdNSm0V+vB5LxXhzXTvr6jh0qqQYJ 3Empg0GqhcFbLyEd8Z68uZIqcz2+xdc5+c0ofem4Mag6L0082JHz+2rokBgZ cuamWBUknb7fkd3D9jh58OkB/BnB3/uH+4f498HhAf397eG39PfDw4f096PD R/T3d4ff0d/fH35Pfz8+fHw4cg8+PTl8Qv8+hD/497PDZ/T30eER/f388Dn9 fXx4TH//dPjT4dDB8+749Pjdn46f946YP/c0rllpo0V/pqp31YaTbRpzPB6T 94FG9ksy4sfkMbNnGcb1lt1gnOzP99ja52CRsTW+8EKHZSHfeYYIWfGiBYW6 M2RumkAKEf8MZNjI3hJXQ1rZRCXbssbe9zGkBdt5+j3HNrV4RRIEmlm0il+C EXbCVcMkuxpX/EfR1OK9nxdqjm5z/d0wlfi+pKZzy4pNLYTAvB8NhMtYgVMo 4Jjz0MORttEg3NBnmUiv7JSLRXGRLz748OSOAKPJ7lbSqkzb9fAqTmQEXK5+ klEpLKXVQCG99rivk3FnP4kb12b9uY/BndQ8iT58yr5hdjIJX0wvo+Q3TvXr m79x6PN4DHf/xjd4DlyXrZDi9b6p/znEq0MfMQELeCWpmtLLxk0R2/ijsRAG 68bBJWbUZttT6E1+3ep4rpAVgcITcMTkEqD9z5Px88nH/B/ry1q5TYrZuK1K 5N4ATcktyijsRoeSViCHbLdC5MvOUx0JsgBr/sTQdoY3JZjJTBr0DvQwAief 5XBeg2I+umzQS4L1eYFtPpf5KHubg3ZCsOv0VV6tQbe/Ak1+CUbc26akyuDX +NvT9WJRXuVgwr/CPH0FOq9etloH9jyHozV7VlR/wx7TDKFXViJsDgJygv1z eG40Lar8S8ScCCMj4OTL+sK5P2a/+x0aO8czJIG+37LJ9LvfZW8XpFBhneor kRqtR/LEt2zN+PhyDk+bE7REi601xmsaTZ9Qzyhit4LvVCNdVAkHSNAtCrUQ MA7mu592NXJRr9hDZP6uGVpF47Lo5mPMthSw4uP970DPZ78UxWqcIx3ybZc/ wsvBQ8iOjk4PHhwcBJXKBU3rJTUu3b336Nsne7c97OHXvftbvJznHo2Fckkt K2UT3HzrAQ2b9ALWiPlAVxofg3HvP9zDi0/46Vu3JtlNzMMFNz34lm46WuRU h8FY4NhkYpqN3XsPnzyma48/rXIuZw8NiQSdRVbw0hcftnTXPt3F2b4xVe8Y Sjrh6wxaSFga4MbH/19hV9PTMAxD/wrS7lPSfLQ5ViBuXLmiCRBCGvQASPDv 8XtO2qSt1EumdbWT2Y6T2LGtgLIxkGV90qSd2FuWIk6rOHSdOHOqEdieS34i IJON0Mn3A9sgbTD53yxsWbhCCLzlB0IkQic+SZFtIg4Dy5B8Wn7zbBV7j9Ya tvZQoCyG8jC1pW7maMSsbMvOAaPzyrfxisBMMDqnk5Cfos90u15+N3KSL19p 1haBpeblHMwmHGLoG6HAnftVjki1rDLWcXp7fwZQb9b0/GgJGknKSCLGju0x YQwJAwcFRtHkucQ42oQKN8UugO46dtG5ihjYIv58X2rFvhVFgJLdPqngUqCF DOvFcRzvarkXOMd/6LvMGjh7cW+egbZYwdpkZ2Sj8qoKz17XG6v9LZo5c9/1 gNEIQmuqzqvc2bkS0YuouT/e1mHCB0RFPbGG7J4rBzds4F/RaGI499ABhNzb oBIyO9nKIf22HITkVaMEfMxx3MtL53JcOuvaQp8jkTsgD7GF24YDV51Y1RLM 37m4LubSjfkgCOHBy5s5v5LRjhx0FB2XyE3Ka+DzEI7k1STgv8fyCMcXPdOl mA5MKyeXlEGc65ojTT0QKpu6Fc+nTb39jzrjr2oTVH0rLKmMg4Kyh0Zys7r8 bKq/f+Xc9VWeHozCNjOcOZd2a3ZXUccCRp3oBplT/8MMB+yehAEAH4sIABlZM2kAA9y9a3fbyJU2+r1+BUa9zrKUkGzLl27bnfS8suyOtdq313Kn p1cmrw2RoISIBBgAlMx4fH772deqXUCRkpN8OOdorZm0SbBQ11378uxnj8dj 15XdoniSvX95mj2vps1m1RWz7HhRFlWXvSgWi9rlZ2dNcbXzkVk9rfIlNDNr 8nk3LotuPu4W7bhoq3J876Gb5l1xXjebJ1nbzVy1Xp4VzZPs8aMHj125gv/q mnXb3bt79/Hde65dny3Lti3rqtusoMmT5+9/cuvVDJpon7j6rK0XBf0nfvIk u3f33sPx4T03rau2qNp1S60VDjp83+VNkT/JTp8fu+u6uTxv6vUKvl607rLY wCezJ861XV7NPuSLuoLGNkXrVuWT7C9dPR1lbd10TTFv4b82S/yPvzqXr7uL unnisnGGfzzq5005zd4V7bRuFrnL+K+soCvPJ4PP6+b8SfZzVZ5fdOM/FfCv oquvq+ykamEp1l2hzxXLvFw8yYrL5n813Xw5mdZLF7/25/wf64s6e3O5jt75 88R+RK/7KW+7xabX8iX9vL5c/69z/CDxgtfl9DI7XS8W5VVeRe94PRl8Ti86 xt1Rnzf56mKTHcOSrBddWZ1nL18e995eldOLepG3k1ba+T3umq1dOb5oyrar VxdFkx1Nsl/rehZ16HjS/5j7s6jXs/kC9kHv9dP8+n9dFPkKOndWdu2kKjrn XFU3y7wrrwpY4OzdT8f3Dg8fy39+//jwEWwX+m/4z7tPuMFZ2a4WOWzsF29/ fi5f//bbb4f8tRyuH+XlT+u6azuYHHxt8jzRccquy+4ie/b6NDstmqtyWmRP y2oGP2m50Rz3zJPsoutW7ZNvv72+vp408+m4mJVd3Uxg3N+W1bz+Fj7DntBv 2qIpixY/ln5jP59k/vsse/bm5El2eHdy+P2DR99/K6Og7/icPSumBR5bOnD0 uT8K9DfWCeb1eAobZHpxnTfdP/wX7brhxRx8M4c9wF89Laq/5cuyyl4NGui9 AR54WrYX9WrYfu/z0Pqr8rKIv+01Cuf19ea8Kapho73PQ6Nw+i/1W4dTbPbQ ry+O3v/6p/HJ2z8/oIkycyZvpm3Kj7mwY/Z+efcS9v/J26sH2du8geXbc4ml XzeLSbsqppPri7y7Pqe1/wYk4bRYgRReXT0Yr+jHzi/jq3yDK0grCyINnu1g 28ki7nE/spflFW7QUxSNeTPbw339/PjF+KjKF5u2bKPNvXeUnW6WZ/UCZKA+ kNXz7G0Dp3q6yWA+aKsfTu7zxk7fIXtb9/a0ndSfJvl0sr78dlXUq0XxLXRv Cr+cTC+Kq3zx7Wp9tijbb58e/zqeTtt79yar2dxs3df1ld+697YcB7/9Dx88 /Pb+wwePvrv73eT+w4eP7393lx4ZTFa2d3x8mt25d+8JDLWeFgWdUBx5d1HQ q7Kj41fZ6cmfTo+OURbOC9ghcJjrCv61XIGobzKYYPzHcg3iEDYNCEw489N1 U3abUbZaTbL73z0c3//+8d7NJw7E/tMLmL7cyGTeXSdVU+bpH/15ApIV5/DW vziOpexAzIqEfPD4cV9CgkAbv3/+7tUpPnMyfjbhC2i8auqumMJ+GIO20P/R 23dv3j8/fv/82fj09Ylz4/E4y89Qhk5BXv/hP+CffwE5V8z+CvesTHALt/QB /PMcti5u47+YQ/jXEawO7M9GH77T0ibJ4DM9GhP3HhYQDyD07KqcwUZtCtA6 roo26+osz1b5ecFbee8lXKzZL6SczLLDe9rGw72Jc69hWPC2vJPjrc212R7c b8uyy9oqX4Es6to92TZlky347LVy9lrcIg6+aooMphd27lXR5Ius30I2b+ql HwL3DvfhAtWmLjsrsFF65t5d50ea/QSHs/iUL1cLUqWCeNjfJWL45WP/8m8P zx6dPZo+fFicPTgrZo/nh/cfTx/nD+4/np8dTg/P5g8ffvfd2XeHj5PC6cC5 XwuYYmy1gPNAuh52N14pnHsc0bKG8cARaVB0wGSgpqinTuRoT36NoBHYTVNu k5fWT9Cyhlk9LyqaVfxGXqMLsHsmDkZ0hPMZ7bR8sLJ7pknnhwKb45gH8MRF u9OfqkyvjlHqKhhlaUE9wvWzbeBSjrI/fO118SN08PnP7+D0gYh69d6/7iKH 7dhewlZft1lVdziwWU17HKQCzNlFvV7MskWRXxWOVi9vxyVt4Wx6kVfnBU0t HTj4aaRSwCvd7CD76beTkepQ2X7PnGivpmfjYnpxAMu3WMCm5r0C/ZmByJTV /a9XL3HxznGW3/w8AZHxY09SvIUOtgWKs6LpoHObTMyBNts/KzY19BbkbCuH F7S1Im/gaTyFfOkd0KW2bkmW71DDWvjh9GKSURfe43yAobRe4sYFMTBtyjMQ Bnm2LHByynYJL8neN3nVrsDyyF7mG5gbvQ6yfbhE6cWu4AuUd9xHozh+hKba FqXTuprh7YIXHRyRjC7IKQ5zwjJ0Wc5mCxDW34Co75p6tp7i5ZN9/qbEf35x 7mgBU7A+v/BX9+fP/wHL8ujBg+++fMmkBy0fRjl8MIZZe5FfFiMYx3SxnsmK OOnEFGa7nOM9V6AU7ku063zT4gRcX4BlAKsCcwvbEU5p3nX59BIbgIsNlq6p QJKCboFSW7Ut6Ht+Vq876gjs6KqgAU0yFOVw9mFYxaeO9Glo6DXobe4EVGq+ c7N9uFsOQA7C7U7SBHqRnFawBLl30IvLlt7FCgsYwGBWVLQt8uwclL/K9GKE t8uqaC5AJgQRhtZqiXqiHQWMb97B6hVeR8ItwUsw6e8hPMowobSHquKanguD mOaLBfy+r205NjH2QZ87kA0O/75usyl9TVecvF1upHgqRJbhu3hdJ1lG3ZJr nEcIE0qnvsZ1zlY16k0lvGgThu2g54sZGtdrXG/+3dFqtZBVGfP+B90KjPF6 kb0uzmtogxfs6OXb1wdwV7ad+/z5P9E8u3/38MsX0Gbq8aKekkzg7rUs6tE9 AE/jtOEUgU6Pnbkq2/JswaOBJ+bl+boRNQx7f1Zc5Fdl3dgN3a5XeDqhfbl7 RLyVZJq267Ir+M6+qK9xSBtUHlYkU2pspl5iKzzZZo/APOAmwH2fV3W1WeKR bwuQq/uoRzhaqRLvaVx6niBZ/ynI1hqsRDOVYReAVCtINOIs8F5yupvhS1C0 cA74BgVRmkMXoZ94GTez8YJWAM4V3i4lvgCOII4HrHoUiLNyTjdaak7N5BV4 HPBobFsR7FQ8/ZOD7BcSZCRbYHcFGdlAc/milb2rMwmP6GRW507UNJA30zVo pfRitKNFA4M+nYGsmNUFX2PcpJxtkVakK+FOj5Yjg2HCAqJSNRA1z0DJqDd0 MnGhvEIvQ3DzIu/WIvRAv52u25bP9+fPM/9T2MNw9x6/wAFh1+DrsmuLxRzW dg5rTYOF4clpo07AiOB0QQdFEMu5JDWW5VMm8mkJ6h3MXY1Xp65Td9GQoOej irNcFYuwl1yQnjLV6Jj4+5osKNxB2o7M28lb1IZgj7RFO8le1Nco3kcuCDT8 uV/N1r8GP66xgRfv3789zfhUP3rw6MGXL6PMfwk75dtneFrl1D96+AiuI3n4 7mN6GA+f/8H//uXkWL5/fO/h3S9fnOwB2wfcm0b8kUYEJhE2skAH2UrU66ro 0I+ImsNKRTse/iXqEEEittkFCvgl+r7gwMrktw5OGS0P3D5mmiZsKcNtVjfl OTwXrRLvjIJkUYmaJmn+cFGErayHPqd9DPobbo5Pmwlc7fxdUV2VTV3h9mpH Xjw3BfWK9jjcp8u82cAxxn2L+mt5Dqc5A1uyXOS0S+qsPtPhodpX8EkozA0P tpRuxbCJg7wMN1mkTMDqxh8/Pnzwva4jXGuwiF7SygbH53He6YcruSDaCaoz YGdfYRdULj8r5mVV0r8dHQjQgTLW9fZe/XL6HnRp+t/s9Rv673fPYce8e/4M //v0xdHLl/4/9InTF29+eQnfO/mv8MvjN69ePX/9jH8Mn2a9j14d/bbHG2bv zdv3J29eH73cw1kh6eBvdRQPHa09Hrtm1RQ4ebC+qjLSTD49fpsdPoAZEy8l nQKa1MPv4RS464tCNmddgVDmf9J15PVZvPhBoK/KLsfzDm8A/f0aFFoQ6ZPs CL5EuQxCiO9c2HeFnAN6K67eCNVT+vY+Ca5vsjdXKGqLa9FVdHFwJ0D/YVcV dBHWoA6xAgf9Yyl/DYpFvaoX9TkKFtDv12jmd7T1QUEZORbP1wVpNrAOFzBT s+xVPSv2eFJPYfN2/AEpfi1qWmhvk8S1s4d7dl6j3kNXukhw6P832XvfB+f+ b/iz5hT9/X6c+vv94Ln/6X/Anyafu3f37uGTZ08fPXlyCH/bn0u1J060P1A3 fsTnRDueiGGPpshXtDd8jq0H3xxshK/pX/+T286f/rHObr7e5xGPf2KLHpf+ KRoI7Eo7A5k0O+Cl+/wk+6albTLGjcDG2x/tztHl3uyBzYPykr/Cp1lSqpjF DYz/ZhntlQTU92EzklXLUh6OGpqOcHc41qLgENQlX9plR0KZFRr/ClE+RY+g F6mSAXt/IwKauzEZbsrkfP7+tlOdXLX/ue2CJvfu/yS+eg5//Otou277+/FW 707sS333jUfgXxv3vzbnWbyBxSg1f7qdZeuHvYwCLt7KXuQNdjJ9k97I5LpJ bmY1rGUzT9y7HNVCbgL1Id3TiYfDPrfv40vI7mFQE+SNTbFAoz9WpLMzGL22 EvUQre/a9TTw3unxfj3W5+C8LVH9yKtusRl57djaAs6bAWCvgHY+BUuq9aPw yq+oHraf6ioqrMHu8HVWWfFukQmtC37Eqhcuhpo3evuP8H4j5xY5C7UbGHzp 9xuVZvxuj0c6nvNu4qniG1F+jVOks4YCiydu70x2mfyC7IWWzROvpophUfYk I1pP5XCPRT1xZEFH7+CbeHWxacupOAPASEM5B3NzWhSgWLTi7hqTeTgrxB4E 9QZ3HDlrxXaKfT6obYIlAyYW9WdBb0cTvOxom3WFX1Pu5ShLzRvv1rjXrBek I7XkRnHuKNkYzB7qzi11DgQ5h6ku+NKiDyOjV5xLjhym6oPBUQbvHTub27ae lnQ7LIsuR6sdjE9/+5CSBK+B4Tp0UeJ7lqBL6et5w/XevG7VfUpv8W9wvfMU D3CSRQ4pN0NlW87lYHh3SGgs806M72JRnNOyoFjhIbKiCaYFWB0tGvFiEDz4 7i76dmCHOFI90TksO0J9IK3sBVzywatbBIKAvXWFHkgxuk//fPyUppPtTZFr k+wNmcHQuxKe3lgrEaNbZJat6pZM3ih8Yk8AWXAkTZIzAZKw0A9o6/8K2nlw ZVzn6oZru5yXLBfrknc9rUkL6nhvo45gsxMOpmvW6IjLvYSOXHgjli0Na+Ii DewTJyDimo/sP5A+dRfs0TRN86a8sWVnn3iDQc+P7JUdfo4v6GgXl1UFe6pe t9lVvlgXtHNccJh69xbbeHBa9rz8/cA9/nBBQeXwqNv//Nk/NJbdTA99+XKg ft1p3pBbA2ckeCxSc/NTSd6uaNWhg3AzJsalISUVJ+/9P7IOLobW20DweTBL cnYMPnHuEK6xOUoyf1WJVU17qybPOH46K7zfNgwcdwUabyuCTRGKwN5KvJvS iwRnWyNwYU2b4m/sZcOXT0Lf2jXdnIiL2GhP2kRXYCmvKbCZ3nbUQZ6v/u6W NdKh9G7XVH8JctHSnb4KXXa/rGp0Y04LDp+FtbnTire2jc+z93aggC1IQsCs 45RDg+7avwJeuo/ePH4a2sZo1Zi/y6tpAVuNduyKAQNtUFf8OBw8XVPgerGZ ZCQZxJPCE1/MRqJDKLYqth2wU+uWfDZnG2fGQLZKcK9nfG8g7KzIoU18iSxt XWlMwPwcJrMpOpCI1OX1atzVYwrkRaINh6/9xLHDgGW/q4vpvM4XuNdlUBRt aNeNBNuMQxy/UrWhDJ6znj8WBTuCo1qcijXISho5eSnwUMHDuFoTUJGbohYZ KXFKmOmLsiAhDR2hfuHY8BbJ53PZ4+jZKz5x85kqJ7h+K7xLCtLyfHyGVRhs KVZY+ELraSu+Md4QDJah35IjJa1vHEeT/fkb3F7RAnxhxxtc/G32YnPWlLPs LUvqn+Fifx6Uin0ErHEg0+gXRuugmxaRbujZeZ+6x9ipg1e+2qlGen2Ex7m3 HzO+NWCRrflar/K/r4vsxeqy4B5CB/9wOJnc+z+H340Pf/yBHlqD9n34HT30 c7E8mf0QG2XffssOPr7Sob8Zdnjwy9n8n/zlERyN/k9v/qUf+XMVfO83q+KH 3i/Vc3YIW8cxKommKfvsbUXf+exyNv9Qzn6IvuHOZTn8j//uC31zulmCZtiU 02OKSp1iUOqHLe/APj+SdR28guYcNsZy8I1fMtk9H2D3xE+kOiFhsg8cJvvD A1ntBz/a3kOjPH3bupye3wzhwqELsr1Qyv3hbm9XfUk0se1lUY/wjHyYSufi GVzmn8rlevkBMYEfFkV13l0MOiNThY/QTn/48McfdozK6Dm7hnDMsLR21wrD rhQn+g/9z/t9bUExh9/v+/Yn8ssD02YGKgfYFnc/zYu7syfDvmRT3yn9wZd+ v39gWcDakEqIoAPG4oSDxaALSWeeuCekRRoAEMonFGesJgytHBRXIBdnE/tD J349snZz9UXMCnFmYHuoxN6sX05ETrcZhRPK8wpFP14fRhK6ME66RnPff3LN z2qr3IGw5LXRsfK/MBgN4rbDcKzojBU6KGiGRAviJ/kjuctdHDzm6/WyXHGY jNQ0/ppuW44pUYAdNR52CWxEz3SEEuJp0xC0WQczXhiCbgQcxFGlJwH7j4tO kWlymOpzGPEqKGxBL5B22dSiQIm+UixXccrwb8nMq0wPdD/GdxCZH7ueuXEX BjlA48o+RmIiaglMio1qmb39aHAfxqj3OiHe0PZy3kdDB3c5/GPvYJIFgCFP TLr3H71s/8j9V0WalMHgFkFXD1i4iXmBGfuYEG8f/b6sq3MEGeJ3uAHyoV06 zy6r+roiWwG3OP1LsJhk4hG456zgGHud/aNoani40zPLYVkCzWYrQduBqin/ qWq1mkdiBOfBt0ld426DjY/4Hw6zFp9QD+d+yKEp56OsmJxPRi7YBaxPXZeL GSznjFqj2De8Hn6N2Bv+SKYyRnA4Z+S+zhk6PXS+trlXYN4mxWTkVwfao0SZ Yoa+EYa+pT0MwRgKkwcmEYj1ZdkG14MGvUeuH17sa/EwiCcZq7cIQh7ziMY4 AtF0Be7i8Rgau2QTHda4nKnP1s4HNBxuOT5LJHRYnvcvRPEGyJ4P7hZ0b6El TegVF7kOKfQpAM9dkLlJ9hzsgcRLHaEes3vjGqajIy2D46pBweB+jYKkNJ/i IsDlAVeKONNCUzhH5+QGh4lqcYVFTMhOlK2BbZHQV/gBCk9HwJ7JjkmKg54U Q8Ujw6s/DpMeTLQdQuwGcWhkDK8h2F5jkvEMCIAHG71LBR5Hwg2l2q6NCxas wWWUjNgrvJ+SnsFm4xUNRswk8wMuZzBSF2CXuF9Th66l+1Jeo9JpghIflWA9 vtR7sajyFVjivNdeeZTS/s/PXx3Y0dMBJCCYAJQ+BsX5462Uh6yvPDieA97U 8L4tSoR9UdR/c7XIbMcGv8cBphxgLlLl/VUgZ9fPz7OCXJA4OT+tK7Z49n9+ 9hML7KM1Oha7kgF7xjqlAR6FO/EZnqf9o+dHz6JJXeVlE5CLCE5DjzfuiICR dYneiyhrinzB8s2LMN/WRY1aiaDA8HaAkck5Sfr6vXe5JdgtiAbK9ZgnvNEk j1XyYioKCMd/MMaDz1Zr7WS/AcJ/vYS+eOMJLYKgSH+MHkqeYXI2imsiub1a wvYVU5ge2lwkanAoq4Bg53MqbiKPM0adUjyTin5Shb3VuSDAlEKjWrwg5AsM BS3RddZyxCX2dZz4VW+zz9+YQ701+sJyGxWKWtSPaLgiJgWLaA+nes3hYLQy UGxF4D4yj3xUGMW/8LGdYibtEp7mGrYcQeia4qo03my6v1D9aDvBsZe0c0dZ i4lNfhPiI1O4laLQq1uvOA3l/fuXuI6kfaFXGUSdnYYxTwPsbYs173C3qXuW gkvoimw5oKsfC247kqoyEXjGwJLIQZVYFQ3pr9hjumS36TEZhqZo7zlCym1b C3gFjOuqLlkhS8QUtUFeCuclNfv/oE9W2Q2hg6zAq92+kGGV0hOC2cLhcQav lTH46HyDd9FVmRvfaIvxHuiMV8/qrIFNXS8poInGs70P8XYvUIbBt2vYwYvI jw/aP4HdE5OC4eJOPbpVgYuE/lO67oajzKdNDasYELlxLNYg987CdE3gpo5V ddpy8AQCGAPoELFZvmWXvjXlHC1AzyP337CL3rkKozV7x/F2mmR/5scs+rEp 6GIq5wIpkGMUrSROkBwChXaFZU0IkucheOTliNGG2H8aG2o23gRCU3VqRZI2 NVwSczYHCGqYL9xcLjsQ7ejihU6CnaG+Bzb7MsqP8R5UkLmfPw/9uV9YYJZN U6Pk+6xuwweTeyjXPIzSYG13DIDUVx6FHkq++E+OXh9FIENHVsBgfsZlXuX4 toQ72EwT32POe1a8OcBPNmsMi8PropSF9olt4tXRb4JVxK7gpqF7iKPHHWna CtzErULXGQhWBhQaAPycEarYC9LdRXSbN52BFLmcZL9UC0wPjrs0oli8twVQ /J0hqvr8nC/sJWZedTUczDOvi/XnmxxK7E/CM0CzclEi5Jou1jOMSLDZe4iZ YVYTDJ6W0CTpWJxSVUwvORWpCjBb3yNjWJHdjdpR6jmb+IKITTJFRv4Swn44 0Ui7SMNAEXUE6zJfk4Jhk3FQmypJbae8hWq+YH0oERyVa/WsUM8OT6w943Yg ah9wPKlcoLia5muZpRrbdD1zAMM3LeNgybXFCgprHewMwEBuSQfyrO4uGH5x BRbTis6qi8PBJeqQPZNDwtAM+BBcYKTbopINtjfJe8fo6jbbbwXzgiJ0rAkT aJAhTBAVjSZvO74HU29l36VDvoveNySi1hjmxGNahdQZTLP7hoTQVpdmsCQ/ f7MlYg66Zg0TiAglaD8RBL9VSF7FdSr4TIFPuSlpbeg40L2Ab+gdCZCdSRtF deiiWi+D9zrdsX12Zh+Msv3vHj68//BA/dVREMd5TXuVbxZ1PlMrPXTmIu/b yV6zfmL0eu4T79j9uwcjXuH9wwPxkYfh8IuTzv3hg3EYxDrzw3MTfCZ257M/ nzrzxH6sIZAbozk/9H+1NbAUx0RgMQbBjeFTMtmD+KDtPM3foPPPl6suRKa+ 2OhJmBBrQdEcmOUk1x8JvpoF1hWInbzqFNcoJ3P4A/eRvvE/4Lu//zRZKSA5 sJs6TPXQoqSjxDO4jlXK2TQTvMZROyQzLNZJzPVGsUb8AXP1KIxefqsvGCQ9 cnf7szHY3G6bEyjtZJ8Ez/nEOqbFNzTFWEBfDf5o95lv22bceZVsh8eCbw4S I6J1s2LqfJa/GnXWGEwNIfJ8fFTPALw68q4U3jMk4l99LFEWTQDsxDboR9kK H6O4Dgd00KNI2wX1otSV2rIH1mNZELxB379DBMc7dE5Ql+Ud2m3rioC9bQBQ z9mBOZjUINlG4XHHahBNQsqvrD6XAfCNLpTeWQthpR1XStB0AsQXM9dBg5Tt ffsLCcxC57EXxlYQN/EoMaS02T3ygRyTauJn3F9NKYnu/TcZQW7kvLRGdiV6 aK4mv+7svyxNEpCdHz40SSgeKYxdyN1uGQRYtvFkmQ3GDcUSb8S4waAdOL7F z1D/Yh8mLItRSj/41vdAqBXkvoymQKKIN3q5yG11o59rdLOjayQmc8JB2tsI bhAzkRwklNJskYrs9FizPUZUxd5BpA7x6MKeX8UekW3beeTNZVFQSsaJ99bG X18ei0+yRwz5gbTwOpj7uhPlg5lfcwbk0qd5EYviL4/+arb/oHtm83PUhbX7 odCzbWbi2APp+PGiaT4wTu+DfeRj4riLx0QO+hh+SbIszs0nTdXiofdgT3xo oBdlU8xkd488VsEvMB0Q1HApgw8nnZa8uCXKle0tBCSSXqCgREECKmp7XyJ5 2IcWOn+gCPdaORuyvqhnW4C+H9NGAhvgaTHHsxVc7ZEhsMqZvAZWkx0hiw2F cDk1OIX8pNRzCt/f4rrxwDMMbO3YSxF8zs5aH8CDIef2Lxx6+1DPP0hsOWy7 dKfMzvtom/8YLmsJXJP8gJ2FqcH5JUdtpvWK0rYTs5GTU67zQcGPiJefbj4I CjzE830An3QCBlWQAQmqIofYWUczmmxkKwbhGVxRkaPpsO9qwjyWZ9R62d3Y 6iz2cGmzDyf3pVHO9/W5BEVr9dLshQcq+xbvwIDqdcMBxosin7HnjzpUoSJ5 XSyuiv7X2GFBntNS6+yRUAMJj3l8+AVjOiUE+3GwHz6q1R6wB3D435GTF5dq gQn3kQNJ87P3UPWlNJo9Fouruu3Gf1+DMAZLMF+c1w18umxH0BsYQlEldgUd qBRyHo7NAoZKOvAn9BUjTr4FXQ6d6nCHztZTQezAZ+LBj44rKkvt+kxIKK39 ILYIgzZap9Q7szVjiYemg1chxNGNvlykwVjWV5qw6QmZnHUaYrBt++GX6Dne 1AuRp6QlBqWhjTRB3XYhrPZkq0cg0Rb6A2Z3797kD+AYXQREpPEHxewP9xDq 9+BHkRS9b+PYOk0ShkKjBjU8QggFvt+awHaGvyOLBid3K4mNTb0QhzzdNWcF qz2gt2NPQA+p1y17yobbzyfzbZl+83o9VsyytM26giNQdtrbbSs/cUfesa4p F9ZRTDqlz2pPnA4LH6dkMDwcAqBQr7m4lDmcIPf0krVeBptQXCRMESHSnE/+ 6a8qhe4kUmj6ejTKnvIkHtPlv0gp385vifiXz+jH8MPn3MRPEo++cS2m5BUn V6m19932s4bNe+96mNuixFlKTXHdpD1wqTwZ0gxo1wpbFRnF5qaL5DPFOgny ksYLEuZPZDcrHPyAwrn4VfmyXpP+rPAx4oiZzSZWkkeRUk9IB3OlkLN2elEs i10wALnrU/oNC0GyaJXcToKvmE7UiI5NHv92+2EYhVgKCVMUxhviHJqT6zvW QUD2Sd8lBLDxY2F4Dm73aoxzF5vOeHrZThPcYpRgi7ooXAOgkCw++LB9MNle w9ajwSwpuymoOd02LYnCGfWqVM/ZVl2H74j0ZUPGJhK2cNA3r9xNJ4MmZY78 RiNOFMVbSfO/BjaMi2WXBXnE7rZtNvX7f8sEo31H4bBewhglOWIsAK6532UY mPGXxCyO8RC/NowgfUXor6OfmKbgVwNpZ4JvRG/4u+22yk2N0a/fX/RdmMl0 QbscpAXX5AfuNwl3tKCi6ul03dj7QK4BJ8nPRvBTKOyKbLkqcNDR/pPoNavw K/wCHkJQgMKSHT+PJ36KFIZD3KEMgXWrWWEMI5J3S9QZSZVMylUfBQs8UvN1 Q7JZ+KS0QejMGLpGFupJDwEeAC1iNPX3rcitEmOOFQZiuxKkX/a/1/kMnRXT DP+d9YHl+6rwchYsXB4VISiqHFnfUBTAdBxk6HUBCZTD6KsyX4zruU9xb8r2 cgK2Ar91TAc4QixGglqeor6QQJ35dDJBM6Dzxs0FQJ6t1g2oHQVjAwwCLWH6 0iqB6ZtHT3GHOAjm94hHZ8ZbZQkm89zjvxN3PSsBl0Wx8qmInHi/PfvUiQUy h3MvcTk6W+MlUv7lZyViDiirlfBWJg6Zyk51mJmes0AYfHt09Oyjuq0MRJ3g rTih5ORti3yhCf81rDa50laaur8l25daLgU7Jm5nt8WEHN3WMvVk08gdtd3W pMfYgOUDSOpzwoyVU4oW1apzHnbcc86rJN4t8uhqmakVYxUapW0LGHXCOCT0 HNJx5PSzHeAh7zvt5WyLvbzdXHZkLhOjFittTyU6HQAKMSWhB6KHa4MC2n2O J6T5fKKKJKrVjuPIqHDli7iFlLM9xA9GGQeNNhwRzt2fGORdZO8IjmWRPkfI prJuSR2Xj/mYZPt/evf86PT5gZLIfY88ku7Gbpyjz7hQR69OiawkWBgoNwj7 wReP0xB8waADn3ZL/T/XjoMwXC+Xm9488kS3Agve5s2bwUYZg/k+vUT5JJuc sCiw8yoO/h9kQXFVXzJmMJdzgT/A2JDdQIgGKJcDbxL4NabVDiE/7KRCtzFP I7Um4slO0QHTC16XKnff4MslIxsErF/VHcgCdp0xMJfkxrrsKNvXOveVttE7 2V0vVkAgw8Beh7qUINJ7qDJtnvPnEWrDW96VHlzNAgOR1957E9DJ5O4LbU6m IQKKSHK0pTuks0XANHTk52c/fYv45q9qKo5Ejpxa572sOAXOb21HnofJeYMK be783A4y6ERbjhAfC8/7GgVly46obFwfk016dxfsS8Fa5/Gva8/7x75sz97h NAwTJw5QZpHdrTu6HsWkRA2SnPybzrpaN2YCDC/GFg1KDd2/YaIKvEAhoLlT mvE+kYaPm/DdE5BsJpBCKDqhhzDTyacH1MggczhD/R7OKfnLgwIZgKU+E18p InrIUO+ZDc0yLUlIYRQxVZlFIMAbhzUnWzuKXAZLzndQ0ROqRtwTKl7sdmCb QCMYxY7khaGqK7n6XuaLGOqFLVAt0lAWhpoo5MeGQxE55TA/Hx1Fi03Ucb1n d174MfwQrwGNvuXEwNHbYNt4SUC2v2cO/OCOEkCwMDkgeTG058OEt4lxt/6+ GWx2bKu33w/cLh6YHR6kQXS0vxA0pxQn806TvPLYCcWnk4z6xOHKj/C5wIld br25q8t32R+zZ4VXJX16+n5C2oV8mAPxBU9H/j1/zE6Lbr16CjNwug/tjrYS E/LfXrdo0X+8l/3P/2R3P929i//rX3rAPl/vEDFTJwTFoPNs1bq9mAjVCP49 YmKriLhPWY1n9VVhzpo3Tmf9I7bLaxtQe+T9Qf8JIrUim33g/E+augW7howT gw5RbpzC3pdtTfvY1UsTmnJqR8db+5qxB+q/1QX133Blb3NBWaOcOhbIU0Je DGyROjjAp52XdCfPbImcO62/wkg/xfaI8E+k2RGa07PyU/Zs8iAyfQ5YCCh1 tK7rzKQJ8/ybxrllTxrD4kjZeBloHbYRV+NYL5ifDttaUeGAIhoV09KwA46w tLqvPF8vMaXIjB/9xhNO7iyyCMwUb7lLxRiD9w++nHAexkejX+u6GhV7Dn28 6P+ezp3+3ifVEUdLIekdGdet06ZqUb1ZZhpbfAzic8rYfZCePFLVMdAGZA1N UQopdczkx2rwAt+yx7uJPk8yD9ANLJ4uXjheNZiLFVlL/H6q7BMyRSRNVS6Q 9DtG5JPJzmBol+qnIPAK7U+f9bgzhxg7MM/LhTjryI2tPMCqJnhsHI5Err0w Bk1fAX35h4zPQxp7RRvs1x3YGZBnHIqd4TWwtz1sFmQZdk+WkS4tj4NR0+f2 jbJbgW6WcBXLAixzglukVdBVeym4oggvgsoUHF9W3CKMFgU5RHGGnr49/Tlm Qezz+SU3dMq5BKZkf35lQlo/I7Rnt05KD9XtBe8eDBIf/QAHnWrGfCASZ6qA tUsuEHpki+f9pu1Q5M1i8wG9WrfeCqHnsUZ4m5Ysw5q5MHqbH8+Oz5hEGyrN LNfm8wLjtT5nGFukbrCbjqB7MXJthU7NIYf3g8m9yeFdATOF5HqsVBmi/RQv SlLxIS0JSnwtL2Eykvou4qpguC7l7E+F8dzygKW5/hiy7BQRtSPSwi4Rdhyb TaxekZCndb4uZznHLFKhSl/ohl60G5pAPlJUnTQFNMGqELBScbdGUndAHPGp WAHeI459LXTII1LBwCrXKhzHYzOHmvgugjpyz3j6sYRPPGSF9Efh3J/IkbIL wjX6Ch2f/Rk36MnbLPFkuCVvXciwlpir+bmh+WMVkHyxLynAF+Zj69gCWSq7 RGC6aaTo1gkWN5iDwn5LT66XqrEHrmF+sffmkFuoy8/l80j+i0FmKRHT5gTd sLfCEEpXg/QSghaLU+E8K4WSqhpjnfcJ4KfPFBjb9FBJb9rClOCvq0FiQPBv /0AN2hwBu6p3Wv2xdS/Rb3CrkXOXHYB0eH+g2ME4+PhHuANRb7qoF5SuZ6iL DNr4pTjnnQOjqed6MqnrosaLK1dyPVsisNG6D5JsB8qrTaL1aXKaK5iHrOOg RHBQXwockL80dQoo3C1pkFd8F0JzA7Bstv/i3buDkVPbSmpT8a088zkbLZLZ plBp8T3ibfNWFTqFHUaib+sOnrgTs93XutvnKLU91jnyCtBXH/SrP6qYmZwW +WI/8YqbTH10Y6WPvpj5J75K1M5AGgsFONNnZZXgQZWwXEKbURHaXax9dJoM FQk5tr2YYyKzLtsSb0xivQYXx01KYfoS9bCKEDdj0tlogT5yjRk8T1s5gzGA JOA1T69swmZYslsCGVHSvJOSVswfJWIdMf7lpyKQi4bsF8sVJtYzk8nxFyWx x5JtshuKz4gxAf8yPgfxOmzpJpNahVk6ymkdTsad1u0yNloNr9XLssNX10Jg pSKDNh50Zj82LA7k7hd7Bo2Fz9+YByRfpzahm2idZdpXeIfSeyPrA5uT8kAl U4xsU94sJM/f7HklYb4dJoVLaITqnNG6G5gqKHkV5HZWQ99Qa4fXMgdYzxEu Ga432HtIL2HS7kTZv6YCmQKoIyGusAGtrkRuKlvHi1P18KXqhQkgV8+p0NZU t8nyyGf8rquyXihnUvgd+QRdTzk1XALxQrPhmDaHPEGTXFCySLeyibtk8i/O y5LIvDozU9h/D7HwU2RmAmYpRFlnQtGLznt7CelN2Yd46SVxtjHHnHP5P75h c+Nte9laAke5ydNW1CHd6IHPh5niEb5rjsHGxZT028V9ov/+LEcNBg00SMXg Zx/+epTdvzc+K0ENXldSnUlZyaR8gPLD12fzdUtBxA8YYy66D2Djwbl6WV4W GNYdBaIVTnHFfrGcoRG47SPYCoOAtXsr5JTMGAGPxAgAc0xS0kcDS87g62Si ObHV0IefeE5qdVt5sHPkK3E+YYrpEwXQ8VXSIAQhdVpMYhy+sUfPfgPeEoX2 OwNXfSsQz1OCq4IQV4QrKafb/CetAR2pXJEfmqCp56ZLi++Jv80lJeEyGxZp TfngTyqNxQVQVWABukVKkPD0KbzVps1Kga8INeZtYIRMGBcm8j3wnR38nJy0 NcQQw82AR1eoSgMQk2U5jfgJBd+vytkatFQbYKRCmlR2MlkINpOyjDjLWBXc W35rmBE6ZX1JmmSIQACc9N9U6+SBtGYkMlE6LsHNKZe/WMW+GlUwrCI7p27s +/y5rGAuYZM+3SD2h8GyAprXqyOYxErOATcyqpbqckf7JFDXY8b2HLRYEatg k5LvAg21swakLdIYkdNKW8MSH0Ip9/Lta9Eg3V/2sHTzt4eTQyzOd3Fv7690 4H8tzt69P4YdMSvz8KM2+8vedXHWdFN8eDqW//6rd757GEE+6zthEfeN0AOc WSbvwuXq6g4XH9NxFDYkPKr4PnPHC7UTTofl7w+TQJox1/nUBQwMklhreECI Em1Dq6RKNUJcKS5XFEhIdLEkvoDJQFGvsaZkFEpISc07bUyOGhQYu1l8QEPm 1GvCwfpHYE+Kk1bx5P7qVVbOl5oJkPyZU5rHQ818TolIMfcL0kLTgRK9DoTb FS1KWYtnI/Q7Ik/4/t1RhiXdnx0IdN+cQ3dvVwdm5YwmXzNLtndjnyhsQU1S NEfQ0ae+Tm7G+ZahFukB9/Fl9vvs8bBv3l9dtvFVcON0VNlLxhcK5WvKSozO j9IRe+RMlMQFi/QS9s5LomK66POl3pRBJvX6NA9EgqK0/UFHmucNLQK+4HX2 x+z+IazU/j6u1+FB9n+BvsTUlThPrxPrx3nAdN77s7S9Y0rp53kR4en794Tl m7P3vLXOfIbeUhRSYysl5KTyAVZfN92rIh1SSqYe77yylbNR5qDmKA57h6sT TNigpfiS0uS9J9vcX2tjy0bexkWTHOHvNCwBKjth+4yU3haECYrf2DtbGRii +YlNAVqBYIax3NaAMYG8BdLf3jjCoKkM1RnvFqRUosAwhrGZjTHjEtlh9VEV exbc66RSHnn3OqhiO3zvzh0NAgYDbqhI5yUKa7b1uR0bL0okDuAVLYGlstsR VzIJBvbyN7BTrPWLdXXhClMCZa9c6iQmEGMGZYIMaGrkG8ZOVb4d4WSpGheb F+zX0dFabRpbG2b6D7pDYPO+Eh4iB5q3tYUFoG8sxywAhGaSWn58CVpI+QJB no+8sHAfrWNAMAeDifDJ+4mJGExUerAJFgc7ZMa0fk2JA8JYVkUPB3qr1Ztr v3MvETuGgMPhfBR1jMygXnkn5c7ew9SWWfGhQD5EtYDsixJr+q+zO8Rr6+za DnwIX7uQzpub0UKqN4h+3A58bX5i2mEBL4/A6+9Z7YnC1tPT1ms65aG5BV38 H/5jPM7+0synxeyv2UnPQqKgNNOrkJDYS2yJPV8C09HB+U9chA2StqDUuy6U AD9oBv/p3DET8j5x//LWc30TPL31yENxka/ar3mllu8YvNilbP8tez4bj3/k +0ZTPig5Fn/S3wuYwWSX/rabbFimzPhRCE7njNdwlIr5USxCTBZU3YwvjtND WvHm0XzNGK2Q3MwDnZhuKcTjM0FggWczH9SFM6Uth83eaQ3VD3F9zkZMvBK7 AMAEqnC7r2hRL5BHP7j7HkwOYySep8VI3cDKnzYIzn0cnP2YkudGcW6jYnw2 +glV25TpE/PrPBXP0wTmyN0xGEGIG5GR0E/VivGKw7QwXRKCDd0KxywBSd5j VElTB/P1AOUEUjzVnp+e3eBdX1SC9CiddwWdYxB3AxbctBO3B5F0TfpZrwiP PPPgV4994prI+SIJYfxo5gP1IgkB+cIrXivvk3+wHbTa6NYZYHO7dKhXZhO1 CJNz6qfOA2hujxQn+Nl2oEw4z7dZiZFUgeTAYnp3mxRyIpxuo2nuo1V4ohio Yf0mUTkBUa1FRTDEPMzfjcCDCVGHvNd4sDbpudJtGQF2g4nBAhvKZ1cyipKM aWxNonyEcEVNbVoErzyhSPwPJ9m7Isxk1ANiYGdcmiY+908KxYFBNRpflH+D r+moDNIEFKu0AyHQq4waIn8gQgiNETMM7d5+fUnOaLR+jCnOyPHqb1/ET7KY c8TmgCGJiBbftGYINkX2V7D3GHN+E+JKxL5ty9tOAjGUyidx8/EZRuHii6P3 b+vbhhF26RKaDR3pesNL62+UDXazLuGv6JGL86v5jNyEix6iE4aViZj0wjTO XupYQUBMcjucSvYf4GmC7wWmQs/AhqDQYPDFxmlN6q1kfHRM7hc/2VG9cjrR UquC4OZMD42Ca1ZyJdeUZYDO7UV5a2K421Bb9qZACMY5r4us7+jWckwtGQfJ +oGswRZMarMuZIcKUzkCWBEMZhPMiNbOR3iH3cUpZQZu0qN/gqMDh6rLkewb RPey/EceKpt+//jwkcBBaQHiSCCKDtfbODrQsHMUdxfVPh72S+giqFOC0cQN 1C/OJO1Xu2av6vEIOmYEOWMmPgUJYDpFv9TvoAh1vJs8Ce5exLe5R71CJx2i EjVXVTj1xUPngYGhmmFgmY+Ax31EB5yxc8x9xE8TucWtHIjFJqTPS3t6YZz4 9E2m0kzaT1ifjcQ7BYPMnPoL0KWIOMMJi18aMuClGIokwO94EWkeGP2is3QG qjtl2NJlUiLYf7WoN9hIr6T81LyIVBPuB8YWuDMu+O4Z0+JrxuvVvrVPmjyP 6yAZuFhVjvIEQqjQtF/Owy6hmWViR1YP3bPXp1SNzNY2qdhAx7ROrRMZI8ER mVlOuap25Xp9pzSma9PlibLbJtaKKloUOdetUr7WObk7Qe8qZqYZdEEzWQoB HGAzJ1ucEnxmw+EknMIpXYpX0Aim/pxUylnVcoTJ1tomH7SXaSDjQNDPNnCC OnvmqM3oeHDdQQv+sg0StGZa15emaqOPm1H5JLjbF3akIxd0vOQgRftpi+TP LbtEJ8lefpdH00HipDJl7EU2WG7tvmQxcsPLC60WFTnRNOpF53FzOyJoBV3s vO+EICFcNe4WVw2fRZJbpI0ZKSXXtc9Q1zKOJEN9hOu2ksqCVrAFOlzyBiOE pFUiauMYQDTRe32e5tyssGMfvlgw8VNxK5MM1FO5XXpfOQ0ag2G59sn2uVdj lDUl4HSiIpSJapscvacoko+IYVY5rF/bsa8jFtS1f4viaTAH74ICtRXmOEp1 Inu9HGmcWnglosl223/3NABG0Rrpl2HNNKPEBRWetq1XH9uAOfUVjfD0nTf5 6sLUkBQJf5HaYUEj9NEz/zpanJBdBVcnISpgo6PG1VNjnVVj2QQ4Girj+AMp I4/lUoQRKdK1BRy6zRLg3Gdo0Ndc2+al82kQbltMueTkzl3lU/Rw0LIQjpEo XVi9MoRISS2LesGjraQsdHCXjQfZd/Dycr4J+3yKkL45N+8J2BFWlN1o1HDG dUU/Mflx2/RBx6F9WMKmXjVMySC23Djrm2XkMWzDfjHdHKqs4npUrRNexE6M YzM2L0ZnBWw7XL6qTjTOYWieJF3jCBriqRN3dMh50sPU6uRYH2/M3knvBAig yM+f/wOpnx7ee2i5eqQy0bRu4HzgeLQkL8fAg+JDxxWMsaB6oRX0iSEWxsf5 PXs4kUXo/uNH34kX6PPnX18cvf/1T+OTt39+AHvTyfxSEFaqBhNnN6kbZ6ZU FtMznLy9ehB6MonZlwoEjE0Fn47YVTTYyqhqRXqjOUHxaCIeF6njWSejj5RJ Y6zg6fEl8AIsHn7Ts93t9eJlh12vIBbNOURSHX2YHW/sDUXzr6cyelNPBBux zVmlJW9dsMd8SeaetT4kD9AESlK0GA3OQNdWqLg1Xd/XyBqaI+9JlYo6A00S 9apUKHGgjZ5z0V/US9s0xVW/jEDZKiTPTwZenChUAvqN6EVxSngZ0G0R6b2q ZIA6JmxAfCGgNY5xrKbk2wHJq5arwWKOgugQlUOLOnNwxZZs6ekmJjd1Vz3b zOzQTNlkaKeIEMWqhLyJSgQB4klHXGZlDyXfCXomlR7u8YPHj+lioJBRRrBS yrUSURs2Kb+doB9iSsCM1d24LfCOJpCQ4f18+exFtsjBfqeFdEmaunuT+xwh Qin08NHjuxQqw2ueiDp5/0iT/nCcFecl2WhFkMLZ0enxyQn2hlRK+C1uVn49 0+B2BPfLvrufUYXp1qiJ0YaP14V64NdCkPWcVwXjc/QCBV6IEkaYJ3y7dAlO LHy2zwUx79y9kwl8Nbvz+M4BDqNs3d7dT3v4n3t3/2tPLlQpiFMvYfsKomnD N80ommZ6i7sAu3gGduQSK5jueiN8kJsP5ndYBb9zdMf5D3+6c6BFbMnfHS1/ v05rLJadiuVFCZ/li1YUpxOui4o7jlT8Gmse05weB4lgCvwd/UbmtkX9LsAY qTTYk2cWGkDykUvtOSthOq2ZagqNxhC/ns+A9s5ZIbrdVC8A6HGceiNyEXU0 4X4LNVC5Kl7dF3YayaWUFY1DWBECJ0jD4I4vLx/MYVp3No4W5RIvBJyEZFUV VO9bMF+8967HkMTCI3aXatZObLt4p1u5JMRvx96mv3lGs+Dqt+Mgd6ijw4ZF Ixeb2KYxE/l1vTBqD10P6pJh5bLWPtCRIfZVh8k9jaKjPCqwb3ShESF5mw7P Tc/Tdk6xsWrGAhdt0I3sHYS5sdPriMu2kgk2izat5ocaglCvR0fyvl7DdnNa q+usrjussrvqqbahYgLpddnpn4+fUmyknBav0Chj6B1DD3777bdDq9VRX3j7 kN/pItfcktB36NKYuIFgMuDy7Aozs3ykcPYib9twGD0kj2Ob9QyzMIqwDr6u maxpHfIWr5saCfCNZqSlJtVtIFVCZAk2ePdLuxOqUssdamOhEZ9TwXfTlOet 8WM59WP1r2p8h02sLOcFMeuSDjTFiphwIrAQIEuzwI7vrVxGuqhVhkq567mL Wr/Cb09/Fpwq5wUtxPGTzxFSjh5TCiyrzltnGENbImaex8mHhNgQKGsDq1zx Zblh6VOh55KThwQSjVvq/fuX7YGM1StxSF0Zcwo6oqoMzJYhHVKoKuFX5tuQ ROLrohvtS4t65ETSNJ7mKyZYpLEJ0wFya2BLgTYqJMDhfpSg2hoFnsEEk2lM dYw480986X4/EysoZjypetTnCtXMT94M2Z+kIJYPEihIiTXD1koi8hUZEgqv wdBGz6OUfZM9l1+BeprbI6K7PjjK4lTCiJ/11sVFU0CbvkF/KlalTbc3tQc0 Z3ZDtqx93FIO2F+E8Me20plcb1zrc2J3vU4tVIyfCrgbW7FHfHux44spuhgm Ao1dYAcIq4J+cJxXsYMwt6inMvR1AlsiI1NjJx4uEXMM5iWiH2A1Pap8KALu skCAAmy21dqz0RDq4Ofnr+LX9LiVt70qJA2+/P2xAurYeXbsfIoCLxHBGopP q9yWhA4kHYSM4NIOtIV9qogk54ibZTuCxTrqyYzXVPPrYb40A8mhyXyKt5hc s6YIBbv1fCgvBXr4OPTWprFh6g0NpRU0r+IWB8ijfugIuQH0Tj0sU1DHGfNM UQrJauPUEp/V7BUSJT7bfoTR9z5HWIBU+i6ldjNx92vmL5dqyZNlLU9SKtdt g+Rs5wzbRcslEUzYHjQ3UC4Xo71I1n9lhDxTimYn7kHyYoQQE5tyPUhyjDZo RfNw/UCMz9pKjA+m801IAxdRHIHwJB+pLamIkEkar7aQ2H8ktV1Y+FuOv5mq C/0qoRhpI4jXFCRKRArgUPL1SWRFdLUhEmrSWdlrHkOTERNXLEXp2+OWeRMy x6woq4V+BxO2v1qACF4cKImBoplNIF9RdDYH/C1G0AuKAsINTgl0tJm9o8Pl uMXZZ/pG4GdP3DFTKy42Y+P8iQKD3o6PWWwnBg/tG8mGjbQ3tOKBxgxQMurB 58+8iUxxhnGZV3mvQoPkLL0r6EhGPJ5CVYDvr9Bg4sydc1TUyY4Sj5pRY6MK um6PFbI9PUrMlS8SfoApGDEgq12VwqNulQpxB4BQWLVKRqYTJJ7QmJi9dVOd VWFMiLgDBm/HWnDSc77tnb/XpE43idxGp0m8ECFaAibGmJOkz8DimKLeDwr8 v7CyWi32Nu+jVaQwO8X1a4wx9V1eg92As3oajTlLjdlxDFo6QIZoINVbZlxD C35YYKxsOK+Tr9re4qK1AUSJuDsyZMQ1jmbXeYUaAM6FH7SVrv2hCX82u8XB ApEz6mNbwxcj5HiNnqWWACIN185o2DPrPIqYd6acAlQcsNgMSbYSYQhXaDlR ZYWRTBw0Q87FpxvktjJ2gk5irx8zTIOvpp1oivAVObopaGVMVAFWin0praKP PsaVcM03vgRQ0wm+9/ECOrvwI1VgtPJXS7Vc0Rpmk68ZAmJx+GqUHsObsey2 cMgZO5tcyglfhSoMHE0WrU+z3FJUSiS1yFmrlbzJokH/WmZbhIUTagp0mohb SYx6hNKGAIDLtqTTeOGrdTjAFu0HPlP5g129qhf1OWh/6HVW8YM7abVAPNI1 XJz1AhdWM+taA2TpRejqRtMXMEtqHDhxJu5ZsRKNtY6DwPWiUAqHAUOcFJJU sBHXrUq/GrR3csmpQRkamiC/+kfKr+Wi4SNZAI84vW3Fbra70FfREUdukvxz HkxXrpTVpwe6VU/LUE5xd08HaYbkLGnhQHXE3hyiMr0J44sVtllRUpJNTwXj pLEb+mfDzxoJ3g4gzk7LJUxMQ3Dpfh/jSXK7e5fd0Dte52Qx8R3wZpw34mfx nVLsI5yEltHichbYaSBnWjGCaSY99tsG+EJPB0lW74JNY3qybcXcV83JP7Fi I08zxu64fgXfC7JlSS1zpJZRz2ZwYOWu9RaiEDOx7ZXuYy+U13sIy5xyCmxl gUBfu8I312EiOczhW0NqY4o3eh5NkwBYoauboL3DA2qqIpO3kAc1/okPowjt z98kJY5zv6yISw4nVmym21mpdNnRxdSvCLBVeBtyUwnSUHZ/SBtfYQDYmaIA CiVmhy5e837OWwt7sujn/qGxTBDkHMBoCuNhEewW7zii/iFFm1JdkATIjOdO G0H0TLqHVJpD3YVjHDG7q1/dBReq8QYJXIMzjmBb/75W2yWdC9QssrpjEhwD dMQb1KQ7FqBkzySt7hi59pvBzTcxbkaKvOAbDEUoMuRgwg4aiLH7lFJyZqo4 E1aiCmHKbnoxktqQtFH96FoitDjm4ZNDcdC0V73tzzShE3kR/bpyAhQbuiar xcSMvU8TVuEUoyFrMfPJ/6We/0U9pTBuK3oQy2TiDyIDQRRvt2PyQOZOiSVu a5QjQuvCix2h73RXkF+NV8zQq3rksK+pnNRe0L/lBvOozNMDftdJ9ku1QAtS kNAh7JAgNqLEPe/awSPEKV5e5UXwR59Tm2SlBq3YZcdjEzPPO+Iw2NkJB1st H+08CiMLCcGsFN4Ku2Wt4S8KLpCoJwQJK3X/DoKFtsRWXFbKVLNyibWZxH55 vqPV+7ijMJbxl0b1AAOU6sqXyeJsyp54UXijZyv8BEZ6al6jIlJePPtEyXg0 gYfYYCSb8grbRPumvXznBpTJ5mWjdAH06bDezbv93qupME67swbOTeVvdpDm GkbeN2A8/JOMvIabNzlvQs27tf6kT+HcUll4S55Z0a8GqgnNGBj/GC5KXIww wRJYwDAjbjuuyhfmEHVSZJGmcEaotW6YaSNRczJ3QSrbNLZdOzJ90ieuxwXh YaM2lzqRd4nOm11k7zcnWfvKzS3Yqq1j0USG5G1kE3pKq6kFTAvWgRi/WSHn yjTRkSg5bNaH7jK9x9a6AltZrqy88AGOmzMYfRzgNjWfxUcm3il6o+gonIcD tymHHpLlhxgSISFuGwhUcCLLFfaSeCq3NosZSkuGcwvwYGKluYJAsJoD4i6x kxi1rpSFufTAmigWqfgYDDxGFRgpfR0E3CovKWlA6xP5jACDgKD5Ux+Wun/I YTURHbuvquzmWe0jk0P1Rzq+nmQnVDy5hobG6N3BFLpbl4VzviycXlKlAfJz aGNYuw8uHyV4nqtbkXroBqmsvYH8U/aUb54V/TgdpvcCOsgwDdd5M2u32L8G kuth67F7QBmMrV+EJO8W0qUBRfPtmDNccgi+98iK62/lyAzZms/u7BWtlai3 epyYXIjlvJ2zgDlzWzPebRGIbQMIRG1oN/mMdwWimMAlZcvHUxjRasTUNsQx t0Mm01WEq2wVRVP3Z+vUWxx29JtQ3sT6a00e0zpdvjpZhqJPSfO7LIq3b2FZ 0S7CreErP6EpdIvDruhm4ZiGQ/vIgkpaqmXlsm01fEF04bGeSE9NZ8rWWAQB +BQEY8ghMfGU23V6R/6czik21AslM2ZDKlSQlQx2VN30VHtFAUlT69W4q8e4 mdhl34aYEU63pP15uZ/YcDClpp4Za+kwYRI38WiscB0qM6xvVH+EGOqa6wEF B0dPy6LAIPnGPC9DbnFghoUTF7ZXCdkWKfDFVwms46OaO7c6B2AWG3W0B2gh C/aSTZvr3KNiZ6kYultXPsIloT+YKFwyf/+Y0UXoVs57VMUATVCsJGAeybn6 3YGpw2cjD0uYDZxDAnSIB0e8pXF2u+g+HRdsngoYBG34iQak+dQO0RppjxtJ XOeOsBSDP/K1F5k7BUDaqQZz5Tha6BNosFJduzPOYCJOKN6T5S78zKUz56Lz 5EFk6pDdUfvF2oIRuq83Msta1y+Bbf0niUtQ6rmZckG35hbsEllvCSY22Gso 8D/4n6eYAHtlu2/2Euzy08F29ZVvRl5dGzRKGDmkqcQchh1jGhK87wisGL7c sotVEvKhbnEYeE4RdnNJpFVlt089tdw/xj/w/w2jfWhfpo1zwpK5AXVU8uDN +/I+pVG7oUadWlbCcmFb2wkry85FVvaW7hmD26z8tkpkN9vdCSKthLhASDqq FN7XPhviR25nCJhEiq0mgYt1UHINRNpsuz7jtKCOzKIbVFq3S6XdJfts2g2x BPicqCGWWMgJXFAKbyHttt8o7ibOxXW7zhes/Zs7iO5ro26nDAdkO9wqK7jg XgSuBF1g4l6B8lYnEln+SdXz36R4/rvVTlQ6U86q9P0dp79u2/95F+//1OZh YIjfOzhuDCjsMclHNCtJO1ewrQkUbKbMg3ll7uw0tIJ9CZry6JSBLuPcGMGR X8TZDHgoupAmCR1G9UlL+dq+uqB1hzOyiRKISl/rtzUxwG2i6WMfwvmK+WBB Bbtocg2AhLrV6PScM9VHuURCkmIWEJsIv/lPi7Z8P5zlYnmGw0Qm8gRxM1Vn b5jQqaH4uCLapCJHYJYyZLFHqR9liR+xNgEdYBYVWJ9kJySY1BegShKbPZUv fEC650qxoegVFwS8VSxaHFkef4CR3X5IOr13Pb1Ku4UVvFIJwlk5zbJPrhdV MubSTUra2qu3Ex1thwJO7q5/w0qHRXOWQ0xSeNsb+0UCfSRlzakxpgt3vrZA ui+NrwSJIYPgRo94YAOroSPiWmLWG16/Un/A4y5VMfBMoqYHowSxdKII1oMJ QWqxjELoxAc073A1mTOC7wROCplkUVGI3sLgFXTdlDqsHqE6OxpTs5Rw//AS Bk03wQsOSu6Ln5/9NH6OKSOz8UtMgN4XrVa+IJQYFvLoT6a8+kC1YLRoFWVh 37GnDyRmR796JHowp7UMusT8/AZ+O1iG73ERRtne3T1vzON1EXJnXiDVpTBU 82yaPcV2Dj6iCTG8h9aV0qcxpYFmu8QbTmg0T6rsGZzvUbyfTBx2MCzXH9Pj wwffhzE9nDwGEzoEBMhMTh9nn/oQkJcxeeqcLzFfNC742p342o0TqKbdU0uK j9+RNLAZXNvnTT7z5I140FSsiRcocUjg25B8t8uZkWClN4Q7Sa1g2Ewvaagf Bvk4QhaOVkF8ulvbvtgFgSZ1RPJoRwfeSmKaTOgkT9edJ+9BlAtdayEBnH4t ZQGHvxaP6b6NsUmcoOzBKgwqi8i4naGi9W/JK+N9SG6flAAfzmpChCMpeZfF bpDbXacpVzEeRb4MbhTymRfyaY1Tazay9J0NhNfh6OarIJFx1RPyWG0hIeiz Wwh61xP0ZiJu50cKNsJ2ib+lGsS/IvUPB2IfXpJ9hei3c9YX/1I9wRi/VoWI 2FuTkoBux2T5C3H73gZ1jGVtlKUS+Swo30ugR1jVRr+TtGhoEE6a4mxye0CV Lm5WT9fUWhwhFjuAfW1UfoeXepS0XkaJ2BVi3cQcMYnXvZBTIuQV3g3KlZiD fsjLEsyhS+iQ1DWcsdmzXMFLuP4xiKFWgIOayIDwtnXbhvQYfHzMz9GsPi02 NZM6hv5iJAMd9R3RAxHrn+8GQx2VExr5GGGeFniBFy2l1a1bpZir5716grnC PGv0pbf9oIALP2WpOiNIP4cZ8LqtQjqfbRg7VNVcBq7JEAYs3qdSEri4kFCx QC8Z3bLrFZv5nz9X9bitSt5f3zBe0s/mCc0SOvKjWQNDpULKDWa6wSs2OKRG VKhdJVZUkI6z7geZi8wrRhoBZm6Q8Cg+EZBAd1ir0WgG9huMh5ZQl+edZ66z bm2u2KhqLKkedT9jyEdH1lguFdO3Z6ClcVF6gapi59FLoVS/Gn6RwS77fOX9 RLOCLXoJe7E5vPH8g5iUGoAe9B69RGa+uiOJ4LJhyiRYIVi0wHJSsb+FEdSf 7MFpp0UFZ7smL2ogsvK7HM8RQYfd+ToHgdgVhc4aPY/7tZ7WC4posVjxKZlN fbZmxQY3LoJuDE3ktDSewXYDH2mWZyhK7afVlD1DuKM43trOUb1KENRc0m0M V8kKurGWtGuhzXl/XQeKWz9gFgEUvVWSZ1H1XvViZfT6WL5Oi4Yk6yCsBvdB zPXiaedtRC4u5EazRcwklkZTCvrhglAojkv4BkIxsm6RLqPfBxDFOUNj+VAK kypNvjBiN3j7rgXpTVHWsQc6BrJjz2xGEo06QQAD1QYWlCEsqKOMvXS1PGK2 mJyPJe6FM353wdI9zkaKCIQDW0dTIMaozXp7ZxTYa7EJFDXSLS7sY3keE0R3 E4YVeGKM3gFzMKmC2TZuVQHJE0pKS7lZLsa+53PSQwT4eKSRJLdUnHKCho98 ZoDgMEB7NpFk1q6tAaMMa1rV5a2ds5D/pkkX8bw5T47Zn71h8fd8ztRMuHbi v50JHxvTMI8SUY9BHp2gsKXSs6dTpQWV5AQYT5TRENFSR05QIYXc1m1vfs4x dkHbkXhcsB1zmzqjTLIXuotQC77qOZXiYE8qKhYLJeqJU47KduB/ixR5uBaZ F+DoN8V1e+LvynL3hGgyygCenJa8eVICTo8H51b56s1yp3mnc/+44WDaHmW+ CCoXX4vMcUnpAaCJrMAA7+QuZrYlyUiCOYpzUJ12Djd2CE9EiLObTq/zigsJ doLfI2FQQ+QqcCvifMJ1XtYzmngLmA2SkotJBWyKDqO1HMfh635as94Ws9mi OKs/wdkmz7c6vuH67RVDYx5mdW4jXxK5kKFlTBbHPFtcYKc1UCPiBUw6QDAo cYuJwRU9oIWkYRI/CTcZpUpyKKhGeCXXxjSoMp6W/3QOee3xCJw3XDiw7FE+ vXt7TJNHNcxbOSVVXXm2KZioPVr8PYHAmM9xo4As3MdoleKlhHrTYZHn9sm3 315fX09g3sYF6C51M6mb82/bbrMokK+5+LaDa/3bg0Dbhk8JbjrHwDHGzmmx ON+3QL13VgxsmQmXugsOialfjZG7ZqMgbyk1hUuh49C5dc3Fk3yWHPaEaJtB lqOWqew1GJyhV9roRSbseDGfxl9EPv81+J4eT+77hEMu1x1WlchpbrWuKgIy o0az9i70xPCrsdakoQMjL6HULlHb2gHndUj+QMByJjww3MWNj3eKhdZTr96s hN17P6erdLh/YYYPvm6mRv+GqRr9v3eunmb7dOb/PZPFUvv/X7uKomipKUh4 dR+jT3f7hvlX54Azt//FGSAy9K/ZKe/9c6Rki264rjgBLqSFEuxCSbp8PLsX 9GaXKHMFwH1jfl1axbUVM9AJFzXpj6KDmcs7jgLWAdfXz2cWjIkexzB0SYTt hL90OiBPTWDcTCKISgfRXUip76sTSrwXeI0OlJTIFVgERZSzWwDlXMy1IFe6 nYMYm0G3tI8t0ojvtJESjsrvGvrSlJhLeJXUh4zxrgzWQbdDgompCbAmVG+u PB2Sf40WLZDaCchsWQ916hMl0k09U3YN+ApLW5ooRFw965vIgylcvZ+/ERdU SFXd4gOzLi/yJGlhQ/JnwLpeBtfzwDQ1pR3pI3qeSmRT+4i1QUWfqvxl7HGg lE83z4kv0+jwbKT7CkG6/ESKw2mwatSEL+EHOJXsUG86LSOhJEUY3GvWRI2K s1aDBshu1fj3yrrVTzyl4xOZOCjRDOWWd5RdyfClh6K9RNu5R/budTlkljQ+ JTX5woK5/oIFbxyRyPc8liqZ5yBvcnofJa+rJu7IVMg5qav2AFyyXeDFvTJN 6P3KK1hP5D4kmmj0LQW7FO0lbVD9X/H+FFo+LAVa5hnqyKtsVcMW32h2iKam 9mcfKWXrSnmQc068VpiHdRzT/LgwP+geHY+5+ArtKQq0nOWLvCIXKnwXu3Z9 3HdF99GCryJcYzY+2h9oleFGInA3qqloocqXhChbs3VNNLJqrKqirJSrJ5q2 x4sHj/VlycgbqsNJZYcuiTveMwyJk8mLzUR21WdzZDMTBYNYzensobhxbb1Y S5qa0eg7LsgI1/OaEuP9HFOY5JjImShS+s5qC+zI5m+++GHmZ62SnLOB6ou2 aS443YVYbYjfT8TMPjl85PJMmxWPkWmC4Xe+QFmMg2Dcr0msJi7Un5+/epI9 ewH/s/9f9x4+PHw84tjX6Yujew+/O+jz63/vax8/Pnx0F8tbQBPPfnpifzT8 zb3Bb5CC8wn8/9Px4b1H4z8dvxr+6H7vR0SJNAU7HMuSRPEox7Z7qxzIGoJt 9fFpHL4SByrfEb5N3D5vMc8azuCf6nyBK3iO//uFyJd9Iy1RQCAIiknxxUvT PgFZy9Sr5P0jS3WSvdXP9DGpg5djHVuqNjFgVVEeTK7VZomkiOEa/fn4XnqB UzIoz7MA2+jMBDNQlv99XTC/N9VsO8qW6l8Q1GK5IGWMqZsjScpdDA4nRomq IKRuhFHLCMkkxl80eduNHPczHj+7fxlNobOAUDc7C0LJAHubCyYJfeTI6UDp 4Av3ZBzHMSd+1J8Pvuh0RriKHREF1Q1VWch6/c1Cqr1Pq4b28WbjHNzugop6 Ip3FQugF7z98eE9yuRQSEvPGvB1slN780FBwuVmjl/vU7w+vHLgtuX1bIqct pa3i/5rf3RgnlUqDzbqqvAZh6Z4C+T1FJMMXWRlnIZHPHmOqdIJCgQokZ1sv V5qfdyi5jhew+YuF7ypxpAz7Sh/3Artwy9hiMzM+HN5B2ceaoVHCKnNr6gTT qWQ1KZm92KqSh3pl8HaStjYobBh1x+nQ+lekL2/g3Us6GWE7skSgXbkwVZnC kuZbN4LzQQc4LYPf3bQNQMngyjv8ZnR2clIcOa5D7WjNP68uIyVsXZV/1yha P/tXjrSjeKPHi6KuDxMSCjONFC7jE3PThLOSMcskkQspPMkgLoo4aU0QLBFL Q80Xm7Ykae5nJZ82ddsmzof2GXqGqhuKwpBlbj3zvikKg9wWlLBjV2HwVixi 9jhizUBkNTLDvMWOcn8qmWeJMH5BeKmFXC4xQZFuPg/naGxRNK717u/NFfOJ SqmlX7jCZlQY9BqMH0+85X+FOiVCHphwu29D0M7X4tRCgDLFyGtMPulPGis8 hpu+YmZzapPxAKBEVpslvhxj7Ojsr5hC4HwNDTA3PZdhiUM+iBn1rFh2c0rT pNbZtifZ/vv+Z9hKH75JRTbhQjjAsT7ziEKYz5JDsnBZV4OjH6CHcUeZwjLi 7JcSApokIbBGWRX5kp09bWFXhMq5zIUEjTxThQA4sJLBkZwXusp+xRPJ5THZ NukvWRrGE0c+nOEqY9DeP3xEojezsR0G+kc6s5woqDxBRCplHdvBq0NCvD6Y JxdNvFmoJiN26jL7Y3aoRTR694EGs9hA8Pckp1JgaYuW8N8UpPlUKuGVHayL 38qXv68BYjM8kheSMPi5rZVM5kzouSQ9Mmxk4lsIrzmqnN1zmTkkdHFHv6Q9 FUe1XGK6uVafBOf73FoTW4iBfjARlZ70RB6xeICiNJJKIoFh0wmH4RlR7mj1 UJHltt+JjZROz8L/KZlyDiZNZTWXrItaHAlpfWVwqt4Bje52Z20vCruLERuK +NTKCycUNVbY2Bl0PdLJCKsVJsPTCVuiznm4f50MgypNt9nPxeYUWSo9C1jH eOO8U+c0RqflHg8EdlKUyXc3oNw6kSt8o7TW0BLhwNcMa4a01nm5ZDFSIjsc Ju7jzLEjjS8o9JBlpkQ9F7ZiKjhCNMBw1cPgQachWd8QFPagAzZpP0hJhiXu ursUKxLmXftxAguEA+R6Nd7Dv0cMeHvet4k+YuqaRz7tR47jEaMV+BigycXa kHchC0OQL/qy5+Iw79yXUnnwgPm5UyVhetQTaBr/UsVaNFnI3jZEkMDnb7yt OJ5Vain7bQ9aRUnRfNJSIvZmr4NdcCFOjv9S6Sfox4v379+eOq771Hq1gIdV CkvlFdHJMQGzdpNcOo3cWFSU18qLqIBUP10Om/Rij48vlXuv0BOliAjC0pNN varLFprEz6fkNhwFNza5aJYIkBdkGJLZqFJOKAg15doRY12Y8YIfkWxFrIiR oD7H0J3r5fcF3/Qs73KxUpdUhg9j5lxvK9GUz1vTkdkyZpWeNu+r8to9vp0M /BpURJiBkatq7QPlBXBpFRwZWfK2vnl0szQF4jf5i5O3zqv5VPHobFEzp6OC gqxVTw6PM9i+3Zr4KkQqhUbCBa9lXrnf10RFWV8SLJWyJtetpkbzItOe865O a6WaTHMUH6Hu/aXe5FoPG2MSJIGqDt2mdUMMFseIyUCRBC86fX6c7ZdRtSUt r8ne7wt0AVI2+gHvKVAdQXCBjiAUoqTAk1vIe6HYcxSuAhyQLy+e6X2aO2nK s5Hic9wCZT8EX4Rc2Mzd6d0P7Fm2G53QmKyu9CovYQri6xO7O+CGcR4tHNKN c5pMhYtTHJQq0DP+sNcGGPgE64JdhdxjuljmCZgTHBU6ekqpv40TUXYTw9qb vdfqaO7I+Jq2KKyoWKAuBHcGbjreciN0zo1lBZOlr1oW36gA4m2tTKV62FU5 CWD/yGH9phqv8u7CEZoQMfM+VEX1RDyopNUOMbxVLXPktsc3+tcJgMVhd5DY lpj3fVTaZJ6LGaE5/wi+Fg8+J4D6TQfHPcdya2Dx0/YOOXiyyiHO5bq8OS/U O9/a5VdBil3xPk1xFtGPCH0avPCw8g0j4OlCRwCiAWdhBTupMy9nO71KJkfc yWWFyWpg19MNlL17J9IY01SpitzIA/ApLHQs04rSDAuJZKC8l+cYZFUsM8a9 cKbni7UgCuGiwdFiZmbUE/TmEFSedA6CQ8kt4fZ9MFbKD3idEePX0gcVsZLv hluXQNAo3usFKrOmGqekt7HHBWP29BAFPzA/zfYMtBKWao1UOGcpUjEYmAQt 1rEL50ddrRKiI8RazuY5tSV7dN7whucqgkxYWHyCkZmqtFhGTPg/4LJCMO0k e0f9oWh9bRuhFixzWzDiHNmOmP/QUFmmIgDmRVNnNT9lGpEiu24dGTm0DzBw xnAz8iZiUlggURaketJA48LSdWxcSkAVDpWUiyqrK1wu7oulTkT3jxPloMST Nse0WL885BC/0vK02QlTEmfHEfD8xBBPY2/eE9nzs0CA8vmbPpexc9SUeNZN W5bEWmwZEchlZVDxfC94eVdtcacq06XfKlxXzCpwAUKX9GvKzXEr8iExzENg WfuHaBKXrEBnrdRyiyXricxKrW+ib3AEpPGJqT2ObeG2tkEfYwoaKkIhOkVz AcmAA6fL0IbOjgLIecQQnsEauv4aouOxaM7wkD6rvVbQt6lQHZQLaUM/o1kL EiBWAtQTCp2g6s0cJ7aVoAyZiVKLCNe25AGQQuoRx1TGGFW5jnZbmMYw/0JU z+kvdOPNCw5Us4ugB6sIQVNCxqlaRRKP5EpJZO/qju1qx/KKXKY1Wqe0nvkS QR6k7XLhKnL+yBx6MPouSnBZ0f1nB3ghy/U2ZAMfgDI89pxvAbwtuMw7SAKC MNkURjjkxJMkNyIdjy9c8XeQQmZxRkp/up0wF96LKGz2ZjgNDWpVwNayWCp+ ikrVoVNFXEVbG9faYaTaiHRAdy9qdfiWBM+BWOqbQEPfUf7sWmFhmrnB8Hjb jVTBIItCkrzlBKMUxfpt3Iu2VMha81gUM7VS+lTSvfEFY4UfuCj5bFiVMdTR YpzLdqnpcOBZNPDIC0bCk6zZ2QdsYK93jkN9Q3YofP/43oMvX0j3kZg7NUE5 yRwaDulmWuLJq9MBjzZxN2+K1Gr0R7NjSaIFpq2wfbNp9MhpZaKQsIRnK4D3 bUGKsopR/egR6TkZnXj8qA/h4aOXb19T1YmWIUL6uYnf28adlRXhRb6vfGYx qiNpJYqryVtzVMIsU6q8PuT3nJme5Ab/s1SOowOZU4SagUYC+Eotz8hXOegJ Gc/Cf40lztRVhjmrI6l1q5JntqVDkhS1YSwm17OKGPK3sD9vtH3SL4u2HTLM uRSDufeSVJ4tgrF2nLwu/Bp8FFs7WsdnUfNLvUTIG9sHZgwlWiDzDP/IZ2yg iYO5fAo+jQdM4t0ke5ljFQ2XvBKs+ERMt8HrYXqQnHwKul3V5cwxEJOTnYgh IRhyuKT9u6CXboegWPY1MSl7rocfUcXFYk5zRH5O3cXbPJmi/tL8xZcezWnv 0ou2sk2BjqO5qR1k7pSBaB2J9xDMPsJ7XYCxnlZ7A/tV6eEHk/4VIqFqBCAp MKIVF9ouLVkG4JIDmCAoNlIiJHrSUSSF1OPofcRGFWGpBBlS5G1dxTku6uA3 vnKbkU7RBF6odwUXjlbs1csiB4vXcb13SdDvubTIwkKYDOXM4K4yr+vEg+G1 tUlIWyaf8SbQIOIKgFLNSnBnClwdG8C5Ei64sCDo5YjLgP3Xw7uP7a+wwJWU twkoaH+qnIKcuiafE8SQS/r4+zt0z3dukj3nm6QNjhj+NWX06tFtmKSDHaDQ Wj1V69DvkLBz31TotYlGewqbATT4tz4W8eb49C35ku1T70LDLxGqtH/87uWB 9mfE4O+oH2DWl1ROM9kPBX1vTsK3R+Qpp6vbcCAIcV60ccO1pdNJgc4gw+zp aOt1M5WQZ85QOo4kBEBq71SI7CQhh0wQl+yK6unJtAbWZNNo2HMMntNuISBI zfnBZkt7D63Mh5+5ePeg8wsLWzjvI6nn6W0c5lVIoDg7ws/S8VEm9NMgcV0I oIE6WXsHFu+wpmwv++QCGtbht9jbrazGZ4Ijr7yLysrJEPNZM04ENxe6vlYL groHyJKPprMwIopljJyXFUfOOcpDJNHxpEmm5iDpWFf3SPzckrXEvNrovyKg hB5H3GrzAPfwAsIzSzjrK22Km1A3saKdW21NW+L8SiP14c5Aj0EjF2hMDEKb AwVno4Wwc9slSWRkCAC1kxMHdtwI40u8IU+/kPu5dZ2WoIUbej01ag5iQIqK 86jNK68JWTATiBe90xfQkOEae0B+KPkqtGckemZQNdT7GAAixCFIl9liPeqQ mn6vl5ouWBuOUuDzok6YUHUbFHLQ9IZUT7iO6hfCRGfQUdRiSPJUZr9elIzv dz4kx/cwvX/7T21FkhgPdidBrJXF7CwTE8pUO0FsEn6xx/j1CHJbU52NVFay NihzmEwGVBPrCkfPNxnKvoQ2m7qrnHvaw5CmMFhGK03oMWVlJk+Mf++usvVu DK8EpsMgBONsQ/H4RZLCy5GvXTLRKdYoeuWM/WM0Z3SJnVkPG+1GWUrP34zT QLeNpMNYJJ+hjfWkmH4r+Eoy6MZjjRGBiPU5+s9gs5mtjZETtLcf3v3+e8yG 8MGA/oLgS4IF2Ufxkrve6ZaQEjr6sPaiVTIUtC/0hgmnfEAiJMOyGVArqTXX qwk73NshokHVUaVrNorHxSH6Wwl/FV9TQmlrVp28o941nqxrKAscuJg4AZBN Kj8fLHH01nj+CcbJ3sCjwJB3bEi2nINLVHLSAoneTSSXhtsSufS2c1vmIsUG jKQDcaK/m2T7p8RH2Cf5ihAfB3yGvMUGG5TwMMK/WV7CnX9R18rMlu4hVtws Zx6QT91KPRc5h2A2WuLIdt6RSrwfcOnoycOJIjpwReDIvlTAjLHIsW9NsZR8 03sPZF4Ve1NUpIEUGFxebSL2CmZ/4Jq1EiYCRT0H7W1top1Uf4w7RVsO95vP LT3TvGW++K7r7NEY3y+MdCFmRKKkROaWalwV54vy3CD8KM8BAT9wbNou0FfC hkJ1DHHYq5XnAkkFQjRTuGh7xzfbZw+8ZAF63nM6CWihF7ODJyKqXJ90FYNr W5YddgvOrqUw79NEjlx3EScqMOtMJfXaFowkJk0mnCxbByjX4mF9nnc/3NlA Wtl9Ea0QbcE5GBWFI9OEXBNUnwT3DUn0jAm5zOxR+gt09BBl273/890DWTHx U7SuRcSsRlgTr1Szb5gNS+JSo5MR4bjfL5b9djtHsJC0BhPJBcCwsY77fKVp Ul/hK2U3s/MWtY/VaQ5OEWF8UvkVvAk4Fd+sLwx6QAZtyOEaAlkdCUzlGGUl CHHnLKBNnKdtQUIiztjHUcbQkYnzhB2FYEuISlwqpErQLmqEsnTaVhnKWYXG 8RgoTrH0TF9yLx2vuzHSSr7FKJXeH86dUpyv7/uR+ysRwejxN78JFe91ylMV x4U7tTSek5HWIMJ8Mksl1kvc2JuuO3K+rbDje37IgVnPaA0CoxFu64rM4ybO neaKkSn/Ok7XERnVv4LwgD1yyjXSYfs1RadZfUIsqYnTBJAgvBKKyKsCtEIZ R1ssyzFqdmC/SaAG0QMesWPzZAMvH+oSpM+oM7psbLXV1l2wBGF3MR6UedkF z6WBkOPdWeJWqUzKCiHHyQKK3LO2nqupm0bKoJLhkRGNuqyEQFG+6HtHpDEx IRuVg2Sk/hlS7WhQMWSXoy2mEVFStKIubpmU+bqhPclxTn0dtCZ9d8xOuOG5 ZmhL2BgGSmf5H4bIcNfTQ8PKKSdQzsl5iL5R4uTXJ+OnBId+VlSgLozr+fhU ABz+oNnN4/2Ihh9P5zwdquarrB/ed8YZPs0bTqpkSrNZeY7uB128ckjZ1ztn FMO29Vz9Pd/2SOykqBmDrVBHS68y9cMFuJ9FjuRxGgm+q5LJfFYj53V2Suhh EC9I7ho71J07ivDHkWpWMq+CudtwzOpNG0XQY2f4nnANU87alkw4ZX2M8ydo B8trXNitchf5PcR0X2b0wYQzCVWoN5uHmERv+CD5xJiXDBU95ZEztJSY/rQk FLJP3XY9PDicKM3ONckcQmlan7EaHEx3ZV8P8VYOgTzhOup4JtqQxIuqg1L3 EYwy5u77D+8QYSUIebSUUyoqOmHHhAjZjJDb2nEuQ8NgQFP6zkPWd4HpTfbA or4eoxLL61m7AqVArqTqZEQadYmYNJj90vZuCSJpKoNh6Lzvh9tPcq4ESF23 FcgfzwgtkCNymoUGDMh9LYIUNFEzDWXrOy+ssuQYYeIUVMxDyvWybNXIGgnd o4wBJ71VC4Uob8MbJBkDtSef4mJfKam9gUiVbA6Y2HOuNSjmsgEVOntOJUNB MpfMwK75ZpZOMYcFajBwyq7Kf4D8CoduwWFnZUFJLo+XWtwH2E/P0fzi+Q2H e8uZ1kxV3yxOn+ksXFtO8JHM8aCSF+2M2Kmvrjo6gfYoeTwSDQZtlmXoBTEX EltedFVeU2ZUzYj10DuheVt3nCHrQk9FpEdMGD71RU3VnFJ+KD7jN+wCVJEF e42p55bvg/LqpxclPJLh6ClGhWPkBklZ6EU2eFndfFF8UkIMYg/iRmADMRGI f30/Ie0VeuMZEeZHXVKxEEvai0EIv4w+y9KsGyW3akq8xTkj+1cgsJjmK5YN 8F1IE/f3msfjEzDao/NI28AY1cdMUVk2OtNv5bLASAOhhYONxthctGMGlTVN /WbHDO+wBQLro6C7LaTbmRpb23YyEwnLLLZ1MATDbAicDWabjwr8H+g/ML8b 0ASajS+6LAML2DvQJDWUbjL7kMCC5pQtaDQWeQTCTiRaj6mdoe5ZVPl97XoE EyNK7wdtSrAQJh/6B4KAytehnmsgneAioPq4pgLCa67oCrnCzcH3g3fTRIIC jyWIX9QKKRwzMWRKDiUzSDIcPWm2tEtH8dyGifB1J7xTIwF+/SH5NCMwQM3x X6NScCV1UMI8at4QCpIAP4hLcFATimmOslBu9Wud8Bfv3pETmB2SN//QpwYL 0ZQYDIrBIgLwtl5d4C7iDLGegOF8FErh0wvI4t+mCdZ+6yCyZIpE9YD4ZzlR Bm01oNIbyHoehe0CWkF2j4SQXZ+eiIx6rZD2Exd4YxN1uumZqCqAVIJLOTiU n/i0T/hjaE9keDjrP/EB3WD5ZWzYTrLYowW7dQbCrp6HoHDfQMDfL8o54YVU mXr3/PjNq1fPXz97/iwKhzkLz2+Kc4Y6yCQ8p5Bf9oq4vZlWzPLxEBAtnpAV +uW6YHWFxIQoNCDWEE2V1cg53M3ZAcnE2xhOanMVWX/2UVvJ0kw2QhPZFJj2 5CvIbXvWSWaqmvoDB6zuQK8BbvPQqt0nHBBNoR6qQCShPkznjpFvpgFdYOPD SNa+pmuNQpUxxTwa+jZ/UxNiML2FM9BGDkzFei4ci6mBbFsyIesLqgBDseJs UI4wLC1HLzMFkAtEHyUOHrAxozquvfvbJOow3xi5OxIrLjhBF/Gyh1Ty+Bdc 6BQJDdU76aMpyUWzZ3SQs2eioJat0rgIxbfhOJ2byzrQ6zGTSDwbAlh/pWXK FYbTO1kXlC3nje+YSGyRb5hPlFVuvWo4ekfAASdkw0bFaWqqdzRKjcHXm7YA jRhhYRE0kQtEK6ZosQ1fgN32mJQHdVz4NGiM/G2y3sEoiDevV8dKwBY8N7mp i+F8KnKvGULdWo5NmPy3UuXqLfHwITKwKeW6EF0nKDPJiNtHoVeT4DlaaRih ddvAeZFHUI/DBI8R94QwDGxWYxU3K7XliR5DjM+xAVlP6fDeVeNDa1FnFsxK KSFORtKxA0392OWQXi10iUw8CU2FshTGqM6pEDX1cNpyGUFKPG39sYjYr7hE jXKV+4RUpKQdRcosGhk1J0ZGekOUXmg0Ar4nKBVfWUVCS5TMQW5r9cqm1ytx aw/TClDhc0ph8U1INH1XMFPjcHqzz99gTVJBpY4befCLMmDw82uNxPpEIH2Q 8TMhjhZLH3L91aAmLwRmHwauvInklinOS3Qid6n8XczS9oiBPCoN6QwmcGQB gn8moCXLi5/ASgQDY2bygMiQlENlfuW0anmoopbtgXDt9pL0/bMa47yC/bfw caJ3Q1S4M6JarlwJElowIzFuMv+xFWTZPpJkInfRLHGEUbGJntZYDmoSKbzu AQen/QLQnlNvEvrnKY/QdIs5hvI2rC2ndFUhpaAdRILvtHEdpJJyfgc7F/f9 njQzARk92iMjIToavO5aTSGaMVwBWhj8bShK4mFemLhNMiuaIQl1ioGnt6mc SC2PQkmNGkLFVeW8a6IOc/2Vo3ubtIKA8RttOb80nbicLVd5DCwKkWucqQlh yBf1YrBVeFsHYpUT4V3SZEcD7WPzikvy8SzICbb958F1DKKmu8CFeowST7s0 iIEwsIlUtxP5su3vSIcW//EZRoeF2RT4z9+j7v+Bo0T0Tyxpp39j+vuR/7Hv BchB+PLH7L+y/RlcAAfObe1T6IB/7fa/Xof6f58TZcO/JB800y4wsN8lH0w8 v+XBz4ONkXrwDzxr+MUR7vvhEzKttJ6fn2R8HczK/LzJl/1rAQRLtyj+uJe+ Vvbg1tiKA1L+OC03w3CWvj/L56H6U+G8XUsZ0EJgQu4lhT6MpIiFGL8CFwXl gGqemHKVKGNC0IHMTCwpLvZLT0dLYPCtf1vYqYWNulzYoF5KwmM5Op8WEYwr vKSHCMsX5d/S1/RF04wv6MveDa3u24IRYqpHo8+F3YfMGK08dWi8XcWpUAKn 3HEbc3xKWfZ1gcbCxbIoBnXT39dc1LSvPpm7n9mmuWz9jldLWq7bmly9D5Li wGQcif9RjWwWhxIRwZvBvGlL5VqQ62BMvDOcBeol4NhC572cgi/ujdIy4d1Q osBWyvU0uLJVIqKtYYlV1pGGQyg+CXWUZ4kXKH8A9fAOiZDCdtP2PLi90l+O gT4XXPfQG67bOqiuIJKk4XHGIrv9xF46GBpZcf/kpM/kFtOryvVz1bF//bH8 S7cX/v0bbrBsX/bTQfw1iOKtPUr+DQHGX/d7/rvhpjN//avXXzLjG27d/lzd rjd3bnwUpviO+eCfnEb+u7VmsLU3t51G+3drPWLb779SvbhFM1/3+9spI7dq Se21r/+934Zbn9hXK0lLzi1QRThI6z7hrlW1Z+tFHfSfHlhGceKzBJafGfEl PxoVkLMaQT+RX96HobYEG9EDqshAaQokH1euxIQ11YtCkZxcEEMxWVUQxilz DbPSeo4L9i+BUlGu1gtFUKSyUphqkjQxQxzk1IhWDK2v7eYdBuhrLn1lp5mt 2xNfN3H9wYCh53yi+dae9Uk4l/l5STS15g6ppdRZbNVu8cf0rdo9H5f0Zjc0 yVuqmN3eUDaW7pFev0IReFFwMhkGmEiH/fs6XyjLpdS0Dqj6iAZV9AEOrvF1 Hk0/4nDIL9W37iPXEmMvXyHuWJEz25xLpKmNl+bRLTrsIK+ENVOKY3VkLniF KFS1jKcNvSDsokypqXEBKcNCZsNfLtAS9rOhL0IOe4Qeuyl1PzOUDX4YeWYT DxLdTTBKSJEYjkokU7kIQX62Pj/3fFLoeLdw95xIH/unKv2uLsImuW2KPWt/ pB7k08677MIZr88ojsm0QEy57xDoV3QR5p18UexeCz7O6GRNspeYfDhiQC4V 5lxxXYrEbLEIgpUgJ0jZ9fj4fdAMLLmQDc8KM/cxkz4yKjOVyR5VxY0Y/c1I 357+LA63wJsQ5exrLVy2J+Fb+EV2huQWDR91bwexD4swuok4ADMzxjPGsfBy QTgihezJOwhwHYoO7W41kJGb8JbSJZLX3YkEIRlfcFGMkG/sxV6rajj9pXTx HQo4/okSfis9wcAhUSTTet5WwRjM5W1/qAoJlvPjT4Ya8FBhJIU2vIL++YHw HB8CFAY0mYJ/NfsADRz438afJ3o6vlE/Ngr+1mduo8rfRhfuDXbLA7cdfurn 8ZM3WRP27+aZuvFvi8/t1j2omx3a7Pa/f9WK0b/JZPJP/l61+K/4uT8tXh3v Fu1W3UF18lcSs/kJq4DgSRVdBOSP2aN91VySdaUkcPkPTQQ3F6L6jIKQvmJc 4NnGRVJbLygK6hpWpgmziKgJEDk+ifwUrwkfHhcO1N59nEhdYW9iDFcgiGm1 WmsN4VR02O1/fI76SDFLNzm8Nw9CRh3ZKlg1i6AWoNrEHRjT+WRea0RbWO1I r1QCZvc1IrQDzspZu501EX5GvQmGsVw5nDnJV/W6RxWOQXexbNIscZw9BsoQ PClwwq5O5QkhRQHyypbot+yUd0YZUGIILS6oCxddb53EXbbHe4dKeRpOSHVR Loo5ayWSdNrTa6/WC9yxQtdPGe2YtL329e1CnmhPR2dCordcUesIS7j5fkcK e7R4Y7jzvihHU585iBglw+PZlt1F9GCemzEEIPEITpt8Tgmv3C05cUS7W3zC XYPReaSGZdIUdrHL+1zd6DGmLIEFRt9N7iMuL0VBufEnzv0O9TSEuRPjyKpX sVU2h3EhM/0vJqIzubAvhOUJhTMDTh3ZZaN+Sq4Vb//rwG30Zv/Vf//u9YHQ BFMwGlp6pXkXcV3OneRXuMVey++gCa3l0T8wMnTvedg5bEFbTusVRl89YIYI v0ZYVbnqewH6sKQeiCuyVXJeJ2gnIdnOlEeIIWH0pOlZcg6gJRixQGNe8qEb iAxK0vTWF7b+mgcohiTVrjH8rO+3jcVETHHMb/Zf//fvXh6ABbhkciFoxnvy Ydzw/e/ha2SluS5nyJwbI7yYCdawFOTYgrQ6bule0rMR3oyVJzGoBTeLMJjw 8vcKZt1w/YRyBmSS9GfsrAjWKpmzBKwe8cOzNaOnCmvR0i84o1syRDeZT7nS 92wh38XJzPWYtbgFMRVB2GojkaTZwHGOrMf4aQbQgDUPCzieHL0+GhRvxEoT VDNUfQp4DfuJQCKt7B3YurB/N85RCwh/Q3oCFekBFQ+d8Xzv6J2QkoBub9gm E7/tISSR2s72o+JMIW/qgPHg6fsx27/7aV7cnR1IcbI9SWfeQzKE9bJShDvS nXAtqT3M5nnx7t0oe/58b5TtPcPa3m/g5vI/4Wezvdfiv9p7p4tYzOxDlHAA z/22R3kMKTWduje7e1e7Rxfgzi5i//ZG1NHdPdvWK+lScL3RmOnJbvDcm4od IbDr/p/Grm2nbSCIvvsrLPcFpDgilLtUVQtJS1RIUUCtqqqqDLGK2+CgOCEt iH/vzJnZixMHwcuKxLF3x7Nz25kzlYBcAbXvtJ2s4QvY844fSF3CEQdI9TJn AGSLLmqBMi6MudHZ7mwuMwiIEuHmr2KJkJxCpk92bZGngSTWsRCog3A7RgwX Itm7qX93aUG2RePCyGhdyGt0GbL+nsH0Eemha5X9nWFUK9veoHtsrptgSAx0 KW7HA7qffhY2hIaAr29GEnXSK4FLS7DdjqIjiPbZYiLAGL6KwmV1uSX1vGnm alei1W95M5OkdSQdkILl5wwyD2Cz+qsoCtiXLzf8wjhqR8ztosIOPU3TrgNV WIEdv36Mg6JWh3flr7vOLQo18NUEkRVboACqrZT4ZL52hB8/B0405/Sz0TYb /7PwZnwPo2FV/UkNFYZ//y3x9c6XWpBaRUbyRATlobMtfUiHVnfY91I3p6Xc q5l+QTM7AauoQMQSeD5rAHuxG9mvrO6hfN4lyA6+mbFzSGy1LL1fweGsd6r5 NSs9q4Yva2sY2m0fsqxttb2he5ro4VAvop320gbHxTytpRpXFQf7HjCjs88e GO/XiPdrNhqtKChBjJ28vD67v/4dIWzF5D2K8YKmk7Fjasl3BomJU/KprZP1 c6QJxjxDG0O4avzVdyXBj8Cjs5HZGi2LSu8jiewsuR9I42coANDSkmrOAHqF ZrlIxlBJRhaDmOeztMv+ht5lQ1IfURRt3bUSWAsKKeAORGiCmxJQt4B64pvL fWxzcFt9zQUwIyDGj+ZgEjZ+2R+d37W4SQpqsBiBDH3Y8tlNSB6lCWAhtIwH BQxFmY7ye0H1LfJF5Zo0F9qVnDag3kYLdLUSdYbel7IOEhLcCigskQ1z0K9C yEAHX2eBTYa5ImgHHQxXmjoFHksk1ZeuOiRBTTbxYLKMcUy8rMDj9hJIhyv4 cAVKe10ejKuTcltQG+1Jz1PrrEzrk43cZmrSDq0ASHqa34uSc/2bwo0b6pGt v1v016KxYzqGx22zjfGteYtxx+xg3DW7GPfMHsZ9s4/xwByYVrT199Ac4n9D fzwem2OMJ+YEY9d0MfZMD+MH88E0aZxh77I3/NLrruiWb0uilvfl4cHOYSA5 tfhTJeA6IZmmKZwMtqXPYKunV+weC8K/n9GF+LxM5qc3YtRLhCgwL57lDfsX Akd5xMm06jJrwmrSZFgGkRPgBzUctsHIUo9CG/LUir317ToXJ4A7eKm/gMMC R+NaBlAAVdkCPiPLqy8lx2BbG1Z8zKcTddWvc2t7rvP0o3Wg5x09r85C7G40 QyJTvtUQJxPpDc+/J0fTzSG2VmNuojtqglBJyMbKf2Xjny4+mWgeNcxsi4AV 27ZD8ibbOgMpdu/HqKPF6RpJo4FLDOuns3BJ0pA3bqJ/PRcUjaCw9BtxBON+ 268Zj8N5OJN78PIqmxYos3j9Kj+zGlgUlaLtrayqaUHA58Ey2mQD3+t5TeE4 5OWQbX3hXEPDxefkA0uiJ+9jYbF89C4B2piLg3s5P80WlZ3nA6MtIEZBmifT mO37ftpt/8ke57cTi5mSj9KqLBjTgySotGJDDA66yhY2+2Nxm2tfzByQkiYh cCGhWt5RgMfi7WaBJHoiw5FENCdfHmekyatnfjZ9enI7ZQ+KXuAp9zW9y+wX FxlJMk6hvTnPyjmuJxnxdE5i/5ZMvYspJxrbiwd85eV8PC4estJ+eM4n/iVp 5cldNZFPmeb0TTcjxRwf5+Vvbr5N30jWvkVH4uYoxGncR0ioaE9XLQ4UB+T+ A7vndOUMkQEA --> </rfc>